Abstract
Ludwig Boltzmann was born in the Landstrasse district of Vienna on the night of February 20, 1844, that is, between Shrove Tuesday and Ash Wednesday, a fact he later used to help explain his tendency to alternate between extreme emotional highs and lows. His father, an Austrian government official, was the son of a Protestant clockmaker from Berlin and his mother, born Catherina Pauernfeind, was Catholic. A second son, Albert, was born two years later in 1846 and a sister Hedwig in 1848. The family first moved to Salzburg and later to Linz where Ludwig entered the local Gymnasium and except for one year consistently received the highest marks in his class. But unfortunately his father died when he was fifteen and his brother a short time later. The widow did her best on a small pension to keep Ludwig in school.
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Reference
For more exact dates see: Walter Höflechner, “Ludwig Boltzmann, sein akademischer Werdegang in Osterreich - Dargestellt nach archivalischen Materialien”, Mitteilungen der Österreichischen Gesellschaft fair Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften 2 (1982), 43.
This fragment is included in Gustav Jäger, “Ludwig Boltzmann”, Neue Österreichische Biographie, Band II, Amalthea Verlag: Wien-München-Zürich, 1925, [Kraus Reprint: Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1970 ], pp. 152.
The letter is located in the Staatlicher Preussische Kulturbesitz in Berlin.
Höflechner, op. cit., p. 46.
According to Dr. Emilie Beckh-Widmannstetter (the sister of Ludwig Hamm who was the husband of Boltzmann’s youngest daughter) and who collected the early correspondence between Boltzmann and his future wife, the first letter was sent on December 13, 1872 and the last one on July 12, 1876. See Dieter Hamm, “Aus dem Leben Ludwig Boltzmanns” in Ludwig Boltzmann Gesamtausgabe, Band VIII, edited by Roman Sexl and John Blackmore, Graz/Braunschweig, 1982, pp. 31–56.
Ibid. p. 47.
Ibid. p. 49.
Ibid. P. 50.
Ludwig Boltzmann, Vorlesungen über Maxwells Theorie der Ekekricität und des Lichtes, 2 Volumes, J.A. Barth: Leipzig, 1891 and 1893; Vorlesungen über Gastheorie, 2 Volumes, J.A. Barth: Leipzig: Leipzig, 1896 and 1898; Vorlesungen über die Principe der Mechanik, 2 Volumes, 1897 and 1904. [A third volumes would appear in 1920 based on lecture notes taken by Hugo Buchholz.]
See Herbert Hörz and Andreas I aass, Ludwig Boltzmann Wege nach Berlin, Akademie-Verlag: Berlin, 1989.
My thanks to Setsuko Tanaka for translating this letter from Japanese and making it available for this book.
Karl Przibram, “Erinnerungen an Boltzmanns Vorlesungen”, The Boltzmann Equation, edited by E.G.D Cohen and W. Thimng
SpnngerVerlag: Wien/New York, 1973, p. 642.
Martin J. Klein, “The Development of Boltzmann’s Statistical Ideas”, The Boltzmann Equation, op. cit., pp. 86–87.
Ibid., p. 90.
Höflechner, op. cit., 49–52.
See Gustav Tschermak to Ernst Mach, Vienna, March 2 and 20, 1893.
This was also the opinion of of the physicist Woldemar Voigt. See his article, “Ludwig Boltzmann”, Physikalische Zeitschrift. 7 (October 1, 1906 ), 650.
Klein, op. cit., 57. aBoltzmann’s scientific articles have been collected into Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen, 3 Volumes, edited by F. Hasenöhrl, J.A. Barth: Leipzig, 1908–1909 [reprinted by Chelsea Pub. Co., 1968 ].
Ibid., p. 61.
Stephen Brush, “Ludwig Boltzmann”, Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Vol. II, edited by C.C. Gillespie, Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York, 1970, p. 261. The major articles by Maxwell and Boltzmann referred to by Brush can be found in his book Kinetic Theory, Volumes I and 2, Pergamon Press: Oxford, 1965 and 1966.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 262.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 263.
Ibid.
