Abstract
Many find that there are at least some situations in which the notorious Principle of Indifference provides a reasonable basis for a distribution of probabilities, construed as degrees of confidence. For example, knowing only that there is a bean in one of three boxes, but ignorant of any information as to which box it is in, the only reasonable distribution of degrees of confidence, is a uniform one of 1/3 to each possibility. It is the purpose of this paper to consider what might be offered by way of a rationale for the principle and how two objections to the principle might be handled.
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References
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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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O’neill, L. (1996). Indifference and Induction. In: Riggs, P.J. (eds) Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8607-8_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8607-8_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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