Skip to main content

Part of the book series: Analecta Husserliana ((ANHU,volume 59))

Abstract

This essay examines some cardinal reasons why Nietzsche’s philosophy can be regarded as the quintessential advocacy of and apology for earthism (mundialism) insofar as it pre-eminently champions the sovereignty and sanctity of the earth against all its myriad adversaries. Since Nietzsche envisages humans as entirely earth-bred and bound, their self-transcendence, to wit, their self-overcoming, is accomplished only by an immanence that is solely geo-centric. Consequently, he construes the human condition as being one of homelessness until and unless the earth is honored as the exclusive realm for the realization of all physical, mental and spiritual capabilities and aspirations in a manner that enables all earthlings, to invoke his idiom, to become who and what they are. Accordingly, this presentation sketches six interlocking ingredients of Nietzsche’s earthism, namely, his life-philosophy (“Lebensphilosophie”), ecologism, animism, panpsychism, proto-existentialism/anti-essentialism and naturalism. It concludes with his recommendations for the reclamation of the earth as mankind’s one and only homeland.1

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. Please note that the masculine, rather than the feminine or the generic, is the operative gender when considering Nietzsche for reasons which, if they were to be examined here, would exceed the space-constraints of this presentation.

    Google Scholar 

  2. F. Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans. R. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 157 #314, hereafter D.

    Google Scholar 

  3. F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. W. Kaufmann, trans. R. Hollingdale and W. Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 253 #461, hereafter WP.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Ecology did not become a distinct science until around Nietzsche’s death in 1900 (see M. Hallman, “Nietzsche’s Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Ethics 13 [1991], p. 100).

    Google Scholar 

  5. Ecology, of course, concerns the relationship between organisms and their environments. But if all beings are organisms in some sense, as Nietzsche holds, despite some isolated statements to the contrary, then the environments surrounding them are also living. From this perspective, the separation between organisms and environment vanishes; see note 6.

    Google Scholar 

  6. F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 298–299 #354, hereafter GS; see WP, p. 329 #611. Although Nietzsche says that such thinking may take place “in primitive conditions (pre-organic),” the latter should not be construed as entirely passive, inert and lifeless (WP, p. 273 #499).

    Google Scholar 

  7. F. Nietzsche, “Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions,” Division I, Human, All Too Human, Part II, trans. P. Cohn, Vol. VII, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. O. Levy (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), p. 35 #49, hereafter HH II MO).

    Google Scholar 

  8. D, p. 181 #423.

    Google Scholar 

  9. For an analysis of these auditory arts, see J. McGraw, “Nietzsche: The Silence of a Solitary,” Lonergan Review 2 (1993), pp. 1–28.

    Google Scholar 

  10. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1965), pp. 136–137 #10; see p. 408 #1, hereafter Z.

    Google Scholar 

  11. In C. Manes, “Nature and Silence,” Environmental Ethics 14 (1992), p. 340.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  13. In Manes, op. cit., p. 340.

    Google Scholar 

  14. F. Nietzsche, “On the Future of our Educational Institutions,” trans. J. Kenndy, Vol. III, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. O. Levy (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), fourth lecture, pp. 95–96, henceforth FEI.

    Google Scholar 

  15. FEI, p. 96.

    Google Scholar 

  16. F. Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Untimely Meditations, trans. R. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 136–137, hereafter UM-S; see F. Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, ed. and trans. D. Breazeale (London: Humanities Press International, 1992), p. 106 #44, hereafter PT.

    Google Scholar 

  17. UM-S, p. 187.

    Google Scholar 

  18. UM-S, p. 181.

    Google Scholar 

  19. F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1989), p. 13 #6, hereafter BGE.

    Google Scholar 

  20. UM-S, p. 144 #3 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  21. GS, pp. 288–289 #347. All italicization in quotes refers to Nietzsche’s own emphases.

