Abstract
This essay originally appeared in vol. 5 (1936), of the journal Philosophische Hefte,edited by Maximilian Beck, first in Berlin and finally in Prague. The inaccessibility of this journal, which ceased publication after the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the fact that, to my astonishment, there is still considerable interest in this incidental essay, explains this reprint in almost unaltered form. In the Postscript a new paragraph is identified and attention is called to the fact that this study needs expanding and updating in several places. The seemingly new title (“ ‘Intention’ und ‘Intentionalität’ in der Scholastik, bei Brentano and Husserl”) which replaces the earlier one (“Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano and bei Husserl”) merely signifies a return to my original choice.
Translated from the German by Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schgttle. “The present translation is based on a reprinted version of the German original which appeared in Studia Philosophica,vol. 29 (1970), pp. 189–216. However, Professor Spiegelberg, who, together with Professor Donald Sievert, also of Washington University, checked our drafts, wrote to us that after more than thirty-five years he found it difficult to stick to the formulations of his original text. His corrections were, therefore, not always based on disagreements with our translations, but sometimes constituted modifications of the text translated.” [L.L.M. and M. S.].
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Summa Theologica,1, 2q, 12a, 1c. Raymundus Lullus, who offers a comprehensive formula (“Intentio est operatio intellectus et voluntatis, quae se movet ad dandum complementum desideratae et intellectae rei”) in his De Prima et Secunda intentione (Opera VI), considers only practical intention in the remaining text, especially because this work has a purely ethical character; thus the continuation of the definition reads, “et intentio est actus naturalis appetitus, qui requirit perfectionem quae illi naturaliter convenit.”
Ueberweg-Geyer, Geschichte der Philosophie,vol. 2, 11th ed. (1928), p. 343.
Another relevant expression besides Ma’na is Maqsad especially in combinations such as Qsad Tani (i.e. secunda intentio) (Averroes, Compendio de Metafisica,Madrid, 1919, p. 800) and magsad alkalam (aim of speech); I am indebted for the reference to the late Max Meyerhof in Cairo.
The distinction between prima and secunda intentio in Arabic philosophy, as I can only hypothesise, has to do with the doctrine of primary and secondary substances in Aristotle. The secundae intentiones,like secondary substances, have only a derivative and, to that extent, secondary being. This is expressed most clearly by Averroes, who says of the secundae intentiones (or intelligibilia), “quorum esse est in intellectu tantum” (Metaphysica,I, 1, Venet,1550f., 169b59).
H.D. Simonin, “La notion d’ `intention’ dans l’ oeuvre de Saint Thomas d’Aquin”, Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques,vol. 19 (1930), pp. 445, sqq.
Summa Contra Gentiles IV, 11, “Est autem… ”.
This becomes particularly evident by combining the passages I, 58, and VI, 11, in the Summa Contra Gentiles.
Summa Theologica 1, q. 78, a. 4 corp.
In the Summa Theologica (1,q. 85 a 1 ad 4) only the intentio intelligibilis or species intelligibilis appears.
Summa Contra Gentiles IV, 11. On the doctrine of the verbum interius see also Summa Theologica,1, q. 27 a 1 corp.
Super lib. I Posteriorum 1. 46 “Item…”.
Prantl, Geschichte der Logik,vol. 3, sect. XIX, nos 107 and 109.
triplex est operatio intellectus. Una est intelligentia simplicium; alia est compositio vel divisio…. Tertia est operatio discursiva a praemissis ad conclusiones, at ille discursus est intentio secunda et est actus rationis per quem ducimur in cognitionem primarum intentionum et aliarum scientiarum“ (Super lib. I, Post, q. 46).
Uno modo dicitur intentio ex parte ipsius intelligentis omne illud quad per modum alicuius repraesentationis ducit intellectum in cognitionem alicuius rei, sive sit species intelligibilis sive actus intellectus sive conceptus mentis“ (Prantl, vol. 3, sect. 19, no. 396).
Quodlibeta,IV, 19.
Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora… ergo praeter actum intelligendi non oporte(ponere aliquid aliud“ (Prantl, vol. 3, sect. 19, n. 768).
Logica non est de actibus sed est de intentionibus et conceptibus qui formantur per huiusmodi actus…. Dialectica ergo, quae proprie rationalis est, magis erit de huiusmodi conceptibus quam de ipsis actibus’ ibid.,vol. 3, no. 371).
Logica non coniungit actum intellectus actui intellectus sed conceptus secundarios conceptibus primis,…; ergo manifestum est, quod secunda et prima intentio non sunt actus intelligendi sed obiectivus conceptus’ (Prantl, vol. 3, n. 705).
intentio secunda quae est quaedam relatio rationis in praedicabili ad illud de quo est praedicabile…“ (Prantl, vol. 3, sect. 19, no. 106).
qui quidem respectus non tenet se ex parte actus intelligendi vel ex parte scientiae in ordine ad rem intellectam sed magis e converso, respecta rationis, tenens se ex parte rei intellectae in ordine ad intellectum ipsum“ (according to Peter Aureol in Prantl, no. 701).
Prima intentio… non est aliud quam esse intellectum“. Peter Aureol, in 1, Sent., dist. 23, art. 1.
