Abstract
The paper examines central parts of the first of two papers in this journal by Peter Slezak criticising ‘sociology of scientific knowledge’ and also considers, independently, some of the main philosophical issues raised by the sociologists of science, in particular David Bloor. The general conclusion is that each account alludes to different and crucial aspects of the nature of knowledge without. severally or jointly, being able to theorise them adequately. The appendix contains epistemological theses central to a more adequate theory of scientific knowledge.
… our Histories of six Thousand Moons make no Mention of any other. than the two great Empires of Lilliput and Blefuscu. Which mighty Powers have … been engaged in a most obstinate War for six and thirty Moons past. It began upon the following Occasion. It is allowed on all Hands, that the primitive Way of breaking Eggs before we eat them, was upon the larger End: But … the Emperor [of Lilliput] … published an Edict, commanding all his Subjects, upon great Penalties, to break the smaller End of their Eggs. The People so resented this Law, that … there have been six Rebellions raised on that Account … These civil Commotions were constantly fomented by the Monarchs of Blefuscu … It is computed, that eleven Thousand have, at several Times, suffered Death, rather than break Eggs at the smaller End. Many hundred large Volumes have published upon this Controversy… Swift, Gulliver’s Travels, Pt I, Ch. IV.
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Suchting, W.A. (1998). Reflections on Peter Slezak and the ‘Sociology of Scientific Knowledge’. In: Matthews, M.R. (eds) Constructivism in Science Education. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5032-3_11
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