Abstract
Displays of “calibration curves” - very well replicated results of probability ratings on two-alternative knowledge questions - are often interpreted as an indication of human “overconfidence”. Several influential researchers see this phenomenon as another instance of selfserving and theory confirming biases. This interpretation of the empirical result can be criticized because of four problems: 1) item selection, 2) forced scale use, 3) differences in singular and frequentistic judgments, 4) normative ambiguity of calibration. Two normative ideas have to be distinguished: populationwise and itemwise calibration. It is discussed which idea may be justified and under which conditions the emergence of “overconfidence” must be interpreted as an artifact.
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© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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May, R.S. (1991). Overconfidence In Overconfidence. In: Chikán, A. (eds) Progress in Decision, Utility and Risk Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3146-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3146-9_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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