Abstract
From the perspective of a supporter, this paper responds to the several criticisms that have been raised to the proposed constitutional amendment to require budget balance. Economists have concentrated on the loss of fiscal flexibility. This objection is countered by reference to the political inefficacy of attempted budgetary manipulation. Lawyers have concentrated on problems of enforcement. This objection is countered by reference to observed respect to other constitutional rules.
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Buchanan, J.M. (1997). The balanced budget amendment: Clarifying the arguments. In: Rowley, C.K. (eds) Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_5
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