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The Hohenzollern Candidacy

  • Chapter
The Mission of Vincent Benedetti to Berlin 1864–1870

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Abstract

Ambassador Benedetti returned to the Prussian capital on 10 November 1869 and found that “no affair of an international character seemed to keep... the Berlin cabinet vigilant.” 1 However, the imperial government had taken a renewed interest in the implementation of Article V of the Prague Treaty. Benedetti learned from Lefèbvre de Béhaine that a Prussian press polemic against Denmark in July had not been followed by new developments. The Danish minister had confided to the chargé d’affaires that the Prussian cabinet had given no indication that the negotiations would be resumed.2 Indeed, nothing had happened since March 1868 when the talks had been suspended. In the words of the French minister to Denmark, the North Schleswig question was “sleeping a profound sleep.” 3 French interest had revived after a large number of North Schleswig inhabitants had petitioned William for the execution of Article V. He had refused to receive a delegation carrying the petition on grounds that the matter in question was a purely administrative one.4 The question had been taken up with Tsar Alexander and Gorchakov by General Fleury, the new French ambassador to Russia, upon his arrival in St. Petersburg. The assurances given to Fleury, that the Russian government would recommend in Berlin the implementation of Article V, had prompted La Tour d’Auvergne to ask Benedetti to watch carefully the reaction of the Prussian government. The ambassador himself was to maintain an attitude of reserve in the matter.5 But even before Benedetti was able to act upon the minister’s request, La Tour d’Auvergne had already minimized the significance of Fleury’s step in talks with Ambassador Werther, who had told the French foreign minister that any pressure would make a satisfactory solution wellnigh impossible. “[Fleury], in speaking to Emperor Alexander about North Schleswig, could have only envisaged this question as being but one of the elements of the general situation, and his language on this point... did not have any other significance.” 1 As for the success of a Russian intervention in Berlin, Ambassador Benedetti did not seem particularly optimistic. The long resistance of the Prussian king to retrocession was not likely to cease because of a Russian suggestion. Even the Danish government, in view of William’s opposition, had decided to exclude Alsen and Düppel from the territory it wished returned to Denmark. Only a very firm stand could possibly decide the Prussian monarch to give in and hasten a retrocession. Benedetti expected Prussia to evade such a step by pleading “good and pacific intentions” and by advising that a more propitious time be chosen to settle the matter.2 Although Fleury’s remarks had caused concern in Berlin,3 the agitation relative to North Schleswig was, as Benedetti had predicted, short-lived; the retreat of the French government as well as the reply of King William to the letter of the tsar once again consigned the matter to oblivion.

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References

  1. Benedetti to La Tour d’Auvergne, Berlin, 18 November 1869, FAE CP, Prusse/376, no. 206. The new foreign minister had assumed his duties on 19 July 1869 (La Tour d’Auvergne to Benedetti, Paris, 19 July 1869, ibid., 375, T.).

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  2. Lefèbvre de Béhaine to La Tour d’Auvergne, Berlin, 29 July 1869, ibid., no. 240.

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  3. Dotézac to La Valette, Copenhagen, 17 April 1869, ibid., Danemark/254, no. 19.

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  4. Benedetti to La Tour d’Auvergne, Berlin, 21 November 1869, ibid., Prusse/376, no. 219.

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  5. La Tour d’Auvergne to Benedetti, [Paris,] 22 November 1869, ibid., no. 115.

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  6. I La Tour d’Auvergne to Benedetti, Paris, 29 November 1869, ibid., n.n.; Werther to Bismarck, Paris, 29 November 1869, GERMANY. AUSWÄRTIGES AMT, Bismarck und die nordschleswigsche Frage, p. 338.

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  7. Benedetti to La Tour d’Auvergne, Berlin, 3o November 1869, FAE CP, Prusse/376, no. 221; cf. La Tour d’Auvergne to Benedetti, Paris, 7 December 1869, ibid., no. 119, in which the French foreign minister more or less disavowed Fleury’s representations. Nevertheless, the tsar did write a letter to King William on 23 November, suggesting that North Schleswig be retroceded. Bismarck, anxious to avoid difficulties with Russia, advised that the king agree at least to a limited retrocession William refused to go beyond an assurance of his good intentions: “I am… far from refusing the execution of Article V of the Peace of Prague, and I have not at all the intention of evading it” (A. ZU STOLBERG-WERNIGERODE, Bismarck und die schleswig-holsteinische Frage [Kiel, 1928 ], p. 97 ).

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  8. A discussion between Schweinitz and Moltke on Iz December, in reference to the implementation of Article V, revealed that the latter was considering the possibility of a war with France on this question (ScxwEINITZ, I, 249).

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  9. Benedetti to Daru, Berlin, 7 April 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/378, no. 47; same to same, Berlin, 11 April 1870, ibid., no. 51. Daru informed Benedetti that the Danish cabinet expected to make a new démarche in Berlin in November when, in accordance with the Treaty of Vienna, the delay for voting in favor of Prussia or Denmark granted to the Danish population of Schleswig was due to expire (Daru to Benedetti, Paris, ix April 1870, ibid., no. 34 ).

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  10. Benedetti to 011ivier, Berlin, 18 April 1870, ibid., no. 54.

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  11. Same to same, Berlin, 20 April 1870, ibid., no. 56; same to same, Berlin, 21 April 1870, ibid., no. 57.

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  12. Same to same, Berlin, 22 April 1870, ibid., no. 59. In April 1878, Bismarck finally achieved the cancellation of Article V of the Prague Treaty by secret agreement with Austria. On 4 February 1879, a public announcement to this effect was made (M. Winckler, “Die Aufhebung des Artikels V des Prager Friedens und Bismarcks Weg zum Zweibund,” HZ, CLXXIX, Heft 3 [19557 PP. 471–472; SCHARFF,Die Welt als Geschichte, XVI, Heft 3–4 [x996], pp. 211 ff.; HÄHNSEN, pp. 273 ff.; Winckler, “Die Zielsetzung,” Die Welt als Geschichte, XVI, Heft x [1956], PP. 41 ff.).

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  13. x Benedetti to Daru, Berlin, 14 January 187o, FAE CP, Prusse/ 377, no. 4.

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  14. Lefèbvre de Béhaine to La Tour d’Auvergne, Berlin, 2 October 1869, ibid., 375, no. 176.

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  15. Same to same, Berlin, 8 October 1869, ibid., T.

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  16. Benedetti to Daru, Berlin, 27 January 187o, ibid., 377, no. 9. Interestingly enough, in February 1870 a motion by Lasker in the North German parliament to bring Baden into the Confederation met with sincere opposition on the part of Bismarck. The chancellor was trying to promote the renewal of the imperial dignity, to be bestowed upon William, and hence wished to avoid particularist antagonism the Lasker motion might generate (PFLANZE, PP. 415 ff.; NORDDEUTSCHER BUND, Stenographische Berichte, 187o, I, 58–77 ).

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  17. Lefèbvre de Béhaine to La Tour d’Auvergne, Berlin, 6 October 1869, FAE CP, Prusse/ 375, no. 179.

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  18. Benedetti to Daru, Berlin, 27 January 2870, ibid., 377, no. 9.

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  19. Same to same, Berlin, 8 March 187o, MMP, pp. 294–295. Cf. E. STOFFEL, Rapports militaires écrits de Berlin, x866–187,0 (Paris, 1871), pp. 383–411. Disarmament talks had been going on since late January, when La Valette had asked Clarendon to sound out Bismarck regarding the possibility of mutual disarmament. On 3o January, 011ivier also had approached Ambassador Lyons on the matter and on 2 February Loftus was instructed to ascertain the chancellor’s views. The report of the British ambassador of 8 February was rather discouraging and on 22 February Daru was acquainted with its contents. Daru asked that Bismarck be approached once more and, four days after Benedetti’s report, Loftus met once again with Bismarck to discuss disarmament. The impression which Loftus gained from this interview caused him to doubt the usefulness of further efforts. Thus, disarmament talks never progressed beyond these preliminary feelers (M. RAOUL-DUVAL, “Projects de désarmement franco-prussien en 1870” Revue de Paris, XXI, no. 4 [15 February 1914 ], pp. 727–739

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  20. G. Roloff, “Abrüstung und Kaiserplan vor dem Kriege von 1870,” PJ, CCXIV [ November 1928 ], pp. 195–197

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  21. A. Pingaud, “Un projet de désarmement en 2870,” Revue des deux-mondes,CII, t. VII [15 February 2932], PP. 905–914).

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  22. I Benedetti to Daru, Berlin, ro March 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/ 377, no. 32; same to same, Berlin, 25 March 1870, ibid., n.n.

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  23. Same to same, Berlin, 27 January 287o, ibid., no. 9.

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  24. Ibid.; MMP, pp. 285–286. Actually there existed some support in the South for the revival of the imperial dignity. Quite apart from the expected sympathy in Baden, leaders of the Bavarian Patriot Party, ignorant of Bismarck’s plans, were proposing to elevate William of Prussia to the imperial purple. They did expect of course to pose certain conditions, including the admission of Austria into the proposed empire (PFLANZE, p. 417; BGW, VIb, 260, 279 ).

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  25. It would appear that Bismarck’s preoccupation with the Kaiserplan was revealed to Ambassador Loftus through an indiscretion by Max Duncker. Although Clarendon indicated his support of the idea, he did tell Bernstorff finally that he feared a new crisis would result because of French apprehensions. The warning was not lost on Bismarck and for the next two months he did not push his plan (PFLANZE, pp. 417–418; Valentin, pp. 404–405; ROLOFF, “Abrüstung and Kaiserplan,” PJ, CCXVI [ November 1928 ], pp. 188–197

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  26. W. Platzhoff, “England and der Kaiserplan vom Frühjahr 187o,” HZ, CXXVII [2923], pp. 454–467; BGW, VIb, 212–214, note).

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  27. For Bismarck’s abortive efforts to gain acceptance of his scheme in Württemberg and Bavaria, see PFLANZE, p. 418; BGW, VIb, 279–281

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  28. J. Fröbel, Ein Lebenslauf (Stuttgart, 189o-1891), II, 546–547

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  29. M. Doeberl, Bayern and die Bismarckische Reichsgründung (Munich, 1925), pp. 301–302

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  30. E. Brandenburg, “Die Verhandlungen über die Gründung des deutschen Reiches 187o,” HVj, IX (1912), Pp. 504–506; FRIESEN, III, 1o8 ff.; HOHENLOHE, II, 5 ff.; VALENTIN, pp. 410–413; “I learn on exceptional authority [Crown Prince Frederick] that Bismarck is occupying himself with the thought of proclaiming the German Empire, and investing his Royal Master with the Imperial diadem, and that confidential pourparlers have been exchanged on the subject within the last fortnight” (Morier to Clarendon, Carlsbad, 25 April 187o, MORIER, II, 150 ).

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  31. Benedetti to 011ivier, Berlin, 1 May 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/378, T. “Since writing the above [letter of 25 April], I have again seen my informant who tells me that Bismarck has for the moment given up ventilating the idea of the empire. I, nevertheless, send what I have written as it is always useful to be acquainted with even the temporary tenants of so important a brain as Bismarck’s” (Morier to Clarendon, Carlsbad, 27 April 187o, MORIER, II, 151 ).

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  32. Benedetti to Daru, Berlin, 12 February 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/ 377, no. 15.

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  33. Daru to Benedetti, Paris, 15 February 1870, ibid., no. Ix.

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  34. Benedetti to Daru, Berlin, 15 February 1870, ibid., no. 18.

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  35. Cf. Waldersee, I, 49, to whom Bismarck had remarked, on 6 February, that the international situation was one of idyllic peace but that no one could predict how long it would last.

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  36. Benedetti to Daru, Berlin, 25 February 187o, FAE CP, Prusse/377, n.n.

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  37. Nothomb to van der Stichelen, Berlin, 23 April 1870, BAE CP, Prusse/25, no. 57.

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  38. Bylandt to Roest van Limburg, Berlin, 23 May 1870, RBZ, Pruisen/r870, no. 187; Loftus to Clarendon, Berlin, 28 May 187o, PRO FO 64/687, no. 287.

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  39. Wimpffen to Beust, Berlin, II June 1870, HHStA, Preussen/roi, no. 61. “…as guarantee of the dispositions which the emperor has shown to him, [Gramont] demanded the retirement of the two ambassadors of France in Berlin and in London, Benedetti and La Valette. The emperor consented, at once, to the recall of Benedetti but he demanded a delay to decide the situation of La Valette, who was very much in favor with the empress; since the two ambassadors were to be recalled at the same time, they both remained provisionally at their posts” (HANsEN, p. 213 ).

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  40. Newton, I, 293. Benedetti did tell Wimpffen, upon his return, that it would be impossible for France not to intervene in case of new Prussian trespasses (Wimpffen to Beust, Berlin, II June 187o, HHStA, Preussen/tor, no. 61).

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  41. Bylandt to Roest van Limburg, Berlin, 13 June 1870, RBZ, Pruisen /2870, no. 212; same to same, Berlin, 4 July 187o, ibid., no. 252.

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  42. LeSourd to Gramont, Berlin, 3 July 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/379, T.; Nothomb to Anethan, Berlin, 24 July 1870, BAE CP, Prusse/25, no. 80.

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  43. Prince Anton von Radziwill to wife, Ems, 5 July 1870, PRINCESS A. RADZIWILL, Souvenirs, 1840–1873, eds. E. and H. Potocka (Paris, 1931), pp. 156–157; R. Fester, Die Genesis der Emser Depesche (Berlin, 1915), p. 68; C. Saurel, Juillet 187o. Le drame de la dépêche d’Ems (Paris, 1930 ), p. 234.

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  44. The plans of the Spanish government to proceed speedily with the election of Leopold in a secret session of the Cortes, once the prince had posed his candidacy, were negated when the Cortes was adjourned prematurely. A message from Don Eusebio de Salazar y Mazarredo, the principal Spanish agent, communicated from Sigmaringen via Berlin, indicated that he would return to Madrid before 1 July. Accordingly, the Cortes was to be kept in session for the purpose of electing Leopold. Faulty decoding of the message gave the date of Salazar’s return as 9 July. Under the circumstances, Ruiz Zorilla, president of the Cortes, adjourned the session of that body on 23 June. By the time Salazar reached Madrid, 28 June, the deputies had departed from the capital. Rumors about Leopold’s active candidacy began to circulate in Madrid, and when Prim arrived on 1 July he learned to his amazement that the secret about the Hohenzollern candidate was widely known. He of course realized the possible international repercussions the candidacy might have and seemed to be especially apprehensive about reaction in Paris (L. STEEFEL, Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 187o [Cambridge, 1962], pp. 99—ror; I.A.B.o. [Spanien] 32 secreta, nos. 220, 221, 222, 225, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 235, 247, 254, 287)•

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  45. The news of Leopold’s candidacy was first published in Epoca, the director of which, Ignacio Escobar, had close ties with Zorilla. It became known in Paris in the forenoon of 2 July, through information received by Viscount Walsh and transmitted by him to Gramont as well as to the editor of the Gazette de France (OLLIvIER, XIV, 20–21

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  46. R. Fester, Briefe, Aktenstücke und Regesten zur Geschichte der hohenzollernschen Thronkandidatur in Spanien [Leipzig, 1911 ], I, no. 25o; ODG, XXVIII, p. 19, ft. z; Mercier de Lostende to Gramont, Madrid,3 July 187o, FAE CP, Espagne/876, T.

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  47. Steefel, Bismarck, pp. 102–103; The Times [London], 4 July 1870, P. 9 ).

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  48. Queen Augusta had received word of Leopold’s candidacy in a letter from Charles Anton (Charles Anton to Queen Augusta, Sigmaringen, 26 June 2870, J. DITTRICH, Bismarck, Frankreich und die spanische Thronkandidatur der Hohenzollern. Die “Kriegsschuldfrage” von 1870. Im Anhang Briefe und Aktenstücke aus dem Fürstlich Hohenzollernschen Hausarchiv [Munich, 1962], pp. 401–402; Benedetti to Gramont, Wildbad, 7 July 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/379, T.; FESTER, Die Genesis, p. 68 ).

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  49. Press references to Leopold as a possible candidate for the Spanish throne had appeared as early as 9 October 1868 in Süddeutsche Zeitung and The Times, II October in Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 October in Correspondance Havas, 13 November in Indépendance belge and Journal des débats (R. Fester, “Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte der hohenzollernschen Thronkandidatur in Spanien,” HVj, XV, Heft z [1912], pp. 222 ff

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  50. Steefel, Bismarck, pp. 25–28; G. Bonnin, ed., Bismarck and the Hohenzollern Candidature for the Spanish Throne. The Documents in the German Diplomatic Archives, tr. I. M. Massey [London, 1957 ], p. 288

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  51. H. Salomon, L’incident Hohenzollern [2nd ed., Paris, 1922], p. 24; P. LEHAUTCOURT, La candidature Hohenzollern [Paris, 1912 ], p. 17

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  52. R. Fester, “Bismarck und die hohenzollernsche Thronkandidatur in Spanien,” Deutsche Rundschau, CXL, Heft Io [ 1909 ], p. 26 ).

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  53. Cf. F. Frahm, “Frankreich und die Hohenzollernkandidatur bis zum Frühjahr 1869,” HVj, XXIX, Heft 2 (1934), PP. 342–370, for the meaning of Leopold’s candidacy in terms of Iberian union schemes.

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  54. Steefel’s very thorough study of the evidence bearing on Spain’s search for a king has led him to conclude that Bismarck did not further the candidacy of Leopold before February 187o. To be sure, Bismarck was aware of the press references to the prince, but he also was informed of the fact that the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen family had rejected the candidacy in April 1869. Steefel has not only studied the archival materials bearing on Leopold’s candidacy but has also reviewed critically the large body of historical literature relative to the genesis of the Hohenzollern candidacy (STEEFEL, Bismarck, pp. II-46; cf. DITTRICH, pp. 37–82; GEUSS, pp. 252–267 ).

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  55. Benedetti to La Valette, Berlin, 27 March 1869, FAE CP, Prusse/373, no. 68. Although Rancès probably discussed the political situation in Spain, it is unlikely that he brought up a Hohenzollern candidacy since he was known as a supporter of the candidacy of the duke of Montpensier (A. PIRALA, Historia contemporanea [Madrid, 1875–1879], III, 73o

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  56. H. Leonardon, “Prim et la candidature Hohenzollern,” RH, LXXIV [November/December 190o], pp. 289–290).

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  57. Find out if the candidature of the prince of Hohenzollern in Spain is serious. I need not tell you that we would not be favorable toward it, and I can leave it to you to appreciate the extent to which you will judge it useful to let it be known. The example of Rumania is made to enlighten us“ (La Valette to Benedetti, Paris, 3o March 1869, FAE CP, Prusse/ 373, T.).

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  58. In his discussions with Ranchs, Bismarck had actually spoken of the duke de Montpensier as the most obvious candidate worth considering (Ranchs y Villanueva to Sagasta, 24 July 1870, in CONDE DE ROMANONES, Amadeo de Saboya. El rey efimero. Espana y los origenes de la guerra franco-prusiano de 1870 [Madrid, 1935], pp. 244 ff.).

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  59. Benedetti to La Valette, Berlin, 31 March 1869, FAE CP, Prusse/373, no. 71; Münch to Beust, Berlin, 1 April 1869, HHStA, Preussen/loo, no. 29. Shortly after the interview between Benedetti and Thile, Theodor von Bernhardi, an homme de confiance of Bismarck, was sent to Spain as a military observer. The secrecy which surrounded Bernhardi’s mission has been the subject of much conjecture, even to the extent of crediting him with efforts to buy the Cortes votes for the election of Leopold. Steefel’s research would indicate that his role was that of a military and political observer ( STEEFEL, Bismarck, pp. 18–21

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  60. cf. J. Acton, Historical Essays and Studies, eds. Figgis and Laurence [London, 1908 ], p. 213

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  61. H. Temperley, “Lord Acton on the Origins of the War of 187o, with some unpublished letters from the British and Vienna archives,” Cambridge Historical Journal, II, no. r [ 1926 ], pp. 69–70

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  62. W. Salter, Theodor von Bernhardi als Politiker [Hagen/Westfalen, n.d.], pp. 126–128; FESTER, “Bismarck,” Deutsche Rundschau, CXL, Heft ro [ 1907 ], p. 29 ).

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  63. MMP, p. 307. The imperial ambassador to Spain was also in Paris at this time and was probably consulted regarding the Spanish dynastic problem.

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  64. Benedetti to Rouher, Berlin, II May 1869, FAE CP, Prusse/374, no. 92; Bismarck to Solms, Berlin, May 2869, BGW, VIb, 82; “Benedetti… who had been instructed to be particularly cautious in his behavior in [the Hohenzollern] affair had not mentioned the emperor’s remarks to Bismarck ” (KEUDELL, p. 439 ).

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  65. Rouher to Benedetti, Paris, 19 May 1869, FAE CP, Prusse/374, 60. 68.

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  66. Cf. Mercier de Lostende to La Tour d’Auvergne, Madrid, 8 October 1869, FAE CP, Espagne/ 874, no. 147, who thought it unnecessary to preoccuppy oneself with a Hohenzollern candidacy at this time.

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  67. I Prim had come to France for a vacation. He had arrived in Paris 27 August and had gone on to Vichy a few days later, remaining there for about two weeks. On his return to Spain, he had passed through Paris and had been received in audience by the emperor on 14 September and had left for Spain four days later. In the interview between the emperor and Prim no reference to the Hohenzollern candidacy was made, although Randon claims that Napoleon himself had suggested Leopold to Prim (OLLIVIER, XII, 64; RANDON, I, 306; ODG, XXV, 253, ft. 1).

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  68. After the refusal of the duke of Genoa, received in Madrid on 2 January 1870, the search for a prospective ruler was temporarily held in abeyance. Although there were a number of candidates, few of them could expect to be considered very seriously. Under the circumstances, the name of Leopold was again mentioned quite frequently. Salazar was most optimistic about Leopold’s chances in a letter to Werthern of 6 February 1870, and seemed anxious to resume his efforts to win over the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen family (FESTER, “Neue Beiträge,” HVj, XV, Heft 2 [1912], pp. 240–242; cf. Werthern to Charles Anton, I2 February 1870, DITTRICH, pp. 353–355; FESTER, Briefe, I, 52–54; STEEFEL, Bismarck, PP. 47–50 ).

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  69. Nothomb to Anethan, Berlin, Io July 1870, BAE CP, Prusse/25, no. 62. “If there was one thing which has always surprised me, it is the silence and indifference of the [French] ambassador during this winter on the subject of the candidacy of Prince Leopold of which everyone spoke and about which one even jested…. Count Benedetti never spoke to me about the candidacy…” (Nothomb to Anethan, Berlin, 24 July 1870, ibid., no. 80 ).

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  70. In early February 1870, apparently in consequence of conferences held in Madrid in January, Prim decided to renew Spanish efforts to win Leopold over as a candidate. Accordingly, Salazar left Madrid on 17 February, carrying letters from Prim to King William, Bismarck and Prince Leopold. Although the letters differed as to content, they all indicated the serious efforts of the Spanish government to win Leopold’s consent to pose his candidacy (Prim to William, Madrid, 17 February 1870, I.A.B.o. [Spanien], 32 secreta; Prim to Bismarck, Madrid, 17 February 1870, ibid.; Prim to Leopold, Madrid, 17 February 1870, DITTRICH, pp. 356–357). Salazar was received by Charles Anton in Düsseldorf upon his arrival on 24 February. In the absence o fLeopo.d, who was in Berlin, he told the prince that he was

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  71. Mercier de Lostende to Gramont, Madrid, 3 June 1870, FAE CP, Espagne/876, T.

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  72. ivier had stated as late as 3o June that the maintenance of peace had never looked so hopeful and that no irritable problems were in the offing (SALOMON, p. 37).

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  73. Benedetti to Gramont, Wildbad, 7 July 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/379, T. Although the

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  74. Gramont to Benedetti, Paris, 7 July 1870, 11:45 PM, FAE CP, Prusse/379, T.

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  75. Same to same, Paris, 7 July 187o, ibid., n.n. The decision to send Benedetti to Ems was taken in conformity with the belief in Paris that inquiries directed at the Prussian, rather than the Spanish, government were more likely to bring clarification. After consulting with the emperor, and in the absence of 011ivier, Gramont instructed LeSourd in Berlin on 3 July to ask formally in Berlin whether or not the Prussian government was aware of the Spanish throne offer to Leopold. Thile was evasive in his reply of the 4th, thus strengthening Gramont’s suspicions. On that same day, both he and 011ivier also discussed the matter with Ambassador Werther in Paris, who was about to leave for Ems. They left no doubt about the deep resentment felt in Paris over the prospect of a Prussian dynasty in Spain. Although they had no proof that the Prussian government was involved in the matter, they stated that the secrecy of the affair might well prompt such a conclusion by Frenchmen. They impressed upon Werther their hope that King William would oppose a Hohenzollern candidacy for the Spanish throne, for Napoleon could not accept such a solution of the dynastic problem of Spain (Gramont to LeSourd, Paris, 3 July 187o, ibid., T.; LeSourd to Gramont, Berlin, 4 July 187o, ibid., T.; Werther to William, Paris, 5 July 187o, FESTER, Brief e, I, no. 265).

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  76. Tension was heightened on 6 July, when Gramont stated in the chamber that France would never tolerate a Prussian prince on the throne of Spain. Yet, thus far the French government had not obtained a full explanation in Berlin. With William in Ems and Bismarck in Varzin, there was little hope of penetrating the secrecy surrounding the candidacy. It was only logical therefore to send Benedetti to Ems (OLLIvIER, XIV, 96–108; A. Gramont, La France et la Prusse avant la guerre [Paris, 1872 ], p. 57 ).

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  77. Benedetti to Gramont, Wildbad, 8 July 1870, 11:5o AM, FAE CP, Prusse/379,T.

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  78. Saurel, p. 156. “Count Benedetti, whose life has been spent in diplomacy and who had seen with his own eyes the gradual development of the military strength of Germany, keenly felt all the difficulties of the part he was about to play. He was to try to soften down the rather arrogant speeches and dispatches of the Duc de Gramont and to do his best to get his country out of an awkward position” (FLEURY, II, 23o).

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  79. Cf. L. Riess, “Eine noch unveröffentlichte Emser Depesche König Wilhelms I.vom u. Juli 187o,” FbpG, XXVI, Pt. 1 (1913), p. 193, for Queen Augusta’s efforts to bring about Leopold’s renunciation; H. Bosbacx, Fürst Bismarck und die Kaiserin Augusta (Cologne, 1936), PP- 43–44.

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  80. Gramont to Benedetti, Paris, 7 July 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/379, n.n. For a fine summary of the events surrounding the interpellation of Cochéry, the fateful meeting of the council of ministers, and the Gramont declaration, see STEEFEL, Bismarck, pp. 112–119.

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  81. Gramont to Benedetti, Paris, 7 July 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/379.

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  82. Ibid. Gramont’s stronger language in the private letter might have been occasioned by a report he had received from Madrid just before he wrote the letter, in which Mercier de Lostende announced that Prim was prepared to release Leopold from his acceptance if such a demand were made. Perhaps Gramont hoped to bring this about by making a more determined request that Leopold’s candidacy be withdrawn (Mercier de Lostende to Gramont, Madrid, 7 July 1870,4:2o PM, ibid., Espagne/876, T.).

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  83. I Cf. France. Assemblée Nationale, Enquéte parlementaire sur les actes du gouvernement de la défense nationale. Dépositions de témoins (Versailles, 1872), I, 86, in which Benedetti declared: “I had been sent to Ems to arrange a delicate and difficult affair, even to investigate it, because we were not exactly informed about the relations which had been established between the prince of Hohenzollern and the king of Prussia on the one hand and Marshal Prim on the other. I had to proceed therefore with an extreme moderation in order not to aggravate the situation which was already very difficult and very dangerous. I had to act with equal circumspection in obtaining information which we lacked [in order] to enlighten us as to the intentions which [the Prussian government] had in concerting itself with Marshal Prim”; Albedyll to his wife, Ems, 9 July 187o, J. ALBEDYLL-ALTEN, Aus Hannover und Preussen. Lebenserinnerungen aus einem halben Jahrhundert, ed. R. Boschan (Postdam, 1914 ), p. 82.

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  84. Benedetti to Gramont, Ems, 9 July 187o, 7 AM, FAE CP, Prusse/ 379, T.; Abeken to Bismarck, Ems, 8 July 1870, 7:45 PM, R. Lord, The Origins of the War of x870; new documents from the German archives, “Harvard Historical Studies,” XXVIII (Cambridge, 2924 ), p. 154; FESTER, Die Genesis, pp. 68–69.

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  85. Benedetti to Gramont, Ems, 9 July 187o, 10:30 AM, FAE CP, Prusse/379, T.; Radziwill to his wife, Ems, 9 July 187o, RADZIWILL, pp. 158–159.

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  86. Benedetti to Gramont, 9 July 287o, FAE CP, Prusse/379, no. 1. Benedetti’s message was badly garbled, apparently in consequence of an electrical storm. Gramont gained the impression from the message that William was strongly opposed to a renunciation, while in actuality the king simply refused to take the initiative in bringing about Leopold’s withdrawal (Gramont to Benedetti, Paris, to July 187o, ibid., T.). Interestingly enough, Werther’s reports on the reaction in Paris to Leopold’s candidacy disturbed Bismarck, Thile and Abeken. It was felt that he should have refused to discuss the matter with Gramont and 011ivier and simply referred them to Madrid and Reichenhall. Bismarck and Thile stressed to Abeken the necessity to convince Werther that the Prussian government could not, and would not, retreat in the face of French threats (Werther to Bismarck, Paris, 4 July 1870, 7:5o, LORD, p. 122, T.; Abeken to foreign office, Ems, 5 July 187o, ibid., p. 224; Thile to Bucher, Berlin, 5 July 1870, ibid., p. 215

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  87. Werther to William, Paris, 5 July 187o, ibid., pp. 125–127; Werther to foreign office, Paris, 5 July 1870, ibid., p. 127; Bucher to Thile, Varzin, 5 July 187o, ibid., p. 128; Bismarck to Abeken, Varzin, 5 July 1870 ibid., pp. 129132; Abeken to Bismarck, Ems, 6 July 187o, ibid., p. 234).

