The Rationality of Strategic Intentions: A Justification of the Cooperative Virtues

Abstract

We now have the instruments to return to the initial question, i.e., the rationality of cooperative virtues. In this chapter I will show that the cooperative virtues are rational in a limited number of cases. A complete direct justification is not possible within the framework of instrumental rationality. The argument for the partial rationality of the cooperative virtues goes as follows. First, intentions for acting, and indeed more generally, dispositions for acting, are best understood as plans for action. Given that we now know the rational requirements of plans we are in a position to determine under what conditions dispositions for action are rational. Secondly, I will introduce the notion of strategic intentions, i.e., intentions the possession of which is beneficial independent of the actions they prescribe. According to the standard theory, the formation of such intentions is irrational. Contrary to this view, I will argue that it can be rational to form strategic intentions, given the rejection of separability. Thirdly, I will show that the cooperative virtues can be understood as strategic intentions in a specific version of the prisoners’ dilemma. The conclusion then will be that it is rational to form and act on cooperative virtues in those situations. I conclude this chapter with some remarks about the possible implications of the revised theory of rationality, defended in chapter 6, for other topics in philosophy, as well as some remarks on the justification of a theory of rational choice.