Abstract
Until now we have assumed that the cooperative virtues, most notably trust and fairness, are indeed virtues. However, nothing of the kind has been proven. All I have shown is that these qualities allow us to understand why people, thus disposed, will comply with social norms prescribing cooperation in prisoners dilemmas as well as in other situations where compliance is not straightforwardly rational. More precisely, I have shown that these qualities are cooperative dispositions, but not that they are cooperative virtues.
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One should be reluctant to use the word soul,which has a Christian connotation, as a translation of the Greek psuchè,which refers to those parts of man that set him apart from all dead things. Therefore the soul are those parts that make it possible for man to be a self-mover.
Again the issue of proper translation. Orexis is the generic term for unreflected, a-rational emotion which for Aristotle is always present in action. It is reason that seeks the right measure, the mean, of this emotion that prompts the action.
The Greek term for virtue, aretè,literally means excellence. For Aristotle, a virtue is the excellent functioning of the different parts of the soul as reflected in action.
Nicomachean Ethics, H vi-15 (1106b36–1107a2).
This is one of the most discussed ethical concepts that modern moral philosophy owes to Aristotle, second only to the notion of virtue. Practical judgment appear in many diverse works in ethics. Hence the concept has many connotations, not all of them commensurable. See for example, Arendt (1958), Habermas (1983), Maclntyre (1981), nd Rawls (1971). They all discuss and employ the notion in a different manner.
Nicomachean Ethics, II vi-18 (1107a9–15).
If excellences are concerned with actions and emotions, and every emotion and action involves liking or dislike, for this reason excellence will be concerned with one’s likes and dislikes.“ Nicomachean Ethics, II iii-3 (1104b13–16). The translation of this passage is in Urmson (1988, 26).
Nicomachean Ethics, VII ii-6 (1146a10–12).
Nicomachean Ethics, VII x-6 (1152a1–3).
kant (1995)
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Verbeek, B. (2002). Virtuous Motives: Restraint and Spontaneity. In: Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy. Theory and Decision Library, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9982-5_5
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