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  88. Benedetti to Gramont, Ems, 9 July 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/379, no. r. Although the king refused to comply with Benedetti’s suggestion that he persuade Leopold to withdraw, William did express his regret in a letter to Charles Anton that no prior assurances had been obtained relative to French acceptance of the candidacy (William to Charles Anton, Ems, 6 July 1870, DITTRICH, pp. 406–407; Abeken to Charles Anton, Ems, 6 July 1870, ibid., pp. 404–406; Charles Anton to Abeken, Sigmaringen, 8 July 1870, BONNIN, pp. 229–231; Charles Anton to William, Sigmaringen, 8 July 187o, ibid., pp. 231–233). For the Prussian impressions about Benedetti’s remarks, see Abeken to Bismarck, Ems, 9 July 1870, T., LORD, pp. 165–166; Bismarck to foreign office, Varzin, to July 1870, T., ibid., P. 174 ).

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  89. Benedetti to Gramont, Ems, 9 July 187o, FAE CP, Prusse/379, no. t.

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  90. Nothomb to Anethan, Berlin, 24 July 1870, BAE CP, Prusse/25, no. 8o; H. DELBRÜCK, “Die Emser Depesche,” Forschungen and Fortschritte, V (1929), p. 196.

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  91. During the evening hours of 9 July, King William received word from Charles Anton, who evidently was concerned about the reaction in Paris, that a voluntary renunciation was out of the question. However, he clearly indicated that Leopold’s candidacy would be withdrawn if the king, in the interests of Prussia, requested it (Charles Anton to William, Sigmaringen, 9 July 187o, BONNIN, pp. 231–233; Abeken to Bismarck, Ems, to July 1870, T., LORD, p. 171; KARL I., Aus dem Leben, II, rot ).

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  92. Already as early as 6 July Charles Anton had been out of touch with Leopold who, after a visit with the queen mother of Bavaria in Berchtesgaden, had left Reichenhall for a foot tour in the Alps (ZINGELER, “Briefe,” Deutsche Revue, XXIX, Heft 3 [ 1914 ], p. 118 ).

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  93. Gramont to Benedetti, Paris, io July 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/379, T.; same to same, Paris, io July 187o, ibid., P. Rumors about military preparations filled the air and were reflected in official and semi-official correspondence (Solms to foreign office, Paris, 9 July 1870, T., LORD, pp. 162, 164; Ducrot to his wife, Camp de Châlons, 9 July 187o, DUCROT, II, 332; same to same, Camp de Châlons, io July 1870,ibid., p. 333; Bernstorff to foreign office, London, io July 1870, LORD, p. 176; Bismarck to foreign office, Varzin, ro July 1870, ibid., pp. 173–174 ).

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  94. Benedetti to Gramont, Ems, 9 July 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/379, P.

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  95. Benedetti to Gramont, Ems, II July 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/379, no. 2. “The Prussian government has not at all participated, and I only as family-chief. Yet, one does not want to understand this in Paris and makes Prussia responsible for the Spanish candidacy” (William to Crown Prince Frederick, Ems, 11 July 1870, RIESS, FbpG, XXVI, Pt. I [1913], p. 18g). Cf. Hohenzollerisches Hausgesetz vom 24. Januar 1821, Titel IV, Artikel I, ZINGELER, “Das fürstliche Haus Hohenzollern,” Deutsche Revue, XXXVII [1912], no. 1, p. 61, which gives the king exclusive control over the entry of any member of his house into foreign civil or military service.

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  96. Cf. Abeken to foreign office, Ems, II July 187o, 8:10 PM, LORD, p. 192, T., who reports that the king insisted Leopold should communicate his decision directly to Madrid and that subsequently one could tell Benedetti what had been done.

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  97. Benedetti to Gramont, Ems, II July 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/379, no. 2; Abeken to foreign office, Ems, II July 1870, 2 PM, LORD, p. 189, T.

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  98. Benedetti to Gramont, Ems, r1 July 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/379, no. 2.

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  99. William was indeed greatly concerned about reports of French military preparations sent by Solms, whose impressions were also shared by Waldersee. The king even considered returning to Berlin and was anxious that Roon be informed of the reports on military measures taken in France. Moreover, William was evidently willing to have Werther take a personal letter from him to Emperor Napoleon, and he also considered the possibility of appealing to the great powers to use their good offices. Bismarck, on the other hand, was opposed to such precipitate steps (Waldersee report on Paris situation, Paris, 10 July 1870

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  100. LORD, p. 184; Solms to foreign office, Paris, II July 1870, ibid., p. 189; Roon to William, Berlin, II July 1870, ibid., pp. 190–191; Abeken to Bismarck, Ems, Io July 1870, ibid., p. 173; Bismarck to Abeken, Varzin, Io July 1870, ibid., p. 175); STEEFEL, Bismarck, pp. 129–130.

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  101. I Benedetti to Gramont, Ems, II July 1870,2:3o, FAE CP, Prusse/379, T. On Io July, King William sent Colonel Karl von Strantz to Sigmaringen to inform Charles Anton of the latest developments. He made it quite clear that he would not stand in the way of a renunciation on the part of Leopold (William to Charles Anton, Ems, Io July 1870, FESTER, Briefe, II, no. 399; Strantz to Abeken, Sigmaringen, 12 July 187o, BONNIN, p.248; cf. Crown Prince Frederick to Bismarck, Potsdam, II July 1870, ibid., p. 247; Charles Anton to William, Sigmaringen, 12 July 1870, ibid., pp. 250–251).

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  102. France. ASSEMBLÉE Nationale, I, 88. Benedetti told Werther that he would remain in Ems, at his own risk, twenty-four hours longer, although an answer from the king was already expected that afternoon in Paris (Abeken to foreign office, Ems, II July 1870, LORD, p.192, T.).

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  103. Benedetti to Gramont, Ems, II July 1870, FAE CP, Prusse/ 379, P.

