Abstract
In 1977, the novelist John Gardner in his popular book, On Moral Fiction, described the once common premise behind the writing and criticism of literature:
It was once a quite common assumption that good books incline the reader to — in this wide and optimistic sense — morality. It seems no longer a common or even defensible assumption, at least in literate circles, no doubt partly because the moral effect of art can so easily be gotten wrong, as Plato got it wrong in the Republic. To Plato it seemed that if a poet showed a good man performing a bad act, the poet’s effect was a corruption of the audience’s morals. Aristotle agreed with Plato’s notion that some things are moral and others not; agreed, too, that art should be moral; and went on to correct Plato’s error. It’s the total effect of an action that’s moral or immoral, Aristotle pointed out. In other words, it’s the energeia — the actualization of the potential which exists in character and situation — that gives us the poet’s fix on good and evil; that is, dramatically demonstrates the moral laws, and the possibility of tragic waste, in the universe. It’s a resoundingly clear answer, but it seems to have lost its currency.1
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Notes
John Gardner, On Moral Fiction (New York: Basic Books, 1978). p. 23.
In characterizing her philosophy as a philosophy of “beingness,” A-T. Tymieniecka has not employed this somewhat cacophonous neologism without a clearcut purpose. She argues that the Copernican revolution in philosophy was one of movement from static conceptions of being and an excessive objectivism toward a conception which emphasized the “constitutive-envisioning power of the human mind” as ultimate point of reference. In her words, what is important is “the poiesis of life as a constructive process which establishes the relative stability of instants of what-there-is.” Operative here no longer is the conception of static being but rather the process of “beingness,” a process of individualization “through which, as through a vehicle, life expands.” See: A-T. Tymieniecka, Tractatus Brevis (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990), p. 9.
What is implied in this analogicity is not antithetical to the project of phenomenology by any means. Both James M. Edie and Aron Gurwitsch, before him, have proposed a reconstruction of the Aristotelian analogy of being along phenomenological lines, the terms of the analogy being guaranteed by the fact that they are constituted within consciousness. What distinguishes Tymieniecka’s approach from those of Edie and Gurwitsch is her discovery of a new set of transcendentals — the elemental forms. In this, neither Edie nor Gurwitsch would likely follow. See: Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964), pp. 379 ff. and James M. Edie, Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Critical Commentary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 90–111.
A-T. Tymieniecka, Tractatus Brevis (Dordrecht: Kluwer), p. 22.
Ibid., p. 23.
Ibid., p. 26.
Ibid., p. 26.
Ibid., p. 70.
Ibid., p. 70.
Ibid., pp. 29, 134.
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., p. 36.
Ibid., p. 37.
Ibid., pp. 36–37.
Ibid., pp. 18–19.
Ibid., pp. 18–19.
Ibid., p. 19.
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., p. 39.
Ibid., p. 38.
Ibid., p. 39.
Ibid., p. 9.
Ibid., p. 98.
Ibid., p. 99.
See: Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (New York: Doubleday, 1969), pp. 3–28.
Tractatus Brevis., p. 132.
Ibid., p. 132.
The Sacred Canopy, pp. 81–101.
Tractatus Brevis, p. 137.
Ibid., pp. 124–125, 139.
Ibid., pp. 135–136.
Ibid., p. 108.
Ibid., p. 108.
Ibid., p. 137.
Ibid., p. 115.
Ibid., p. 139.
Ibid., pp. 115, 120, 125.
Ibid., p. xi.
Ibid., p. xi.
Ibid., p. xi.
Rudolf Otto in The Idea of the Holy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 60–71, employs the term `ideogram’ to describe the way the essentially transcendental numinous is expressed in human thought and language. His choice of this term is, presumably, predicated upon the fact that an ideogram is not read literally as meaning the object which the ideogram represents but only as suggesting an emotional or cognitive content which the represented object evokes. In this sense, Tymieniecka’s notion of the elemental forms are something greater than any individual instantiation they “collect,” but they do include every instantiation. The elemental forms are thus transcendentals characterized by an analogicity in their instantiations. Because of this, I prefer to use the word `logotype’ to describe them.
Tractatus Brevis, p. 38.
Alchemy here is, of course, a metaphor. But the similarities between the alchemist’s quest and Tymieniecka’s understanding of the transformative powers of literature are instructive. Both the alchemist and Tymieniecka believe that the macrocosm and microcosm mirror one another, or at least there is a grand analogicity between each realm. Both believe that specific “works” (alchemical practice/creativity & sympathetic reading) lead to personal transformation. Finally, both believe that “exposure” to objects (elements/elemental forms) is capable of inducing those “virtues” in the individual which already inhere in the object at a different level of being. To extend the comparison further, see: Francis Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 44–45, D. P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), pp. 12–14 and Arthur Versluis, The Philosophy of Magic (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), pp. 105–119.
Tractatus Brevis, pp. 77, 99.
Ibid., p. 77.
Ibid., pp. 78, 84.
Ibid., p. 79.
On the phenomenological significance of the notion of an isochronisms and its relation to Johann Lambert’s transcendental optics see: Thomas Ryba, The Essence of Phenomenology and Its Meaning for the Scientific Study of Religion (New York: Peter Lang, 1991) pp. 25–41.
Tractatus Brevis, pp. 22–23.
Ibid., p. 31.
Ibid., p. 31.
Ibid., p. 89.
Ibid., p. 31.
Tractatus Brevis, p. 83.
Ibid., p. 81.
Ibid., p. 81.
Ibid., p. 84.
Ibid., p. 85.
For two old, but still very good, treatments of the significance of light as a theological symbol, see: Edwyn Bevan, Symbolism and Belief (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1968), pp. 125–150 and Vladimir Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985), pp. 31–69.
Tractatus Brevis, p. 92.
Ibid., p. 93.
Ibid., p. 93.
Ibid., p. 87.
Ibid., p. 88.
Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1959), p. 130.
Tractatus Brevis, p. 126.
Ibid., pp. 56–58.
Ibid., p. 102.
Ibid., p. 126.
Ibid., p. 102.
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Ryba, T. (1992). Elemental Forms, Creativity and the Transformative Power of Literature in A-T. Tymieniecka’s Tractatus Brevis . In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) The Elemental Dialectic of Light and Darkness. Analecta Husserliana, vol 38. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3296-3_1
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