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Abstract

The sudden and spectacular success of the Prussian arms at Sadowa caught Ambassador Benedetti by surprise.1 He had not entered upon speculations as to the length of the Austro-Prussian hostilities but apparently he had not counted with such a rapid victory. While the outcome of the battle gave him reason to rejoice, in view of the promise it held for the Italian cause, he must have felt apprehensive about the prospective danger to the European power equilibrium. He has left no indication of his immediate reaction to Sadowa but one may assume that he had mixed feelings.

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References

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  5. Already on 2 July, Emperor Francis Joseph had informed Napoleon of his intention to cede Venetia, in hopes of obtaining an armistice. Next day, Napoleon told Ambassador Metternich that he would propose mediation to the parties at war upon cession of Venetia. The Austrian decision to give up Venetia was communicated late in the afternoon of 4 July to Paris, when news of the Austrian defeat at Königgrätz was reaching the French capital. (ODG, X, 314, ft. 3; Mensdorff to Metternich, Vienna, 2 July 1866, ONCKEN, I, 297; same to same, ibid., 298; Metternich to Mensdorff, Paris, 2 July 1866, ibid.; same to same, Paris

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  17. He [Drouyn de Lhuys] remained in power with the secret hope of repairing by his ability the failure he had sustained. The violence which he did to his own convictions only irritated his adversaries, increased the irresolution of the sovereign and removed from our policy its last chance for salvation: unity of views and direction“ (Rothan, Souvenirs, I, 36–37)

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  18. Drouyn de Lhuys to Benedetti, Paris, 6 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, T.

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  20. Benedetti to Bismarck, Berlin, 7 July 1866, FAE MD, Allemagne/171; Nothomb to Rogier, Berlin, Io July 1866, BAE CP, Prusse/23, Pt. II, no. 258.

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  21. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 8 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, T. The mission of Reuss was essentially designed to calm the apprehension of the emperor and to retard the conclusion of an armistice, in order to obtain further military advantages against the Austrians. The letter of William, dated 7 July, was couched in rather vague terms; however, it did allude to certain Prussian objectives: federal reform, annexation of the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, and other related matters. Moreover, Reuss did not have authority to discuss an armstice (Goltz to Bernstorff, Paris, 28 August [24 October] 1866, Stolberg-Wernigerode, pp. 449–450; Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, II July 1866, Oncken, I, 338–343). For the report of the Napoleon-Reuss interview on 10 July, see Reuss to William I, Paris, 10 July 1866, ibid., 328–331

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  22. Cf. W. Busch, HZ, CIII, Heft I (1909), p. 72, who writes that Bismarck indicated already on 4 July that he would be satisfied with a unification limited to North Germany. Eugénie to Metternich, n.p., 9 July 1866

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  23. Oncken, I, 326. The decision to send Benedetti reversed an earlier intention to send a general staff officer; it may have been made in the belief that peace preliminaries might be discussed simultaneously with the armistice negotiations (Loftus to Stanley, Berlin, 14 July 1866, PRO FO 64/597, no. 16).

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  26. Nothomb to Rogier, Berlin, 10 July 1866, BAE CP, Prusse/23, Pt. II, no. 258.

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  28. Nothomb to Rogier, Berlin, to July 1866, BAE CP, Prusse/23, Pt. II, no. 259. “Benedetti left yesterday for the headquarters, presumably without exact instructions, merely to recommend restraint [in the demands] and acceleration [in concluding an armistice]” ( Werther to Usedom, Berlin, so July 1866

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  30. Sybel, V, 243–245. During an interview with the emperor, Goltz discovered that the prospect of Prussian hegemony in Germany, the consequence of the military victory and the proposed exclusion of Austria from German affairs, created considerable apprehension in France. Goltz endeavored to alleviate Napoleon’s concern relative to the Prussian federal reform project, and also emphasized the willingness of Prussia to give full consideration to French wishes. In his reports to Bismarck, the ambassador stressed the need for Prussian moderation, in order to gain French support and prevent an Austro-French combination against Prussia (Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, sr July 1866, ONCKEN, I, 336–338; Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, II July 1866, ibid., 338–343; Reuss to Bismarck, Paris, 12 July 1866, ibid., 343–345 ).

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  31. Ibid.; SYBEL, V, 243–245; RAND ON, II, 146.