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  104. Gramont to Benedetti,Paris, Io July 1870, ibid., P. In his letter the foreign minister wrote that a refusal on the part of William to secure Leopold’s renunciation would mean war. Gramont’s bellicose attitude was partly influenced by his colleagues, who had come to the conclusion that war was the only alternative to Prussian intransigence. French military preparations had also been initiated, indicating the degree to which war was thought a

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  105. Gramont to Benedetti, Paris, 12 July 187o, 7 PM, FAE CP, Prusse/379, T. During the forenoon of 12 July, Napoleon was called out of a council of ministers to receive the Spanish ambassador who had received word from Strat that Charles Anton was about to inform Prim of the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidacy. At the request of Olózaga, the emperor did not tell his ministers of the very important development. However, during the afternoon hours copies of the telegrams of Charles Anton to Olózaga and to Prim, intercepted in Paris, were brought to the emperor and to 011ivier. Although the latter withheld the news from the deputies, the information became quickly known when Olózaga appeared at the chamber to bring official confirmation from Charles Anton (OLLIvIER, XIV, 227 ff.; Arnim to Bismarck, Paris, 14 January 1873, BONNIN, pp. 257–259).

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  106. Benedetti was not alone in believing that the Hohenzollern withdrawal, if communicated by William to the French government in some suitable mode, would end the crisis. Many diplomats were quite prepared to concede a moral victory to France (Nigra to ViscontiVenosta, Paris, 12 July 187o, S. W. Halperin, Diplomat under Stress. Visconti-Venosta and the Crisis of July, 187o [Chicago, x963], p. 13o; Loftus to Granville, Berlin, 12 July 187o, 11:45 PM, PRO FO 64/688, T.; Lyons to Granville, Paris, 12 July, FESTER, Briefe, II, 109–11o; Beust to Metternich, Vienna, 12 July 1870, 1:25 PM, Oncken, Rheinpolitik, III, 432, T.: same to same, Vienna, 13 July 1870,4:30 PM, ibid., 433–434, T.).

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  107. The optimism of the diplomatic world was quite ill-founded. The reaction of the chamber did not augur well for the peace of Europe. From the left as well as the right demands were voiced that more than a mere association of Prussia with Leopold’s withdrawal ought to be obtained. Duvernois’ interpellation, calling for a guarantee by Prussia, set in motion a tragic sequence of events. All 011ivier could do was to delay debate on it. To be sure, the manner in which the news of Leopold’s withdrawal reached the French government only served to increase suspicion and resentment in Paris. The fact that William had not ordered the withdrawal made it impossible for the French government to issue a statement to that effect. Thus, no claim of having humiliated Prussia and forced her to abandon the Spanish throne project could be established by France. Yet, it was precisely for such a victory that the French public clamored. Interestingly enough, there is every reason to believe that Napoleon was willing to accept Leopold’s withdrawal as the final act (OLLIvIER, XIV, 230 ff.; Nigra to Visconti-Venosta, Paris, 13 July 1870, Halperin, p. 133; CASE, pp. 253 ff.).

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  108. Gramont, at the foreign office, spent the afternoon of the 12th drafting communications to Benedetti, in which he stressed the necessity of associating William with the withdrawal and also indicated that the French government was prepared to wait further for official news. Gramont was aware of the fact that news of Leopold’s withdrawal had reached Paris. He was determined, however, to force Prussia into the role of having to acknowledge the abandonment of the project (GRAMONT, pp. 1I2 ff.; STEEFEL, Bismarck, pp. 151–152). In mid-afternoon, Gramont received Ambassador Werther with whom he discussed at length the implications of the crisis and the role of the Prussian king. He insisted that William had authorized the candidacy and that the monarch should therefore also take the responsibility for ending the crisis. Gramont, supported by 011ivier who had joined the discussion, even proposed a draft suitable for a communication from William to Napoleon. This draft, stronger in its language than one Gramont had prepared before the meeting with Werther, actually had little effect on the course of events. The draft, as well as Werther’s report, reached William after he had already decided to reject the guarantee demand and to end the talks with Benedetti in Ems (GRAMONT, pp. 107 ff.; OLLIVIER, XIV, pp. 244 ff.; Werther to William, Paris, 12 July 1870, LORD, pp. 206–209; STEEFEL, Bismarck, p. 154 )

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  109. Steefel’s very meticulous inquiry into the genesis of the guarantee instructions sent to Benedetti refutes some of 011ivier’s assertions. It would appear then that Gramont dispatched the fateful message at 7 PM on the 12th. He had conferred at the Tuileries Palace with the emperor following the Werther interview, and, after Napoleon’s departure for St.-Cloud, had returned to the foreign office to draft the instructions. Late in the evening, 011ivier called on Gramont and was shown a text of the message sent to Benedetti as well as a letter which Gramont had meanwhile received from the emperor in St.-Cloud. 011ivier fully realized that a new element was being introduced in the controversy, and that after the council of ministers had decided in its morning session to postpone any immediate steps. He could not, he felt, countermand a decision reached by the emperor and the foreign minister but did convince Gramont to send Benedetti additional instructions. These messages, dispatched at 12:15 AM and 1:45 AM on the 13th, tended to shift the emphasis from a general guarantee against a future recurrence of the candidacy to an immediate assurance. The moderation of these instructions was to no avail, because Benedetti had already acted upon the earlier dispatch and had presented the guarantee demand in its original form to William (P SAINT MARC, Emile 011ivier [1825—x913] [Paris, 1950], pp. 292–293; OLLIVIER, XIV, 265–272; Gramont to Benedetti, Paris, 13 July 187o, 12:15 AM, FAE CP, Prusse/ 379, T.; same to same, Paris, 13 July 1870, 1:45 AM, ibid.; GRAMONT, pp. 137–138; STEEFEL, Bismarck, pp. 159–16o; MURET, RHMC, XIII, no. 3 [1910], p. 325, ft. 2; FESTER, Briefe, II, III; FRANCE. ASSEMBLÉE Nationale, I, 99-I01; V. BENEDETTI. These messages, dispatched at 12:15 AM and 1:45 AM on the 13th, tended to shift the emphasis from a general guarantee against a future recurrence of the candidacy to an immediate assurance. The moderation of these instructions was to no avail, because Benedetti had already acted upon the earlier dispatch and had presented the guarantee demand in its original form to William (P SAINT MARC, Emile 011ivier [1825—x913] [Paris, 1950], pp. 292–293; OLLIVIER, XIV, 265–272; Gramont to Benedetti, Paris, 13 July 187o, 12:15 AM, FAE CP, Prusse/ 379, T.; same to same, Paris, 13 July 1870, 1:45 AM, ibid.; GRAMONT, pp. 137–138; STEEFEL, Bismarck, pp. 159–16o; MURET, RHMC, XIII, no. 3 [1910], p. 325, ft. 2; FESTER, Briefe, II, III; FRANCE. ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, I, 99-I01; V. BENEDETTI, “Ma mission à Ems,” Revue de Paris, II, t. 5 [ 1895 ], pp. 225–257 ).

