Abstract
Constitutional questions have resurfaced in the last few years with regard to the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty is a kind of constitutional reform. The rejection of this treaty by Denmark in its first referendum, and the subsequent debate of the treaty that has taken place, raise questions about both the nature of the European Union, and the process by which its rules (constitution) get revised and approved. Similar questions surround the entry of Austria and the three, additional Scandinavian countries into the Union. Perhaps, no event called the European Union’s constitution, or lack thereof, into question more that way in which a new President of the Commission was chosen during the summer of 1994. This paper will reexamine the European Union’s structure and procedures from a constitutional perspective. Drawing upon the author’s recently completed book, Constitutional Democracy, the paper will review the purpose for the Union’s existence, the implications of this purpose for the structure of the Union (federalism versus confederation), the rules for making collective decisions in the Union, citizenship, and in particular, the procedures by which the European Union’s “Constitution” is written and revised. The constitutional perspective adopted is taken from public choice. The political institutions of the European Union are examined relative to those rational, self-interested individuals would choose to advance their interests.
The financial support for this research of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institut is gratefully acknowledged.
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Mueller, D.C. (1997). Federalism and the European Union: A constitutional perspective. In: Rowley, C.K. (eds) Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_12
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