Abstract
The ubiquity of norms is overwhelming. There are (detailed) norms regulating our behavior in the community at large, norms that regulate our actions in the schools we attend, in the organizations we join, in the workplace we frequent. There are norms that tell us what to wear, how to eat and how much real fruit there should be in orange juice. There are norms regulating spoken language, as well as our communications on electronic mail and on paper. The sequence of characters on this page is, dictated by a norm. There are detailed norms guiding our behavior in traffic. The important occasions in our lives ranging from birth to burial are structured by norms. In addition, there are norms regulating property, economic transactions, taxes, and there are norms which form the basic structure of society. Our lives are pervaded by norms of all kinds. Some of these norms are rules we have set only for ourselves. They determine bur individual actions and habits. For example, I have made it a rule never to leave home without my keys. However, many norms regulate the interactions between people. These norms are such that we expect each other to observe them. We believe that others expect the same of us. By these characteristics, these norms can be identified as social norms.
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References
Excellent introductions in the basic ideas of rational choice theory, as well as its aims can be found in Resnik (1987) and Binmore (1992).
That is, they cannot abstain from acting. Or, alternatively, abstention is an action as well.
A simple, but precise demonstration of these requirements and the resulting function can be found in Luce and Raiffa (1957, ch. 2). More elaborate constructions are those of Savage (1954) and Jeffrey (1965). Resnik (1987) summarizes their findings.
This is a game where two players are to announce their choice of any olne of these three items simultaneously. The rules imply that there is an intransitive order over the three actions, such that rock beats scissors, scissors beat paper, and paper beats rock.
I assume that the reader is familiar with the prisoner’s dilemma and the conventional notation of games in matrices. Binmore (1992) is an excellent introduction An informal introduction is Dixit and Nalebuff ( 1993 ). For the little game theory I use in this work, Dixit and Nalebuf’s book is more than adequate.
This is to such an extent at one point, that Axelrod (1984) referred to the prisoners’ dilemma as “the e-coli of the social sciences”.
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© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Verbeek, B. (2002). Introduction. In: Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy. Theory and Decision Library, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9982-5_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9982-5_1
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