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  110. Gramont to Benedetti, Paris,13 July 1870, 9 PM, FAE CP, Prusse/379, T. 2 Benedetti to Gramont, Ems, 14 July 1870, 12:3o PM, ibid.

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  111. I Benedetti to Gramont, Ems, 14 July 1870,3:45 PM, ibid.; O. AUBRY, Le Second Empire (Paris, 1939), p. 212; Chappuis, p. 74. In contrast with the courteous attitude toward Benedetti in Ems, the French military attaché in Berlin, Baron Stoffel, found it necessary to ask Bismarck for protection against hostile crowds (Stoffel to Bismarck, Berlin, 19 July 1870, I. A.A. a63 ).

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  112. The genesis of the Ems Dispatch may be traced back to the account of the events in Ems on the 13th, which William authorized Abeken to telegraph to Bismarck. The king also gave explicit permission to the chancellor to inform the press and the German legations abroad of the guarantee demand presented by Benedetti and rejected by the monarch. Abeken’s summary, composed with a great deal of care, did not take into proper account all of the events which actually took place. Moreover, the wording itself lacked precision and tended to distort a few of the incidents. “On the whole, the events of the day were related with tolerable accuracy, but with a bluntness and acerbity which, while permissible enough in a confidential document, were out of place in one destined for publication” (LORD, p. 91).

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  113. The course of events in Ems fitted Bismarck’s hopes only too well. He wished to keep the controversy alive, depict France as the aggressor, and derive political advantage out of a situation which could be expected to rally Germans north and south of the Main. His instructions to Busch for a counter-attack against France in the press, his talk of resignation should war be avoided in a meeting with Crown Prince Frederick, as well as his remarks to Gorchakov and Loftus about preparations against French military measures, all would seem to indicate that Bismarck was not prepared to see the issue end with the withdrawal of Leopold (HAHN, Fürst Bismarck [Berlin, 1878–1891], V, 571

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  114. M. Busch, Tagebuchblätter [Leipzig, 1899 ], I, 40–42; FRIEDRICH III., pas Kriegstagebuch von 1870/71, ed. H. O. Meisner [Leipzig, 1926], pp. 1 ff.; Loftus to Granville, Berlin, 13 July 2870, 3 PM, PRO FO 64/688, T.; for Loftus’ discussion with LeSourd about Bismarck’s attitude and the impact of the latter’s report on the 14 July imperial cabinet meeting, see OLLIVIER, XIV, 319 ).

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  115. In the course of dinner the evening of 13 July, Bismarck, Roon and Moltke telegraphed the king that they thought his return to Berlin both necessary and desirable. In the light of reports reaching Berlin, it was evident that the imperial government did not consider the crisis ended. Renewed French demands could well lead to war and Bismarck was anxious to call the Reichstag into session. His plan was to send France an ultimatum, demanding an explanation of the intentions of the French government (Bismarck to William, Berlin, 13 July 187o, 8:so PM, LORD, pp. 228–229).

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  116. Very soon following the telegram urging the king to return to Berlin, Abeken’s “Ems Dispatch” was handed to Bismarck. After studying its contents, as well as the authorization to publish them, Bismarck undertook his famous revision and ordered its publication in the press and communication to diplomatic missions abroad. By nine o’clock in the evening a special Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung edition was on sale in the streets in Berlin (for a precise, critical edition of the various texts, see E. WALDER, Die Eraser Depesche, “Quellen zur Neueren Geschichte,” [Bern, 1959 ], pp. 16–24

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  117. O. VON Bismarck, Gedanken and Errinnerungen [Stuttgart, 1898 ], II, pp. 87–93

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  118. cf. W. Langer, “Bismarck as a Dramatist,” Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography in Honor of G. P. Gooch, C. H., ed.A.O. Sarkissian, pp. 199 ff.; R. PAHNCKE, Die Parallel-Erzdhlungen Bismarcks zu seinen Gedanken and Erinnerungen [Halle, 1914], pp. 162–170; LORD, pp. 99 ff.; GEUSS, pp. 252 ff.; SAUREL, p. 212).

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  119. Jonas to Servais, Paris, [15] July 2870, LAE, H/18; SAINT MARC, p. 332.

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  120. P. Muret, “Les articles de M. Welschinger et de M. Joseph Reinach sur la déclaration de guerre et sur les papiers de Cerçay,” RHMC, XIV, no. I (1910), pp. 8o - 88.

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  121. SAINT MARC, p. 332.

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  122. France. ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, I, 88; MURET, “Les articles,” RHMC, XIV, no. I (1910), p. 84.

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  123. For the fateful meeting of the imperial cabinet on the 14th, and the subsequent events see CASE, pp. 256 ff.; LORD, pp. I07–117; LEHAUTCOURT, pp. 481 ff.; Steefel, Bismarck, pp, 195 ff.).

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  124. Gramont to Napoleon III, Paris, 15 July 187o, ODG, XXVIII, 396, T.

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  125. Napoleon III to Gramont, Saint Cloud, 16 July 187o, ODG, XXIX, 9, T.

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    Willard Allen Fletcher

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Fletcher, W.A. (1965). The Hohenzollern Candidacy. In: The Mission of Vincent Benedetti to Berlin 1864–1870. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7547-8_8

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