    Google Scholar 

  22. UM-S, p. 194.

    Google Scholar 

  23. PT, p. 134 #193.

    Google Scholar 

  24. WP, p. 255 #462.

    Google Scholar 

  25. See Z, p. 311 #4.

    Google Scholar 

  26. See WP, p. 207 #384.

    Google Scholar 

  27. WP, p. 539 #1050.

    Google Scholar 

  28. WP, p. 444 #842.

    Google Scholar 

  29. F. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 554, #49, hereafter TI.

    Google Scholar 

  30. WP, p. 208 #387.

    Google Scholar 

  31. GS, p. 203 #179.

    Google Scholar 

  32. WP, p. 243 #440.

    Google Scholar 

  33. GS, p. 228 #283.

    Google Scholar 

  34. TI, p. 487 #1.

    Google Scholar 

  35. WP, p. 329 #611.

    Google Scholar 

  36. F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals,trans. W. Kaufmann and R. Hollingdale, in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, ed. W. Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1989), p. 113 #9, hereafter GM.

    Google Scholar 

  37. F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, in The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 109 #17, hereafter BT.

    Google Scholar 

  38. See Z, pp. 146–147; see WP, pp. 347–348 #659.

    Google Scholar 

  39. GS, p. 305 #357.

    Google Scholar 

  40. TI, pp. 558–559 #2.

    Google Scholar 

  41. Nietzsche: A Self-Portrait from His Letters, ed. and trans. P. Fuss and H. Shapiro (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 94 #114, hereafter SP.

    Google Scholar 

  42. GS, p. 304, #357.

    Google Scholar 

  43. WP, p. 173 #314.

    Google Scholar 

  44. BGE, p. 11 #3.

    Google Scholar 

  45. WP, pp. 314–315 #584.

    Google Scholar 

  46. WP, p. 315 #584.

    Google Scholar 

  47. See WP, p. 9 #3; p. 10 #5.

    Google Scholar 

  48. GS, p. 283 #344.

    Google Scholar 

  49. WP, p. 9 #2–3.

    Google Scholar 

  50. WP, p. 217 #401.

    Google Scholar 

  51. WP, p. 318 #585.

    Google Scholar 

  52. WP, p. 14 #15.

    Google Scholar 

  53. WP p. 13 #12 B.

    Google Scholar 

  54. TI, p. 535 #34.

    Google Scholar 

  55. WP, p. 322 #586 C.

    Google Scholar 

  56. The second primary source of world-defamation is religion and particularly Christianity, the latter being defined as “the denial of the will to life become religion!” (F. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. W. Kaufmann, in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, ed. W. Kaufmann [New York: Random House, 1989], p. 320 #2, hereafter EH). Christianity’s God, as the supreme concept of being, was “invented as a counter-concept of life.” God is the notional thesis, the “gruesome unity” of “everything harmful, poisonous, slanderous, the whole hostility… against life” (ibid., p. 334 #8). God is simply “the declaration of war against life, against nature, against the will to live! God — the formula for every slander against `this world’” and “for every lie about the `beyond’!” (F. Nietzsche, The AntiChrist, in The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 585–586 #18, hereafter AC). In other words, “Life has come to an end where the `kingdom of God’ begins” (TI, p. 490 #4). As well, God symbolizes the nemesis of the “natural”; thus, whatever is natural has become synonymous with the “reprehensible!” (AC, p. 582 #15). Furthermore, Christianity identifies sin and evil with the worldly and natural but innocence and goodness with the otherworldly and supernatural (WP, p. 193 #351). Correspondingly, it schemes to “infect the innocence of becoming by means of ‘punishment’ and `guilt”’ and, therefore, it can be classified as “the metaphysics of the hangman” (TI, p. 500 #7). Likewise, the Christian God is the deification of “the spirit of gravity,” the enemy of the joy and naturalness of Dionysian becoming; it is the implacable foe of “the innocence of becoming” and the playfulness of nature (WP, p. 299 #552). In addition, Nietzsche supposes that sin was invented “to make every elevation and nobility of man impossible” (AC, pp. 630–631 #49). However, now that “God is dead,” the only sins are transgressions and treasons “against the earth” (Z, p. 125). Nietzsche also indicts Christianity for its disparagement of the body, its instincts and inclinations (GS, p. 236 #294). Correlatively, he chastises Christianity for teaching that only humans have souls or, at least, “divine” and “immortal” souls (“soul monads”), positions which he considers inimical to life as well as lunatic pretence and unabated hubris (WP, p. 401 #765). Thus, Christianity raises man above the earth, thereby judging it unbefitting his dignity with the result that he pays it “only a passing visit,” like the proverbial Augustinian pilgrim whose heart is restless until it rests in God (D, p. 182 #425). Nietzsche, therefore, faults Christianity for declaring that its home is not the terrestrial; the latter is, as it was for Plato, simply a vehicle to the otherworldly celestial. He likewise avers that Christianity, while it fervently defends rationalism within the philosophical order, crazily canonizes anti-rationality by means of its “intoxicated” faith within the religious and theological realms (D, p. 52 #89). In the end, Nietzsche confesses that his wars with the “anemic Christian ideal” are designed not to eliminate it but to stop its “tyranny” and to make way for “new ideals, for more robust ideals,” that is, for earthly, natural ideals (WP, p. 197 #361).

    Google Scholar 

  57. Nietzsche’s third major source of earth-denigration and its accompanying postulation and exaltation of otherworldliness are non-naturalistic types of morality. In essence, every “naturalism in morality — that is, every healthy morality — is dominated by an instinct of life.” Whereas, he charges, every anti-natural morality vilifies the instinct of life (TI, pp. 489–490 #4). Nietzsche singles out Christian morality as being especially anti-natural since it opposes, first, “the enjoyment of life [and] gratitude towards life”; secondly, “the beautifying, ennobling of life”; thirdly, “the knowledge of life”; and, fourthly, “the development of life, insofar as it sought to set the highest phenomena of life at variance with itself’ (WP, p. 152 #266). Alas, Nietzsche declares that the battle of Christian morality ”with the basic instincts of life is itself the greatest piece of immorality that has yet existed on earth“ (WP, p. 156 #274). In its transvaluation of the legitimate values of nature and natural morality, Christianity’s supernaturalism miraculously elevates the ”misfits,“ the ”misbegotten“ and other ”low-lifes“ to the levels of health and holiness while it gleefully censures the natural aristocrat against whom rage, revenge and ”ressentiment“ are delivered by the aforesaid collection of ”zeroes“ (see GM, pp. 120–129 #13–16). It is doctrines such as these that Nietzsche deems so disastrous to earthism and which induce him to lambaste Christian morality as the corrupter of humanity and ”the most malignant form of the will to lie.“ But what he finds even more ”utterly gruesome“ about Christianity is that, as the archetype of ”anti-nature, it has garnered for itself ”the highest honors as morality“ so much so that it ”was fixed over humanity as law and categorical imperative“ (EH, p. 332 #7).

    Google Scholar 

  58. See WP, p. 377 #708.

    Google Scholar 

  59. WP, p. 13 #12 A; see TI, pp. 482–484 #4–6.

    Google Scholar 

  60. WP p. 253 #460.

    Google Scholar 

  61. WP, p. 277 #513.

    Google Scholar 

  62. AC, p. 585 #17.

    Google Scholar 

  63. GS, p. 333 #372; regarding the instincts and philosophizing, see BGE, p. 11 #3.

    Google Scholar 

  64. WP, pp. 267–269 #483–485; see p. 338 #635.

    Google Scholar 

  65. WP, p. 291 #538.

    Google Scholar 

  66. WP, p. 285 #528.

    Google Scholar 

  67. WP, p. 291 #538.

    Google Scholar 

  68. In anticipating Freud, Nietzsche depicts consciousness as a “surface,” one both quantitatively and qualitatively inferior to the unconscious (EH, p. 254 #9). In fact, Nietzsche proclaims that one must “seek perfect life where it has become least conscious (that is, least aware of its logic, reasons, its means and intention, its utility)…. The demand for a virtue that reasons is not reasonable” (WP, p. 242 #439).

    Google Scholar 

  69. “What does your conscience say? — `You shall become the person you are”’(GS, p. 219 #270).

    Google Scholar 

  70. GS, pp. 335–336 #373.

    Google Scholar 

  71. F. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, Part I, trans. M. Faber (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1984), p. 27 #19, hereafter HH I.

    Google Scholar 

  72. BT, pp. 97–98 #15.

    Google Scholar 

  73. PT, p. 79 #1.

    Google Scholar 

  74. See Z, pp. 225–228.

    Google Scholar 

  75. “The Wanderer and his Shadow,” Division II, HH II, pp. 356–357 #327, hereafter HH II WS.

