Quine and Observation

Abstract

Observation is central to empiricism, whose leading idea is that all knowledge is ultimately conveyed to us through our perceptual experiences. Analytic philosophy is in part distinguished by its transformation of traditional philosophical questions into ones about language, and by its emphasis on the primacy of the sentence as linguistic vehicle. So it is no wonder that the notion of an observation sentence is central to W.V. Quine’s philosophy, which in many ways represents the zenith of empiricism as pursued in the analytic tradition. A proper understanding and assessment of his philosophy depends on a satisfactory construal of that notion, one that answers to all the roles he calls upon it to play. And yet, Quine has found “the notion of observation awkward to analyze” and has returned to its characterization again and again.1

[T]here is more to the equating of stimulations than meets the eye, or indeed perhaps rather less than seems to do so. -W.V. Quine, The Roots of Reference

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I am grateful to Amherst College for a grant that facilitated completion of this paper. I am also indebted to G. Lee Bowie, Jay L. Garfield, A.W. Moore, Joseph G. Moore, and W.V. Quine for helpful comments.