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  32. Bismarck to Goltz, Hohenmauth, 9 July 1866, BGW, VI, 46. Cf. F. Thimme, “Wilhelm I., Bismarck and der Ursprung des Annexionsgedanken i866,” HZ, LXXIX, Heft 3 (1902), PP. 423–424. The author ascribes the decision to abandon the federal reform demand and limit such design to the creation of a North German Confederation not to a consideration of France’s attitude but to the fact that Prussia planned large annexations, making it impossible for her to carry out a federal reform embracing all of Germany and, at the same time, to assimilate the annexed territory.

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  33. Drouyn de Lhuys to Benedetti, Paris, s1 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, T.

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  34. Benedetti] is not quite greeted with loving eyes, but he shall not harm [our cause] nor detain us“ (Abeken to his wife, Zwittau, 12 July x866, H. Abeken, Ein schlichtes Leben in bewegter Zeit [Berlin, 1898], p. 332). `Bismarck received the unwelcome guest politely, but his discontent over his visit caused him pains in the left foot which lasted for some time” (KEUDELL, p. 296). To a telegram from Werther, announcing that military authorities had been instructed to assist the French ambassador in reaching the king’s headquarters, Bismarck appended the comment “stupid” (BGW, VI, 51). Cf. A. vox WALDERSEE, Denkwürdigkeiten, ed. H. O. Meisner (Stuttgart, 1902), I, 37–38.

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  35. Benedetti had to share my room, while [Lefèbvre de Béhaine] shared Keudell’s bed“ (Abeken to his wife, Zwittau, 12 July 1866, ABEKEN, p. 331).

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  36. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Czernahora, 12 July r866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, no. 257.

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  37. de Hell to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 14 July 1866, ibid., T.; Roon to his wife, Czernahora, 13 July 1866, A. vox Roox, Denkwfirdigkeiten (Breslau, 1892), II, 293.

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  38. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Czernahora, II July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, no. 157. The word “abstention” rather than “armistice” was used because the Prusso-Italian alliance did not permit either party to conclude a separate armistice.

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  39. Ibid. The secretary was guided to the Austrian lines by a Prussian officer; he took with him a report of the ambassador to Drouyn de Lhuys, which was sent from Vienna on 14 July and arrived two days later in Paris.

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  40. I followed the king to Brünn where His Majesty established his headquarters yesterday. I await the return of Lefèbvre. All the telegraph lines are down. The news and correspondence

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  41. Bismarck to Goltz, Hohenmauth, ro July 1866, SYBEL, V, 26o; Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, 14 July 1866, Oncken, I, 351–356; Goltz to Bernstorff, Paris, 28 August [24 October] 1866, Stolberg-Wernigerode, pp. 449–450; Radowitz, Tagebuchaufzeichnung, 25 August 1866, ibid., pp. 445 ff.

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  42. G. Roloff, “Brünn und Nikolsburg,” HZ, CXXXVI, Heft 3 (1927), PP. 472–474. The author attributes the failure of Goltz to discuss the Prussian annexation proposals to the ambassador’s opposition to Bismarck’s unrestrained expansionist ambitions. Cf. Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, 14 July 1866, ONCKEN, I, 351–356.

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  43. Drouyn de Lhuys to Benedetti, Paris, 14 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, no. 71.

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  44. See Gramont to Drouyn de Lhuys, Vienna, 17 July 1866, FAE MD, Autriche/67, no. 9o.

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  45. Benedetti told Roon that he expected to go to Paris from Vienna (Roon to his wife, Brünn, 17 July 1866, RooN, II, 296 ).

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  46. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Brünn, 15 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, no. 158.

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  47. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Vienna, 16 July 1866, FAE CP, Autriche/492, T. Benedetti’s remark regarding Bismarck’s insistence on contiguous borders for Prussia contrasts sharply with Goltz’s neglect to mention Prussian annexation demands to the emperor.

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  48. Drouyn de Lhuys to Gramont, Paris, 16 July 1866, ibid., T.

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  49. Gramont (for Benedetti) to Drouyn de Lhuys, Vienna, 16 July 1866, ibid., T. In this communication, Benedetti refers to the preliminaries as a rédaction du département and as nos conditions.

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  50. See above, fts. 1, 2, p. 92.

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  51. For text, see above p. 93.

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  52. Gramont (for Benedetti) to Drouyn de Lhuys, Vienna, 16 July 1866, FAE CP, Autriche/ 492, T.

