Abstract
Conventionalism refers to theories about norms which make the following claims. First, that it is instrumentally rational to comply with norms. Secondly, that part of the reason that this is rational is because it is known that all, or a sufficiently great number of others in the group, comply with those norms. Arguably, the first formulation of these two theses can be found in the work of David Hume who analyzes justice as a set of conventions.1 A more recent formulation is given by David ‘Lewis whose work sparked several versions of conventionalism.2 The real boom in conventionalist theory came in the late eighties and nineties of the previous century when authors started to combine conventionalist ideas with evolutionary thinking.3
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References
Hume (1984). It could be argued that Hume’s conceptual apparatus is derived from Hobbes. That would make Hobbes the first conventionalist were it not for the fact that for him the notion of contract or convenant is the central one.
Lewis (1969). Lewis’ work is an attempt to give a conventional analysis df semantic rules. Authors who endorse such an analysis for moral rules are Mackie (1977), Ullmann-Margalit (1977), and Harman (1977). Den Hartogh (1985) contains a more detailed conventionalist theory of moral rules. Conventionalism has proven particularly fruitful in the philosophy of law. Authors, such as Lagerspetz (1989) and Den Hartogh (1995) have given their statements of the conventionalist creed and applied it to law in particular. The discus§ion has not been confined to the traditional circles of philosophers. Economists, especially, those within the tradition of institutional economics, have stated their version of conventionalism as well, for instance, Schotter (1981) and Sugden ( 1986 ). Finally, many of the studies in the so-called “economics and law” tradition have conventionalist elements. See for example, Ellickson (1991).
For example, Young (1993; 1996 ), Skyrms (1994). Binmore (1994;1998) contains strong conventionalist elements as well.
See for example Kavka (1986), Gauthier (1969) and Hampton (1986). The latter makes some critical remarks about this interpretation and shows that there are important conventionalist strands in Hobbes’ theory.
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© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Verbeek, B. (2002). Conventionalism and Moral Motives. In: Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy. Theory and Decision Library, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9982-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9982-5_2
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