Abstract
We have already seen that in Aristotle’s description of the mechanism of the “soul” the metaphor of place, expressed or implied, plays a major role. The soul is a kind of a map of abilities or powers (δυνáμεlς), and these powers in action form the system of energeiai having various internal forms. The unity of the soul so described is a topological, structural unity. Strictly speaking the soul itself is the principle of unity, since it is “the form (εlδoς) of a natural body, which potentially has life” (De anima II 1, 412a20f. ). The soul is the internal form or the essence (oυσlα) of a living body as such it comprises and unites all manifestations or ener;eiai of life (for the soul itself is the first entelechy of a living body (412a27), including, if we mean man, the energeia of intelligence (υόησlς) and the energeia of circumspection (φρόυησlς), i. e., the energeia of good deeds.
Es gibt immer noch harmlose Selbst-Beobachter welche glauben, daß es “unmittelbare Gewißheit” gebe, zum Beispiel “Ich denke.”
Nietzsche, Jenseits vom Gut und Böse
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Reference
J. -L. Marion, “The Final Appeal of the Subject,” in Deconstructivesubjectivities, ed. S. Critchley & P. Dews ( N.Y.: SUNY Press ), 1996, p. 85.
Kpitstç. Cl’. Parmenides, fr. 8,1. 15; Plato, The Sophist, 242c5.
Cf. A. G. Chernyakov, “Das Schicksal des Subjektbegriffs in Sein und Zeit,” in Reihe der Osterreichischen Gesellschaft für Phänomenologie, Bd. 3 (“Siebzig.Jahre Sein und Zeit”), hrsg. v. H. Vetter, 1997, pp. 175–188.
Cited after M. Heidegger, “Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung,” in Holzwege, 7. Aufl. (Frankfurt a. M.: V. Klostermann, 1994 ), pp. 128f.
das wirkliche Erkennen dessen, was in Wahrheit ist” (PhG, “Einleitung,” p. 63). 6 M. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 128.
Die lebendige Substanz ist ferner das Sein, welches in Wahrheit Subjekt, oder was dasselbe heißt, welches in Wahrheit wirklich ist, nur insofern sie Bewegung des Sichselbstsetzen, oder der Vermittlung des Sichanderswerdens mit sich selbst ist.” (PhG 20)
Meditation es de prima philosophia..., Meditatio I I.
Cf. E. Tugendhat, TI KATA TINO£,. Eine Untersuchung zur Struktur und Ursprung aristotelischer Grundbegriffe(Freiburg/München: Karl Alber Verlag, 1968 ), pp. 14f.
In what follows I use a survey on the Scholastic distinction between conceptus objectivus and conceptus formalis to be found in Suarez’ Disputationes metaphysicae.
dicitur conceptus, quia est veluti proles mentis...” F. Suarez, Disputationes metaphysicae, disp. II, sect.!, 1.
I would like to cite in this connection several passages from Suarez’ Disputation es metaphysicae (disp. II, sect. IV, 1): “Conceptus formalis dicitur accus ipse, seu (quod idem est) verbum quo intellectus rein aliquam seu communem rationem concipit; qui dicitur conceptus, quia est veluti proles mentis; formalis autem appelatur, vel quia est ultima forma mentis, vel quia formaliter representat menti rem cognitam [...] Conceptus objectivus [...1 non est conceptus ut forma intrinsece terninans conceptionem, sed ut objectum et materia circa quam versatur fonnalis conceptio, et ad quam mentis acies directe tendit, propter quod ab aliquibus, ex Averroe, intentin intellecta appellatur, et ab alüs dicitur ratio objectiva. Unde colligitur differentia inter conceptum formalem et objectivum, quod formalis semper est vera ac positiva res et in creaturis qualitas menti inhaerens, objectivus vero non semper est vera res positiva; concipimus enim interdum privations, et olio, quae vocantur entia rationis, quiasolum habent esse objective in intellectu.”
Actuality” (Wirklichkeit) signifies here the same thing as “existence” (Dasein, Existenz).
See the previous chapter for the details.
See chapter 4, sect. 2.1; cf. Ideen I, § 143.
It is necessary to keep in sight that the term “existence” is used equivocally while referring to Kant, on the one hand, and Heidegger, on the other; though the equivocality is not merely accidental. The relation between the two meanings is the relation of negative analogy.
Since the time of lecturing on the Basic Problems of Phenomenology the expression das Aussehen (“the look”) becomes for Heidegger the regular German rendering of the Greek term ciSoç.
Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 1041b5ff.
Mit jedem Seienden, das wir als Zeug entdecken, hat es eine bestimmte Bewandtnis.” Albert Hofstadter translates this passage as follows: “Every entity that we uncover as equipment has with it a specific functionality, Bewandtnis [an in -order-to-ness, a way of being functionally deployed].” See M. Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. A. Hofstadter, (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana Univ. Press, 1988), p. 164. Because throughout this text I was trying to keep to John Macquarrie’s principles of translation and his system of terminology, Hofstadter’s translation has been slightly changed. Macquarrie’s renders the German expression Bewandtnis as “involvement.” The detailed discussion of merits and demerits of this translation can be found on p. 115 of the English Being and Time, seventh edition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), ftn. 2.
Der Umgang mit Zeug unterstellt sich der Verweisungsmannigfaltigkeit des ‘Um-zu’. Die Sicht eines solchen Sichlügens ist die Umsicht.” (SZ 69)
Aristotle remarks in De anima II 1, 412b28 that the entelecheia of an axe is its “to chop,” but, Heidegger adds, this fullness of meaning is understood not by someone who observes the action at a distance but by the person who performs it.
Macquarrie and E. Robinson emphasize the active character of involvement: “The reader must bear in mind that the kind of ‘involvement’ with which we are here concerned is always an involvement in some activity, which one is performing, not an involvement in circumstances in which one is ‘caught’ or ‘entangled.”(Being and Time, p. 115, ftn. 2). As it was already mentioned, A. Hofstadter translates Bewandnis as “functionality,”
Das Wobei es die Bewandtnis hat, ist das Wozu der Dienlichkeit, das Wofür der Verwendbarkeit.” (SZ 84)
Cf. De anima 415b3–7.
J. Macquarrie translates Heidegger’s term das Seinkünnen as “potentiality-for-Being.” I prefer to render it as “ability-to-be,” because “potentiality” as a terminus technicus of classical metaphysics generates a lot of misleading allusions.
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Chernyakov, A. (2002). Searching for the Lost Subject. In: The Ontology of Time. Phaenomenologica, vol 163. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3407-3_7
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