Abstract
Between 1781 and 1789 the American states attempted to share the costs of national, public goods through a system of requisitions. This paper uses a simple public goods analysis to show why rational states would not share costs as intended by the Articles of Confederation. This normative argument illustrates a potential flaw in the constitutional design of the Articles and provides insight into the decline of the American Confederation.
The authors would like to thank David Lalman, Joe Oppenheimer, Piotr Swistak, and Rick Wilson for invaluable feedback on this article. Katrhyn Doherty, Mark Graber, Paul Hernson, Daniel Simon, and Eric Uslaner provided useful comments as well.
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Dougherty, K.L., Cain, M.J.G. (1997). Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation. In: Rowley, C.K. (eds) Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_9
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