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  53. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Vienna, 17 July 1866, FAE MD, Autriche/67, T.

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  54. Gramont to Drouyn de Lhuys, Vienna, 18 July 1866, FAE CP, Autriche/492, no. 91; “Benedetti himself returned on the 19th with the assurance that [the peace preliminaries] had been accepted by Count Mensdorff” (KEUDELL, p. 296). Cf. the version of Benedetti’s visit given by the Belgian envoy in Vienna: “In general, Benedetti’s attitude during his sojourn here was unique. He made himself absolute master of the French embassy, established himself there without much regard for Gramont; wrote a voluminous correspondence which he sent off to Paris, saw Count Mensdorff only once; thirty-six hours after his arrival he left again for the Prussian camp, taking with him, it is said, the last concession which Austria can make to put an end to the hostilities. Since the arrival and after the departure of Benedetti, Gramont showed himself extremely reserved and seems shattered” (De Jonghe to Rogier, Vienna, 20 July 1866, BAE CP, Autriche-Hongrie/33, no. 149.

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  55. Drouyn de Lhuys to Gramont (for Benedetti,) Paris, 17 July 1866, FAE MD, Autriche/ 67, T.

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  56. I leave in a few minutes for headquarters; but unless the king and Bismarck have completely dissembled their true intentions or have reasons, of which I am ignorant, to subscribe to our preliminaries, I cannot help but believe that all my efforts are useless. I received your dispatch and I will conform to it“ (Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Vienna, 18 July 1866, ODG, X, 99, T.).

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  57. Roon to his wife, Nikolsburg, 19 July 1866, Roos, II, 297. Roon was under the misapprehension that Benedetti, who left only on the 15th, had made a round trip to Paris via Vienna.

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  58. Cf. Bismarck to Goltz, Nikolsburg, 17 July 1866, SYBEL, V, 285, in which the minister-president requested that the intended annexations be included in the peace preliminaries; cf. Thimme, HZ, LXXXIX, Heft 3 (1902), p. 438. This substantiates Benedetti’s remarks concerning the text (Gramont [for Benedetti] to Drouyn de Lhuys, Vienna, 16 July 1866, FAE CP, Autriche/492, T.).

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  59. Benedetti arrived in Nikolsburg during the very early hours of the 19th, and Reuss arrived a few hours later (Boyen to his wife, Nikolsburg, 19 July 1866, W. VON TÜMPLING, Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Generaladjutanten Kaiser Wilhelms I. Hermann von Boyen [Berlin, 1898], p. 179). Prince Reuss carried also a personal reply of the emperor to King William Napoleon urged a speedy conclusion of an armistice and peace treaty, lest public opinion in France, uncertain of Prussian objectives, trouble the relations between France and Prussia. In his letter, the emperor also alluded to the uneasiness in France created by the change in the balance of power and the prospect of Prussian military leadership of a united Germany (Napoleon III to William I, Paris, 15 July 1866, ONCKEN, I, 357–358; ft. 2, 2, ibid., 357 ).

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  60. See draft of report to Crown Prince Frederick, Berlin, 3 February 1867, I.A.A.b. 84; Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 19 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, no. 159

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  61. cf. L. Crummenerl, Zur Geschichte der Entstehung des Friedens von Nikolsburg 1866 (Emsdetten, 1936 ), 91 pp

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  62. H. Warnholtz, Bismarcks Kampf um den Vorfrieden von Nikolsburg 1866 (Hamburg, 1939), 8o pp.; GEUSS, pp. 184–187.

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  63. Thimme, HZ, LXXXIX, Heft 3 (1902), pp. 441–442. Cf. F. K. VON Hohenzollern, Mémoires du Prince Frédéric-Charles de Prusse, ed. W. Foerster, trans. and summarized by Corteys (Paris, n.d.), I, 371, who writes that Benedetti’s remarks after returning from Vienna had given the king hope for a quick peace.

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  64. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 19 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, no. 259.

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  65. Gramont to Drouyn de Lhuys, Vienna, 20 July 1866, FAE CP, Autriche/492, T.

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  66. A Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 29 July 1866, ibid., Prusse/358, no. 259.

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  67. I told [Benedetti] I did not have time [to talk to him] and continued to work, but of course he kept talking, very friendly and often very interesting stories, but nonetheless disturbing me“ (Abeken to his wife, Nikolsburg, 20 July 1866, ABEKEN, p. 337).

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  68. Roloff, HZ, CXXXVI, Heft 3 (1927), P. 490; FRIEDRICH III., p. 468.

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  69. I was interrupted here early this morning by Benedetti who however did not remain long, but long enough to keep me working late now“ (Abeken to his wife, Nikolsburg, 21 July 1866, ABEKEN, p. 338).

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  70. L. Von Blumenthal, Tagebiicher aus den Jahren x866 and 1870171, ed. A. von Blumenthal (Stuttgart, 1902 ), p. 46.

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  71. Drouyn de Lhuys to Benedetti, Paris, 19 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, no. 159.

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  72. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 23 July 1866, ibid., no. 162. In accordance with his instructions, Benedetti did not attend any of the meetings but spent most of his time at the king’s headquarters in readiness to confer with any of the delegates who might seek his help. “The French ambassador and his secretary had dinner with us, in the minister’s reception room; at the entrance of the king and the crown prince the minister went with them to my room to confer; we finished our meal, drank our coffee, then one by one the others all slipped away, Keudell, Bismarck-Bohlen, the French secretary, only I had no room to go to and was left alone with the ambassador, who sat on the table with his legs dangling down and told me Egyptian stories. The minister came in and out, advising us to be patient; finally it occurred, happily enough, to Bene-Maledetti that he might write a letter to his wife, and speak later to the minister [and] with that he ran off” (Abeken to his wife, Nikolsburg, 23 July r866, ABEKEN, p. 339)•

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  73. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 23 July x866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, no. 162 Cf. ERNST II. (duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha), Aus meinem Leben and aus meiner Zeit (Berlin, 1892), p. 673, for his talks with Benedetti and Degenfeld in efforts to bring about a speedy armistice; see also D’HARCOURT, pp. 285–286.

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  74. The noble Emperor Francis Joseph made it a question of honor not to abandon the only German confederate who stood by his side in the hour of danger. For this reason, and only for this reason, did the Austrian plenipotentiaries in Nikolsburg designate the maintenance of the [territorial] integrity of Saxony as a conditio sine qua non“ (VITZTHUM, p. 287). Cf. R. VON Friesen, Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben (Dresden, 189o), II, 229, whom Benedetti had told that ”the demand for the mere ‘existence’ [of Saxony] seemed too small, and therefore he, at his own risk and responsibility, demanded instead the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Saxony and obtained the inclusion of the sentence in the treaty.“

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  75. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 23 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, no. 162. Benedetti had said, “It is necessary to give Austria time to recover ” (GovoNE, p. 305 ).

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  76. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 23 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, no. 162. Cf. Rothfritz, p. 96, who believes that Goltz’s handling of the Prussian demands in Paris during the pre-armistice period earned him nothing but criticism and spoiled his hope of becoming foreign minister

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  77. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 23 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, no. 162.

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  78. Same to same, Nikolsburg, 24 July 1866, ibid., no. 166. The Austro-Bavarian treaty prohibited armistice or peace agreements by either power without the consent of the other. 2 Ibid.

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  79. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 24 July 1866, ibid., T.; same to same, Nikolsburg, 25 July 1866, ibid., no. 167; cf. BERNHARDI, pp. 263–264.

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  80. For a detailed study of the king’s attitude see W. Buscx, “Der Kampf um den Frieden in dem preussischen Hauptquartier zu Nikolsburg im Juli 1866,” HZ, XCII, Heft 1 (1904), PP. 418–455; Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 24 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/ 358, no. 166

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  81. FRIEDRICH III., p. 471; Loftus to Stanley, Berlin, II August 1866, PRO FO 64/599, no. 138.

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  82. Cf. H. Poschinger, Bismarck and die Diplomaten, 1852–1890 (Hamburg, 1900), p. 216, ft. 1. This note pertains to an article by A. Sckell, which appeared in the Sammler, a belles-lettres section of the Augsburger Abendzeitung, on 27 October 1868: “Pfordten’s confinement lasted three days. Through some channel he managed that finally the French Ambassador Benedetti… presented his cause to the king, that Bavaria be included in the armistice negotiations. And thus Pfordten was called to Bismarck after three terrible days.” Cf. F. vox Beusr, Erinnerungen zu Erinnerungen (Leipzig, 1881), p. 49, who in anticipation of such treatment had decided not to go to Nikolsburg.