Edward E. Daub in his article “Probability and Thermodynamics: The Reduction of the Second Law”, Isis, 60 (1969) 319 writes the following about Loschmidt: “Boltzmann was referring to the first two parts of a senes of articles by Josef Loschmidt, ‘Ober den Zustand des Wärmegleichgewichtes eines System von Korpern’, Die Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, 3 (1876) 128–142 and 366–372. Loschmidt was not opposed to purely mechanical proofs of the second law; in fact, he favored them. His primary target was the general thermodynamic principle that no work can be obtained from the kinetic energy of particles at equilibrium, a principle which he called a ’terroristische Nimbus. that would make death the fate of the universe (cf. pp. 133–135). His [main] objection to Maxwell’s and Boltzmann’s treatment was their contention that the average temperature of a gas at equilibrium would be uniform throughout ....”
Brush, op. cit., pp. 263–264.
Klein, op. cit., p. 83.
Ibid., p. 77.
Brush, op. cit., p. 264.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 265.
Ibid
This and three other letters by Boltzmann to Loschmidt can be found in H. de Martin, Josef Loschmidt, Doctoral Dussertation, University of Vienna, circa 1950.
Brush, op. cit., p. 264.
See in order: Ernst Zermelo, “Über einen Satz der Dynamik und die mechanischen Wärmelehre”, Annalen der Physik, 57 (1896) 485–494; Ludwig Boltzmann, “Entgegenung auf die wärmetheoretischen Betrachtungen des Hm. Ernst Zermelo”, Annalen der Physik, 57 (1896) 773–784; Ernst Zermelo, “Über mechanische Erklärungen irreversibler Vorgänge–Eine Antwort auf Hrn. Boltzmann’s Entgegnung”, Annalen der Physik, 59 (1896) 793801; Ludwig Boltzmann, “Zu Hrn. Zermelos Abhandlung ‘Uber die mechanische Erklärung irreversibler Vorgänge”, Annalen der Physik, 60 (1897) 392–398; Ludwig Boltzmann, “Über einen mechanischen Satz Poincaré’s”, Wiener Ber. 106 (1897) 12–20.
Brush, op. cit., p. 264.
This is Professor Klein’s translation of Boltzmann’s concluding remarks from Boltzmann’s 18% reply to Zermelo. See Martin J. Klein, op. cit., p. 92.
Brush, op. cit., p. 264.
Brush
The letter is in the University Library of the University of Stockholm.
See Christa Jungnickel and Russell McCormmach, The Intellectual Mastery of Nature, Volume II, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1986, pp. 22–24, 74–78, and 82–85
Karl Popper, Unended Quest - An Intellectual Autobiography, Open Court: La Salle, 1976, p. 156.Paul Feyerabend, “Ludwig Boltzmann”, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume I,, New York, 1967, p. 336.
See John T. Blackmore, “Mach vs. Boltzmann, Planck, Stumpf, and Ktilpe” in Ernst Mach–His Life, Work, and Influence, University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972, pp. 214–216.
This is the opinion of Professor Gerhard Fasol, a great-grandson of Boltzmann. See Gerhard Fasol, “Summary - Lectures on Natural Philosophy” in Ilse M. Fasol-Boltzmann (ed.), Ludwig Boltzmann Principien der Naturfolosofi - Lectures on Natural Philosophy 1903–1906, Springer-Verlag: Berlin, etc., 1990, p. 66.
Martin Curd in his book, Ludwig Boltzmann’s Philosophy of Science, UMI: Ann Aror, 1978, pp. 41–56, mentions several scientists and scholars who identified Boltzmann’s philosophy with realism, especially an indirect world view such as representative realism. He mentions Boltzmann’s successor Friedrich Hasenöhrl, Yehuda Elkana, and the earlier writings of John Blackmore. It also seems probable that Boltzmann’s grandson, Dieter Flamm, also leans toward the position that Boltzmann was basically a realist. But some writers while calling Boltzmann a realist use the word in a somewhat unusual way. Forexample, John Nyhof in his article “Philosophical Objections to the Kinetic Theory”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39 (1988), 81–109 maintains that Boltzmann was a realist and never yielded to positivism or phenomenalism, but even though this editor sympathizes strongly with his wish to defend Boltzmann, he is somewhat surprised both by Nyhof s odd use of the word “realism” and his declaration based on an early reading of Sir Karl Popper that trying to understand physical reality must be rejected because it is “essentialistic”. In short, the “moderate realism” which Nyhof’s wants to attribute to Boltzmann looks suspiciously like a version of epistemological idealism as if there were no physical world or we should not try to understand it.
See V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, International Publishers: New York, pp. 295–298. Lenin wrote his original work in 1908 largely as an attempt to wean a number of Marxists away from supporting Ernst Mach, and it is easy to see how an author who was in a hurry and not very kean on distinguishing epistemology from ontology might be influenced by the titles of some of Boltzmann’s articles into thinking that his “theory of knowledge was essentially materialistic”. The titles in question in English “On the Indispensability of Atomism in Natural Science” (1897) and “On the Question of the Objective Existence of Processes in Inanimate Nature” (1897) do seem “realistic” and “materialistic”, that is, until they are read carefully, when major doubts are almost certain to arise.
Engelbert Broda, a pioneer in Boltzmann scholarship, who wrote the first biography of Boltzmann, Ludwig Boltzmann - Mensch-Physiker-Philosoph, Vienna, 1955, (which has been translated into English) as well as a great many articles about him, has alleged that Boltzmann was a materialist, but since he seems to feel that there is no difficulty in reconciling Boltzmann’s relativism about truth and his picture theory about atoms with thatmaterialism, then even with great respect for Broda’s pioneering efforts one can only suppose that what he means by “materialism” has little resemblance to what the term traditionally means in ontology.
Wolfgang Stiller’s recent book Ludwig Boltzmann -Altmeister der klassischen Physik - Wegbereiter der Quantenphysik and Evolutionstheorie, Verlag Harri Deutsch: Thun and Frankfurt am Main, 1989 is a very interesting, well-researched, and quite informative book about Boltzmann’s life, work, and especially his colleagues, students, and opponents. Since the author was writing in Fast Germany before unification, he was not in a good position to question or even qualify the claim that Boltzmann was an ontological materialist, but the manner in which Stiller writes, and especially what he doesn’t write about, makes clear that he is aware of the problems in trying to pin down Boltzmann’s ontology and world view.
Lenin’s epistemological position is normally identified with a version of indirect realism called the “mirror theory”. He was especially critical of Alexander Bogdanov, an influential Menshevik, whom he suspected of being a Machist who only gave lipservice to indirect epistemology and materialist ontology. See Lenin, op. cit., pp. 51–53, 119–125, 130–134, 229–236, 279–281, 333–338, and 340–343.
See Ludwig Boltzmann, “Theories as Representations” in Philosophy of Science, edited by Arthur Danto and Sidney Morgenbesser, Meridian Books, Cleveland and New York, 1964 [1899], pp. 245–252; Andrew D. Wilson, Representing Reality: Ludwig Boltzmann and the Nature and Purpose of Theoretical Physics, Cornell University Doctoral Dissertation and University Microfilms, 1990; and Blackmore, 1972, op. cit., p. 215.
See E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, Doubleday: Garden City, 1954.
There has been recent interest among historians and philosophers of science in Boltzmann’s methodology of science, especially his picture or Bild theory and its possible connection with Heinrich Hertz. See: Martin V. Curd, Ludwig Boltzmanns Philosophy of Science: Theories, Pictures, and Analogies, University of Pittsburgh Doctoral Dissertation and University Microfilms, 1978; Friedrich Wallner, “Boltzmann, Hertz, and Wittgenstein” in Ludwig Boltzmann Gesamtausgabe, Volume VIII, edited by Roman Sexl and John Blackmore, Vieweg: Braunschweig, 1982, pp. 143–153; Andrew D. Wilson, “Hertz, Boltzmann, and Wittgenstein Reconsidered”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 20 (1989) 245–263; S. D’Agostino, “Boltzmann and Hertz on the Bild - Conception of Physical Theory”, History of Science, 28 (1990) 381–398. (Wilson in his paper mentions that Boltzmann had taken ten courses in philosophy while a student, p. 252, footnote 18.)
See Engelbert Broda, “Boltzmann and Darwin” in Ludwig Boltzmann Gesamtausgabe, Volume VIII, edited by R. Sexl and J. Blackmore, Vieweg: Braunschweig: 1982, pp. 129142 and “Darwin and Boltzmann” in 8th Kiihlingsborn Colloquim, Philosophical and Ethical Problems of Biosciences: Darwin Today, edited by E. Geissler and G.W. Scheler, Akademie Verlag: Berlin, 1981, pp. 61–70 and “Boltzmann als Evolutionischer Philosoph”, Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 6 (1983) 103–114. (This last article may also be found in Engelbert Broda, Wissenschaft Verantwortung Frieden, edited by Paul Broda et al, Deuticke: 1985, pp. 88–100.)
