Skip to main content

Negative Acts-in-the-Law

  • Chapter
Institutional Legal Facts

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 18))

  • 115 Accesses

Abstract

Until now analysis was restricted to acts-in-the-law whose successful performances have ‘positive’ legal effects. However, acts-in-the-law whose successful performances have ‘negative’ legal effects play an equally significant role in legal systems. Thus, the important category of permissive acts-in-thelaw is negative in character.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Searle and Vanderveken (1985), 4; Vanderveken I (1990), 24.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Searle and Vanderveken (1985), 5.; Vanderveken I (1990), 24.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Searle and Vanderveken (1985), 76. The expression ‘iffis shorthand for ‘if and only if’.

    Google Scholar 

  4. A. Soeteman, Logic in Law, Dordrecht, 1989, 150.

    Google Scholar 

  5. G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action, London, 1963, 86; A. Soeteman(1989), 132–182 et passim.

    Google Scholar 

  6. See for an account of the development of deontic logic: G. Kalinowski, Einführung in die Normenlogik, Frankfurt a. M, 1973, a translation of ‘Logique des normes’ (1971).

    Google Scholar 

  7. Von Wright (1963), 85.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Ibid., 86.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Ibid., 90.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Ibid., 91.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Ibid., 89.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Ibid., 92.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Ibid., 120. This is apparently a slip on von Wright’s part, for ‘a prohibition of noninterference’ means, literally, ‘a duty to interfere’, whereas the author had ‘duties of non-interference’ in mind.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Ibid. , 120.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Von Wright (1963), 140.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Art. 3, sec. 2, French Constitution 1958.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Von Wright (1963), 191.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Kelsen (1991), 106.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Ibid., 107.

    Google Scholar 

  22. See Appendix B.

    Google Scholar 

  23. See Soeteman (1989), 133–150.

    Google Scholar 

  24. MacCormick and Weinberger (1986), 51–76.

    Google Scholar 

  25. Cf. Commissie algemene bepalingen van administratief recht, Algemene bepalingen van administratief recht, 4th impression, Groningen, 1973, 118.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Kelsen (1967), 277–278.

    Google Scholar 

  27. Kelsen (1967), 277. In this and the following quotations from Max Knight’s translation of the second edition of Pure Theory of Law the German verb ‘vernichten’ , which is equivalent to the Dutch ‘vernietigen’, is translated as ‘to annul’. Heeding a remark made by the translators of the first edition, Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson, I use the verb ‘to invalidate’ and its derivatives. The Paulsons justify the adjective ‘invalidatable’ as a translation of the German ‘vernichtbar’ in the following

    Google Scholar 

  28. way: ‘The more familiar ‘nullifiable’ and ‘voidable’ are misleading in suggesting that the overturning of the norm reaches, eo ipso, back to its point of issuance, rendering it null and void. Kelsen rejects nullifiability, thus understood.’ See Kelsen (1992), 73. Since I obviously agree with Kelsen’s point of view, I have followed the Paulsons’ terminological suggestion.

    Google Scholar 

  29. Ibid., 278.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  31. This means that MacCormick’s distinction between ‘constitutive rules’ and ‘terminative rules’ is not only a distinction between rules underlying, respectively, the creation and the termination of legal institutions but is a distinction, moreover, between rules constituting acts-in-the-law whose successful performances produce legal institutions and rules constituting acts-in-the-law whose successful performances are about legal institutions. See MacCormick and Weinberger (1986), 52–53.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Ruiter, D.W.P. (1993). Negative Acts-in-the-Law. In: Institutional Legal Facts. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 18. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8198-1_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8198-1_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4312-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8198-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics