Abstract
In this paper we shall try to show how small, in extent, is the progress of philosophy from a certain — analyzed — point of view. It is more like progress in some natural language, than in a science.1 From this point of view it becomes clear that Husserl and Wittgenstein moved (with different success) to virtually one and the same idea, and independent of each other. This idea can be described as that of analytical phenomenology. The aim of the paper is to make this idea clear. Because of its general character, our method of exposition will be dogmatic.
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Notes
Or of the streets of an old twon. Indeed, exactly like our language, philosophy too “can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods” (PI §2).
See G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach, Three Philosophers ( Oxford: Blackwell, 1973 ), p. 5.
J. Cook Wilson, Statement and Inference, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon. Press, 1927 ), p. 328.
E. Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft ( Frankfurt: Klosterman, 1967 ), p. 46.
The fact that by the development of his new study of phenomenology Husserl started from Hume is well known to the historians of philosophy. See, e.g., R. T. Murphy, “Husserl and Hume: Overcoming Scepticism?,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 22, No. 2 (May 1991), pp. 30–44.
Cf. with Wittgenstein: “Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak about them: I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are” (T 3.221).
Here too, it can be seen how essential and unavoidable Kant’s synthetic a priori truths are for philosophy per se.
Now it is clear why we assumed (in §1.1) Aristotle’s logical subjects and Plato’s Forms and mathematical objects to be indefinables.
There is a relatively large amount (a dozen of) papers, and one book, on Wittgenstein and phenomenology (and Husserl). All of them, however, discuss Wittgenstein’s phenomenology of the early 30s. [See, e.g., the most recent papers of J. Hintikka, “Wittgenstein and the Problem of Phenomenology,” in: I. Niniluoto et al.,eds., Language, Knowledge, and Intentionality (Helsinki: The Academic Bookstore, 1990), pp. 15–46
Garth Hallett, “The Genesis of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy in His Failure as a Phenomenologist”, Philosophy & Theology 5, No. 4 (Summer 1991), pp. 297–312.] In fact Wittgenstein remained a phenomenologist in the 50s.
See on this, H.-J. Schneider, Phantasie and Kalkül ( Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1992 ).
See, e.g., M. and J. Hintikka, Investigation Wittgenstein ( Oxford: Blackwell, 1986 ), p. 51.
In March 1930, however, Wittgenstein states that a law in physics is possible, i.e., convenient. It predicts. What is true/false, are phenomenological statements (Waismann 101).
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Milkov, N. (1999). What is Analytical Phenomenology?. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Life Scientific Philosophy, Phenomenology of Life and the Sciences of Life. Analecta Husserliana, vol 59. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2079-3_31
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2079-3_31
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