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The Rationality of Plans: Requirements of Dynamic Choice

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Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLA,volume 33))

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Abstract

Having dismissed the indirect justification of the cooperative virtues, we are left with one alternative — a direct justification. Such a justification requires us to demonstrate the rationality of the choices a cooperatively virtuous agent makes. This is only possible if we revise the standard theory of rational choice which denies the rationality of such choices inome cases. It particularly denies the rationality of cooperation in the one-shot prisoners’ dilemma. This revision will be outlined in this chapter and the next. The result will be a theory of individual instrumental rational choice that, contra the standard theory, allows for genuine rational commitment to cooperative choices in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma.

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References

  1. Especially Hammond (1988).

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  2. I refrain from offering formal definitions of normal form and dynamic form. That would make our discussion much more technical than is the case, without the promise of clarifying the points I wish to make.

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  3. Following the conventional notation I will represent choice nodes with squares, whereas chance nodes will be represented with a circle.

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  4. Hammond (1988).

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  5. McClennen (1990). The conditions that follow are McClennen’s reconstruction of the notion of consequentialism as it is used by Hammond (1988). McCletmen connects this analysis with a detailed and sustained attack on the standard theory of ratignal choice.

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  6. Compare McClennen (1990, 113).

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  7. Compare McClennen (1990, 115).

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  8. Compare McClennen (1990, 120).

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  9. Compare McClennen (1990, 122).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

    Bruno Verbeek

Authors
  1. Bruno Verbeek
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© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Verbeek, B. (2002). The Rationality of Plans: Requirements of Dynamic Choice. In: Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy. Theory and Decision Library, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9982-5_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9982-5_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6026-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9982-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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