    Google Scholar 

  76. F. Nietzsche, “Homer’s Contest,” an 1872 fragment in The Portable Nietzsche,p. 32.

    Google Scholar 

  77. GS, pp. 286–287 #346.

    Google Scholar 

  78. WP, pp. 359–360 #678. However, it must be underlined that for Nietzsche, the individual “is a hundred times more than merely a unit in the chain of its members; it is this chain itself, entirely; and the species is a mere abstraction from the multiplicity of these chains and their partial similarity” (WP, p. 361 #682).

    Google Scholar 

  79. WP, p. 341 #641.

    Google Scholar 

  80. D, pp. 20–21 #26.

    Google Scholar 

  81. WP, p. 548 #1066. It must be understood that Nietzsche regards “the total character of the world” as a complete “chaos” rather than a cosmos since it lacks “order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom” and all other names we assign it by “our aesthetic anthropomorphisms” (GS, p. 168 #109).

    Google Scholar 

  82. BGE, p. 21 #13; see WP, p. 148 #254.

    Google Scholar 

  83. BGE, p. 16 #9.

    Google Scholar 

  84. WP, p. 364 #685.

    Google Scholar 

  85. GS, p. 292 #349; BGE, p. 48 #36.

    Google Scholar 

  86. WP, p. 340 #638.

    Google Scholar 

  87. WP, p. 536 #1041.

    Google Scholar 

  88. See WP, pp. 310–311 #579; Z, p. 143

    Google Scholar 

  89. WP, p. 301 #556.

    Google Scholar 

  90. WP, p. 302 #557.

    Google Scholar 

  91. WP, p. 305 #567.

    Google Scholar 

  92. WP, pp. 302–303 #560.

    Google Scholar 

  93. WP, p. 339 #635.

    Google Scholar 

  94. J. B. Caldicott, “The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology,” Environmental Ethics 8 (1986), pp. 311–312.

    Google Scholar 

  95. See WP, pp. 332–341 #618–639.

    Google Scholar 

  96. WP, p. 303 #561.

    Google Scholar 

  97. Ecologists Karen Warren and Jim Cheney present a position akin to Nietzsche’s when they state that each being struggles to “organize itself into discrete and relatively disconnected or autonomous holons and hierarchical levels of organization” (“Ecosystem, Ecology and Metaphysical Ecology: A Case Study,” Environmental Ethics 15 [1993], p. 112).

    Google Scholar 

  98. GS, p. 167 #109.

    Google Scholar 

  99. Caldicott, op. cit., p. 313. As Alistair Moles reports, Nietzsche held both “a primitive quantum theory of force” as well as a kind of relativity of space and time as early as the 1880s (Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Nature and Cosmology [New York: Peter Lang, 1990], p.14).

    Google Scholar 

  100. GS, p. 292 #349; see WP, p. 344 #650.

    Google Scholar 

  101. UM-S, p. 178.

    Google Scholar 

  102. PT, p. 6 #24.

    Google Scholar 

  103. UM-S, pp. 177–178.

    Google Scholar 

  104. UM-S, pp. 160–161. Nietzsche reasons that not only are the philosopher, artist and saint indispensable for the community of nature as a whole but their production and cultivation ought to be the chief individual and communal human objective (ibid.).

    Google Scholar 

  105. WP, p. 329 #614. This position, however, does not contravene Nietzsche’s division of morality into master and slave; rather, it assumes this classification.

    Google Scholar 

  106. WP, p. 73 #120; see GS, p. 169 #109.

    Google Scholar 

  107. TI, p. 552 #48. One’s true nature lies “immeasurably high” above oneself (UM-S, p. 129).

    Google Scholar 

  108. WP, p. 186 #340.

    Google Scholar 

  109. HH I, p. 33 #28.

    Google Scholar 

  110. BGE, pp. 15–16 #9.

    Google Scholar 

  111. D, p. 182 #425; see GS, p. 174 #115.

    Google Scholar 

  112. WP p. 305 #567.

    Google Scholar 

  113. WP, p. 305 #565.

    Google Scholar 

  114. WP, pp. 13–14 #12 B; see GS, pp. 285–287 #346.

    Google Scholar 

  115. D, pp. 181–182 #424.

    Google Scholar 

  116. F. Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” UM, p. 108, hereafter UM-H.

    Google Scholar 

  117. HH II WS, p. 349 #304.

    Google Scholar 

  118. HH II WS, p. 194 #14; see D, p. 182 #425.

    Google Scholar 

  119. AC, p. 580 #14.

    Google Scholar 

  120. C. U. M. Smith, “`Clever Beasts Who Invented Knowing’: Nietzsche’s Evolutionary Biology of Knowing,” Biology and Philosophy 2 (1987), p. 65.

