Abstract
The discussion will be rounded off with some general remarks on the usefulness of the models employed in the current investigation. While these remarks are rather loosely coupled, they all relate to the epistemological status of the co-management perspective. First, the argument is made that co-management has proven less “progressive” in the sense of producing scientific “novelties” than the self-management perspective, which it was grouped together with in Chapter 2 as co-operative action theory. Second, the usefulness of the same perspective in a non-market economy is further discussed (following up the discussion in Chapter 6 on co-management in Northwest Russian fisheries). Finally, the applicability of the various perspectives and models employed in the study, as well as the implications of the methodological and epistemological choices underlying it, are discussed on a more general basis in the concluding section.
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Notes
Cf. the discussion in Chapter 2 of whether the work of Elinor Ostrom should be categorised as rational choice or co-operative action theory.
This issue is more thoroughly discussed in Hønneland (1998a).
Obviously, the same argument goes for the rational choice theory. The choice situation facing Soviet fishermen was far from that envisaged by Hardin (1968). This is, however, to a larger extent considered “common knowledge” (i.e. that the underlying assumptions of human behaviour prevailing in a market economy do not apply in a plan economy context).
As further discussed in Hønneland (1998a), the disintegration of the plan economy in the former Soviet Union led to a considerable over-fishing of the Russian quota in the Barents Sea in 1992. First, the introduction of a market economy and the possibility of landing fish abroad significantly changed the incentive structure of Russian fishermen. Second, the Russian enforcement system was not capable of halting the over-fishing since they were no longer able to control the quantities of fish in the deliveries. Mainly as a result of this, a cooperation between Norwegian and Russian enforcement bodies was established in 1993, which involves among other things an exchange of information on deliveries of fish. As far as Norwegian control authorities can establish, the over-fishing was halted after the introduction of this co-operation.
As discussed above, such a study hardly fits in with the positive heuristics of this research programme.
Inducement, or rewards (cf. Chapter 3), might also be considered, though not in the present context since these are not employed in the Barents Sea fisheries.
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Hønneland, G. (2000). Concluding Remarks. In: Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources. Environment & Policy, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4044-7_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4044-7_9
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