Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to provide a sample of phenomenological reflection in Husserl’s “footsteps” despite my making use of philosophical research tools that were proposed by a writer who — to assign him an elementary scholarly framework — might be placed in the trend called “Analytical Philosophy”: J. L. Austin.
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Notes
PP, p. 175. G. J. Warnock, “Saturday Mornings,” Essays on J. L. Austin (Glasgow: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 34f.
R. J. Bernstein, Praxis y acción, G. Bello Reguera, trans. (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1979), p. 17.
PP, p. 124. Vid. F. Montero Moliner, Retorno a la Fenomenología (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1987), pp. 122f.
For an analysis of the notion of “phenomenon,” F. Montero Moliner, Retorno a la Fenomenología (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1987)., pp. 63f.
E. Pivcevic, “Concepts, Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding,” Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding (Cambridge: University Press, 1975). pp. 283
E. Pivcevic, “Concepts, Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding,” Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding (Cambridge: University Press, 1975). pp. 285f.
P. Ricoeur, El discurso de la acción, Pilar Calvo, trans. (Madrid: Cátedra, 1981), pp. 21f.
J. Searle, Intentionality (Cambridge: University Press, 1983), p. vii.
Vid. F. Montero Moliner, Retorno a la Fenomenología (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1987)., p. 66
for the relationship between “any phenomenon” and intentionality. With this terminology I differ from that found in P. Ricoeur, “Phenomenology of Freedom,” in E. Pivcevic, ed., Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding (Cambridge: University Press, 1975), p. 184. This author calls voluntary intention what is here called “intention” and bare intention what we call here “intentionality.” I do not differ from the context of these terms in Ricoeur’s paper.
PP, pp. 176, 180, 189. About “mechanicism” and “moral antimechanicism,” vid. S. Cavell, “Must We Mean What We Say?,” in V. C. Chapell, ed., El Lenguaje común, J. R. Capella trans. (Madrid: Tecnos, 1971), p. 107, n. 4.
PP, pp. 130, 161, 190f. There is a debate on “aberrant” situations which it is convenient to take into account because of its relevance in the international bibliography. But I think this does not effect what I propose as an original description of the experience we have when we say we are acting “intentionally” or “freely.” Vid. J. Searle, “Assertions and Aberrations,” in K. T. Fann, ed., Symposium on J. L. Austin (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1969)
R. A. White, “Mentioning the Unmentionable,” in Fann also. The working method can give rise to the “assertion fallacy,” according to J. Searle, in Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: University Press, 1970), par. 6.3.
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Guzman, V.M. (1991). On a Linguistic Phenomenology of “Intention”. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Husserl’s Legacy in Phenomenological Philosophies. Analecta Husserliana, vol 36. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3368-5_6
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