    Google Scholar 

  121. UM-H, p. 111.

    Google Scholar 

  122. D, p. 21 #26.

    Google Scholar 

  123. See WP, p. 214 #397 and TI, p. 502 #2.

    Google Scholar 

  124. D, pp. 151–152 #286.

    Google Scholar 

  125. UM-S, p. 157.

    Google Scholar 

  126. See HH II WS, pp. 225–227 #57.

    Google Scholar 

  127. WP, p. 538 #1045.

    Google Scholar 

  128. GS, p. 342 #379.

    Google Scholar 

  129. HH II WS, p. 194 #14; see D. p. 182 #425.

    Google Scholar 

  130. WP, p. 169 #302.

    Google Scholar 

  131. WP, p. 169 #303.

    Google Scholar 

  132. PT, p. 79 #1.

    Google Scholar 

  133. D, p. 162 #333.

    Google Scholar 

  134. Z, p. 137.

    Google Scholar 

  135. Z, p. 330.

    Google Scholar 

  136. See “The Solitary,” GS, p. 54 #33; EH, p. 234 #9; SP, p. 74 #91.

    Google Scholar 

  137. HH II MO, p. 166 #356.

    Google Scholar 

  138. Z, p. 309.

    Google Scholar 

  139. BGE, p. 226 #284.

    Google Scholar 

  140. See GS, pp. 226–227 #280.

    Google Scholar 

  141. SP, p. 116 #134.

    Google Scholar 

  142. GS, p. 233 #291.

    Google Scholar 

  143. See Z, pp. 295–298.

    Google Scholar 

  144. D, p. 151 #283.

    Google Scholar 

  145. GS, p. 233 #290.

    Google Scholar 

  146. EH, p. 240 #2.

    Google Scholar 

  147. Z, p. 125.

    Google Scholar 

  148. PT, p. 106 #44.

    Google Scholar 

  149. TI, p. 471 #34.

    Google Scholar 

  150. See WP, p. 78 #126.

    Google Scholar 

  151. TI, pp. 532–533 #31; see D, p. pp. 121–123 #202–203.

    Google Scholar 

  152. See D, p. 33 #52.

    Google Scholar 

  153. See GS, Preface for Second Edition, pp. 33–38 #2–4.

    Google Scholar 

  154. EH, p. 258 #10.

    Google Scholar 

  155. HH I, p. 235 #490.

    Google Scholar 

  156. WP, pp. 524–525 #1016.

    Google Scholar 

  157. Z, p. 428.

    Google Scholar 

  158. HH I, p. 31 #25.

    Google Scholar 

  159. EH, p. 321 #2.

    Google Scholar 

  160. Z, p. 229.

    Google Scholar 

  161. Z, p. 125.

    Google Scholar 

  162. TI, p. 554 #49; see WP, p. 536 #1041.

    Google Scholar 

  163. BT, p. 37 #1.

    Google Scholar 

  164. Z, p. 244.

    Google Scholar 

  165. Z, p. 144.

    Google Scholar 

  166. Z, p. 125.

    Google Scholar 

  167. Z, p. 135.

    Google Scholar 

  168. Z, pp. 388–389. Nietzsche writes: “We must be as near to flowers, grasses and butterflies as a child…. He who would have a share in all good things must understand at times how to be small” (HH II WS, p. 224 #51).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

McGraw, J.G. (1999). Friedrich Nietzsche: Earth-Enthusiast Extraordinaire. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Life Scientific Philosophy, Phenomenology of Life and the Sciences of Life. Analecta Husserliana, vol 59. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2079-3_18

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2079-3_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5057-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2079-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics