On the Quasi-Intentional Nature of Represented Objects in a Film Work of Art

Abstract

In several previous studies on the theme of the phenomenology of the cinema, we indicated the advantages resulting from the formal analysis of a film work.¹ In this study, we want to refer to the article in which we proved the quasi-linguistic character of a film work (if we consider it as a system of signs).² The aim of this text, however, is the description of the quasi-intentional character of the objects represented in a film work. According to Ingarden’s thesis, the represented objects forming the represented stratum of a film work possess an intentional nature. Let us begin with the explanation of the very notion of an intentional object. Psychology and philosophy differentiate “the act of thinking” from “the content of thinking.” This refers to all sorts of representations, judgements, statements, etc. It is maintained that different acts may possess the same content. One of the simplest examples of such a case may be the situation in which two persons are thinking about the same event at the same time, for example, that it has started raining even though the sun was shining a few minutes earlier. We have to do with two acts of mind although the content of both of them is identical. In Latin, “the content” bears the name “intensio.” There is, as well, the term “intentio” which is used to describe a certain act directed towards a certain object. In accordance with Brentano’s terminology, this object bears the name “intentional” and may be identified with the content of thought.³