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  83. I Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 25 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, no. 167

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  84. Ibid.; “The king and Bismarck evidently had a dispute, and the excitement has not diminished. Yesterday Bismarck cried in my presence over the harsh things which His Majesty had said to him” (FRIEDRICH III., p. 473). Cf. Wilhelm I., Der alte Kaiser, ed. K. Pagel (Leipzig, 1924), P. 287, for the following marginal comment by the king to a note from Bismarck in Nikolsburg: “After my minister-president deserts me in the face of the enemy… and because [my son] shares [his] opinion, I find myself, to my sorrow, forced to bite into this sour apple and accept this disgraceful peace after such brilliant victories of the army.” As early as 17 July Bismarck had expressed the view that no Austrian territory should be demanded, a further indication that he desired a lenient peace for Austria (A. vox STOSCH, Denkwürdigkeiten, ed. U. von Stosch [zd ed.; Stuttgart, 1904 ], P. 102 ).

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  85. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 25 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/358, no. 167.

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  86. Same to same, Nikolsburg, 26 July 1866, FAE MD, Autriche/67. “Hardly arrived [in Nikolsburg on 26 July] and before I got to the king, Benedetti urgently solicited an audience with me… he told me Napoleon… hoped that an armistice would be signed” (FRIEDRICH III., p. 474). For the effect of foreign intervention, real and imagined, upon Prussian disposition to conclude an armistice cf. Keudell to Duncker, Nikolsburg, 26 July 1866

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  87. M. Duncker, Politischer Brie fwechsel aus seinem Nachlass, ed. J. Schultze, “Deutsche Geschichtsquellen des 19. Jahrhunderts,” XII (Leipzig, 1923), p. 427; Talleyrand to Drouyn de Lhuys, St. Petersburg, 24 July 1866, FAE CP, Russie/237, no. 63; Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 29 July 1866, ibid., Prusse/ 358, T.; Drouyn de Lhuys to André (for Benedetti), Vichy, 4 August 1866, FAE MD, Autriche/67, T.

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  88. K. Rheindorf, Die Schwarze-Meer(Pontus-) Frage vom Pariser Frieden von 1856 bis zum Abschluss der Londoner Konferenz von 1871 (Berlin, 1925 ), P. 49.

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  89. I Abeken to his wife, Nikolsburg, 26 July 1866, ABEKEN, p. 342. Benedetti, in sending the translation to Drouyn de Lhuys, termed it “a translation which has been prepared in the office of the minister-president” (Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 26 July 1866, FAE MD, Autriche/67, no. 9 ).

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  90. According to the terms of the peace preliminaries, Prussia expected to annex outright Hanover, Electoral Hesse, that part of Grand Ducal Hesse north of the Main, Nassau and Frankfort (Lefèbvre de Béhaine to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 28 July 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/ 358, T.).

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  91. It was only through the benevolent intervention of Your Majesty’s ambassador at the court of Berlin that my minister was able to obtain, after several days, an armistice… for three weeks, beginning 2 August“ (Louis II to Napoleon III, Munich, 3 August 1866, ibid., Bavière/241).

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  92. A Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 28 July 1866, ibid., Prusse/358, T. Cf. same to same, Nikolsburg, 28 July 1866, FAE MD, Autriche/67. Benedetti wrote that since Prussia had obtained all she wanted from Austria, Bismarck no longer encouraged Italian opposition to an armistice. Cf. Bernhardi, pp. 263–264.

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  93. On 29 July Benedetti declared officially, and in writing, to Bismarck that the acquisition of Venetia by Italy had been secured (PRUSSIA. KRIEGSGESCHICHTLICHE ABTEILUNG DES GROSSEN GENERALSTABES, p. 717); Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Nikolsburg, 30 July 1866, ODG, XI, 298 ).

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  94. Same to same, Berlin, 3 August 1866, FAE MD, Autriche/67, T.

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  95. See BEYENS, II, 154; A. Ducrot, La vie militaire du général Ducrot (Paris, 1895 ), II, 279.

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  96. Drouyn de Lhuys to Benedetti, Vichy, 2 August 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/359, n 6

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Fletcher, W.A. (1965). Mediation at Nikolsburg. In: The Mission of Vincent Benedetti to Berlin 1864–1870. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7547-8_4

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