S.R. de Groot, “Foreword”, in Ludwig Boltzmann, Theoretical Physics and Philosophical Problems, edited by Brian McGuinness and translated by Paul Foulkes, Reidel: Dordrecht, 1974, pp. ix-xiii; Erwin Hiebert, “Boltzmann’s Conception of Theory Construction: The Promotion of Pluralism, Provisionalism, and Pragmatic Realism”, in J. Hintikka et al. (eds.), Probabilistic Thinking, Thermodynamics, and the Interaction of History and Philosophy of Science, Reidel: Dordrecht and Boston, 1981, pp. 175–198; John Blackmore, “Boltzmann’s Concessions to Mach’s Philosophy of Science”, Ludwig Boltzmann Gesamtausgabe, Volume VIII, edited by R. Sexl and J. Blackmore, Vieweg: Braunschweig, 1982, pp. 155–190.
See Wallner, op. cit., pp. 143–153; Wilson, op. cit., pp. 245–263; and Girolamo Ramunni, “Peut-on analyser le langage scientifique sans se soucier de l’outile mathematique? Le cas Boltzmann confronté ‘a celui de Ostwald”, Documents pour l’histoire du vocabulaire scientifique, 8 (1986) 121–132.
By his clear critique ... Hume created a danger for philosophy in that, following his critique, a fateful ‘fear of metaphysics’ arose which has come to be a malady of contemporary empiristic philosophizing .. .
This point of view has been represented by some of the followers of the Hungarian-English philosopher, Imre Lakatos, in particular, Peter Clark in his article “Atomism versus Thermodynamics”, in Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences, edited by C. Howson, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1976, pp. 41–105 and later in his 1982 review of Stephen Brush’s excellent book The Kind of Motion We Call Heat, a review which appeared in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 33 (1982) 165–186. But serious research historians tend to be wary of sociological theories imposed on historical data, whether in terms of “declining research programs”, “scientific revolutions”, “paradigms”, “puzzles”, “normal science”, or in fact any type of sociological or economic determinism. It seems preferable to do enough factual research until the evidence itself seems to suggest something new, unexpected, or important. Historians must fight the imposition of theories on their discipline. Thesis history is not sufficiently inductive. Evidence should not simply be trotted out as an example to support or refute a thesis, but used as a source from which to help infer what is true. For research historians finding new evidence is almost always more important than theories and conclusions. It is evidence which is primary. Why? Because weight of evidence determines how probable it is that an idea or thesis is true, and that weight and probability can change depending on new discoveries of evidence.
See the letter by Boltzmann to Hilbert in this book and Clayton A. Gearhart, “Einstein Before 1905: The Early Papers on Statistical Mechanics”, American Journal of Physics, 58 (1990) 68–80.
The very useful volumes by Christa Jungnickel and Russell McCormach titled The Intellectual Mastery of Science, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1986, follow Boltzmann’s academic career closely and mention how sought-after Boltzmann was, but in the process the authors tend to underestimate the opposition to him. Part of the reason is that the authors of the volumes seem uninterested in philosophy and how it affected physics, but mostly they look at the rising importance of theoretical physics from a recent perspective instead of how it was generally understood in those days. In fact, Volume Two of their generally magnificent work is titled The Now Mighty Theoretical Physics 1870–1925. Granted, that much important theoretical physics was done from 1875 until Boltzmann’s death in 1906, but from the perspective of most scientists and the general public of the time, experimental physics was still generally considered more basic and important, and most experimentalists in physics either ignored or were opposed to Boltzmann’s work. Indeed, when Boltzmann died in 1906 a newspaper article in a leading Vienna Newspaper mentioned how amazing it was that a mere physicist could know as much mathematics as Boltzmann. Physicists were still generally thought of as experimentalists, and the situation was even more pro-experimental in the United States.
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Blackmore, J. (1995). Introduction. In: Blackmore, J. (eds) Ludwig Boltzmann His Later Life and Philosophy, 1900–1906. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 168. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0489-2_1
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