Abstract
The pattern of state support for Prohibition (18th Amendment, 1919) and Repeal (21st Amendment, 1933) is analyzed and compared. This comparison is important because Prohibition is the only amendment ever to be repealed. The main thesis is that there was no wholesale change in preferences of citizens. Instead, producer interests failed to mobilize effectively in 1919, and the coupling of moral and economic arguments that worked in 1919 broke apart in 1933. Regression analysis is conducted on state legislatures (for Prohibition) and state referenda on convention delegates (for Repeal), so states are observations in the cross-sectional regression analysis. The results broadly support the main thesis.
The authors wish to thank Kevin McGuire, Thomas Oatley, and Peter VanDoren for helpful comments. We especially thank Charles Rowley for helping conceive the topic. The usual caveat, of course, applies.
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Munger, M., Schaller, T. (1997). The prohibition-repeal amendments: A natural experiment in interest group influence. In: Rowley, C.K. (eds) Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_6
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