Alio modo dicitur intentio, quod se tenet ex parte rei intellectae et hoc modo dicitur intentio res ipsa quae intelligitur inquantum in ipsam tenditur sicut in quoddam cognitum per actum intelligendi, et intentio sic dicta formaliter et in abstracto dicit… terminationem quae est quaedam habitudo rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi… Prima intentio concretive et materialiter dicit illud quad intelligitur… Intentio, prout se tenet ex parte rei intellectus, dupliciter potest accipi scil. in abstracto ipsa intentionalitas et in concreto pro eo cui ista intentionalitas convenit“ (Prantl, n. 396).
Intentionalitas (or intentio: note 532) est ipsemet conceptus obiectivus per intellectum formatus claudens indistinguibiliter conceptionem passivam et rem quae concipitur per ipsam, et idem est dicta intentio quod conceptus“ (Prantl, n. 539).
The first example of this meaning is, according to Ducange-Henschel, Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis,sub voce intendere,in the Vita of St Catherine of the fourteenth century: Prophetarum cum discretione intendenda.
Cr.especially Logical Investigations,vol. 2, no. 1; English edition trans. J.N. Findlay, pp. 269–336.
R. Ingarden speaks here of an “intentional direction factor” (Richtungsfaktor) in Das literarische Kunstwerk (Halle, 1931), pp. 61 ff.
Cp. especially Logical Investigations,trans. J.N. Findlay, vol. 2, no. 5, esp. § 18; pp. 533659. esp. pp. 580–1.
Not taken into consideration here are the equivocations that Husserl himself distinguished, as well as intention in the narrower sense, i.e. the act of the nonintuitive or empty aiming at an object which corresponds to the intuitive experience that fulfils it.
As in Formale und transzendentale Logik (Halle, 1929), see esp. p. 183 (Wesen der Intentionalität als konstituierende Leistung) and p. 216 and E. Fink, Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik (1934); “Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930–1939,” Phaenomenologica,vol. 21 (1966). p. 143.
Brentano’s historical remark in his Psychology concerning Thomas Aquinas, to the effect that not only what is thought of is intentional in the thinker, but also that the object of love is in the lover and the thing desired in the desirer, turns out to be correct for the esse intentionale (as distinguished from the intentio itself).
n Sent. 1, dist. 23, art. 1 (ed. Romae, 1595, vol. 1, p. 530): “Esse intentionale” is comparable to the “essembiectivum tantum et ficticium seu apparens” and is differentiated from the“esse reale et fixum extra verorum [probably: rerum] naturam, absque omni apprehensione,” “per quad patet quad esse intentionale non est aliud quam visio aut apparitio obiective.” “Illud quad non est existens in rerum natura nec habet esse fixum extra secundum quod huiusmodi, illud inquam est quid intentionale” (Prantl, p. 592, notes 530 and 532).
Scholastici ens intentionale appellant ens quad sala conceptione et consideratione inert, seu ens quod est intra animam per notiones, cui opponitur reale quad reperitur extra animae notiones“ (Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum).
Likewise his follower Armandus de Bellovisu:“Ipsa ergo res intellecta materialiter et in concreto dicitur intentive sive res intellecta sive ens reale ut homo, lapis et huiusmodi” (Prantl, vol. 3, sect. 19, note 631).
Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt,2nd ed. Oskar Kraus (1925), Book II, chapter 1, sect. 5. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint,English edition ed. Linda L. McAlister (London and New York, 1973).
nd ed., vol. 2, p. 8; English ed., p. 180.
So Durandus de S. Porciano speaks of an “esse in intellectu obiective” of truth as opposed to “esse in intellectu subiective,” as it belongs to the species or actus intelligendi (Prantl, note 564).
nd ed. vol. 2, pp. 133ff.; English ed., pp. 271ff.
nd ed. vol. 1, p. 269, no. 11; English ed., p. 89; and Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano (Munich, 1919), pp. 23f.
This becomes particular clear in the Appendix mentioned above: “Mental Reference as Distinguished from Relation in the Strict Sense.”
nd ed., vol. 1, p. 124; English ed., p. 88n. “They [the Scholastics] also use the expression `to exist as an object (objectively) in something,’ which, if we wanted to use it at the present time, would be understood, on the contrary, as a designation of a real existence outside the mind. At least this is what is suggested by the expression `to exist immanently as an object,’ which is occasionally used in a similar sense, and in which the term `immanent’ should obviously rule out the misunderstanding which is to be feared.”
Nicolai Hartmann follows him in this, unconsciously to be sure, in his Metaphysics of Knowledge. For him, the intentional object is “wholly and completely immanent” and represents, as such, the transcendent-real object (see esp. 2nd ed., p. 105ff.).
English edition ed. Roderick M. Chisholm (London and New York, 1969), pp. 14, 16.
Psychologie,2nd ed., vol. 1, p. 129.
Logical Investigations,vol. 2, Inv. 5, sect. 13.
Occasionally Husserl himself differentiates between intentional,which can be used both for meaning and object, and intended,which can only be used for the object (see Logical Investigations,vol. 2, Inv. 1, sect. 30).
Ideas —General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (1913), trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson, sect. 88.
ldeas,sect. 98.
ldeas,sect. 61.
This becomes quite clear when we look back to the above-cited passage from Armandus de Bellovisu (note 35), who used “intentional” primarily to denote what is immanent, and only in a secondary sense did he use it to denote the known object of intention.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1981 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Spiegelberg, H. (1981). “Intention” and “Intentionality” in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl. In: The Context of the Phenomenological Movement. Phaenomenologica, vol 80. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3270-3_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3270-3_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8262-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-3270-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive