Abstract
This essay is offered as a contribution to the effort to make phenomenology not only a descriptive, but also a critical project. It follows the conceptions of Husserl’s spirit previously developed by B. Waldenfels (Cf. Der Spielraum des Verhaltens, Frankfurt a.M., 1980, and In den Netzen der Lebenswelt, Frankfurt a.M., 1985) and J. San Martí (Cf. “La fenomenologia de Husserl como utopia de la razón.” Anthropos, Madrid, 1987, pp. 134f). Merleau-Ponty can be a very important guide in this task.
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Notes
Quoted by Merleau-Ponty in Fenomenologia de la percepcion (Barcelona: 1975), p. 380. (See Note 2.) Cf. Phénoménologie de la Perception (P.P.) (Paris: 1945), p. 425.
“What I reach is a same thing, since every thing on which one can think is a significance of that thing, and is called precisely perception of the act in which that significance is revealed to me. It is not Bergson but Kant who gave origin to the idea that perception of being is the zero point. This follows immediately from this the notion of consciousness as a universal life wherein every assurance of the object finds its motives.” From M. Merleau-Ponty, La estructura del comportamiento (Buenos Aires: 1957), p. 277. Cf. La structure du comportement (S.C.) 3rd ed. (Paris: 1953), p. 215.
“The I seems to be there even necessarily, and this constancy is not, of course, that of a personal experience (Erlebnis) which stupidly persists. … It belongs to the whole personal experience which comes and goes in the current. … E. Husserl, Ideen (1913), §57.
J. A. Arias Muñoz, La antropología de Merleau-Ponty (Madrid: 1975), p. 9.
Quoted in: J. A. Arias Muñoz, La antropología de Merleau-Ponty (Madrid: 1975), p. 197. (See also Noted 67, pp. 197, 198.)
“Things are not I and I am not things: we are transcendental to each other, but we both are immanent to the absolute coexistence which is life.” — J. Ortega y Gasset, Unas lecciones de metafiscia (Madrid: 1974), p. 186.
M. Merleau-Ponty, La estructura del comportamiento (Buenos Aires: 1957), pp. 27–30
M. Merleau-Ponty, La estructura del comportamiento (Buenos Aires: 1957), 83ff. (S.C., pp.8–39, 55ff.)
M. Merleau-Ponty, La estructura del comportamiento (Buenos Aires: 1957), pp. 75–80
M. Merleau-Ponty, La estructura del comportamiento (Buenos Aires: 1957) 94ff.
M. Merleau-Ponty, La estructura del comportamiento (Buenos Aires: 1957) 185ff. (S.C., pp. 48–52, 64ff., 139ff.)
M. Merleau-Ponty, La estructura del comportamiento (Buenos Aires: 1957), p. 307 ff.(S. C., pp. 240ff.)
M. Merleau-Ponty, Fenomenologia de la perception, (Barcelona: 1975), p. 383ff.
M. Merleau-Ponty, Fenomenologia de la perception, (Barcelona: 1975) (P.P., pp. 428ff.)
A. del Brio Mateos, “Ambiguedad y reduccion en Merleau-Ponty,” in Anales del seminario de Metafiscia (Univeridad Complutense), XVIII, 1962 pp. 85–101, p. 88.
M. Scheler, El puesto del hombre en el cosmos (cf. Die Stelle des Menschen im Kosmos) (Buenos Aires: 1982), p. 72. (Man is the being which knows how to say no, the ascetic of life, the eternal protester against every mere reality.)
M. Merleau-Ponty, La estructura del comportamiento, (Buenos Aires: 1957), p. 174ff.
M. Merleau-Ponty, La phenomenologie de la perception (Paris: 1945), p. iii, quoted in the Introduction to his La structure du comportement (Paris: 1942), by A. de Whaelhens, “Une philosophie de l’ambiguité,” XIV.
M. Foucault, Las palabras y las cosas (Les mots et les choses) (Mexico City: 1978), p. 314.
We believe to be a major importance in this regard: M. Merleau-Ponty Fenomenologia de la percepcion, (Barcelona: 1975), III, II. In a pure phenomenological essay, the author revises the concept of subject, highlighting the subject-in-reality; p. 379ff. (P.P., pp. 423–468 (“Le cogito”).)
How can one make man think the way he does, inhabit that which escapes him in the way of a mute occupation, give life, through a kind of frozen movement, to this figure of himself which appears under the form of a stubborn exteriority?” — M. Foucault, Las palabras y las cosas (Les mots et les choses) (Mexico City: 1978), p. 314.
M. Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, (Frankfurt a.M.: 1951), pp. 185ff.
“Well this significant life, this certain significance of Nature, and of the History which is not me, does not block my access to communication with it.” M. Merleau-Ponty, Fenomenologia de la percepcion, (Barcelona: 1975), p. 462.
M. Merleau-Ponty, Fenomenologia de la percepcion, (Barcelona: 1975) (P.P., pp. 519–520.)
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Burgos, R.P. (1991). Toward an Open Anthropology: Developing Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Husserlian Phenomenology in a New Key. Analecta Husserliana, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3450-7_22
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