Abstract
Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals interact and to the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being (Buchanan 1990:1). As such, it has both normative and positive connotations, although arguably the normative emphasis has tended to dominate the early contributions of this relatively young program (Voigt, 1996), which developed initially as an important extension of Paretian welfare economics to determine the logical foundations of constitutional democracy (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962).
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Rowley, C.K. (1997). Introduction: The relevance of public choice for constitutional political economy. In: Rowley, C.K. (eds) Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_1
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