Choosing free trade without amending the U.S. Constitution

Abstract

This paper documents the functioning of the market in trade protection. It uses a narrative approach to demonstrate that politicians respond to the demands of special interests by forcing open foreign markets and by closing domestic markets. In the process government officials violate property rights, disregard economic logic, damage the world trading system, multiply rent-seeking costs, and destroy wealth. Such outcomes imply that there is a constitutional failure, and that the rules and institutions governing international trade need to be reformed. This paper discusses several such changes and considers how consumers could be mobilized to support them.

Protectionism is a constitutional failure. — Jan Tumlir Quoted in Robert Hudec (1993)

Parts of this paper draw on Rowley, Thorbecke, and Wagner (1995). I thank Jae Chung, Yujiro Hayami, and the editor, Charles Rowley for helpful comments. Any errors are the responsibility of the author.