Skip to main content

Response-Modes And Inconsistencies In Preference Assessments

  • Chapter
Progress in Decision, Utility and Risk Theory

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLB,volume 13))

  • 142 Accesses

Abstract

This study uncovers the generality and pervasiveness of so-called response-mode effects in preference elicitation. Adjusting X and adjusting Y in matching pairs of two-dimensional alternatives [X,Y] do not produce equivalent indifference relations, as logic would dictate. The discrepancy between certainty and probability equivalents studied by Hershey and Schoemaker (1985) appears to be a particular case of a general phenomenon. However, Hershey and Schoemaker’s interpretation of this discrepancy is not applicable to the general case.

In light of this evidence, we reexamine the conclusions of earlier studies of utility assessment methods. The results of new experiments show that the dependence of utility functions on probability is associated with the elicitation of X-responses rather than a certainty effect as previously proposed.

Our findings can be simply described as an overweighting of the response dimension, which could be further explained as the result of an anchoring and adjustment heuristic.

The fact that indifference relations of the type [X1Y1] ~ [X2, Y2] depend systematically on the response mode used to establish them is a disturbing violation of invariance which poses a serious problem to any utility assessment method based on matching, that is to say most of them.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Byrd, J. G., de Neufville, R. and Delquié, Ph., 1987, ‘The Difference Between Probability and Certainty Equivalents Methods of Utility Assessment’, Technology and Policy Program working paper, M.I.T..

    Google Scholar 

  • de Neufville, R. and Delquié, Ph., 1988, ‘A Model of the Influence of Certainty and Probability Effects on the Measurement of Utility’, in B. Munier (ed.), Risk, Decision and Rationality, 189–205, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Goldstein, W. and Einhorn, H., 1987, ‘Expression Theory and the Preference Reversal Phenomena’, Psychological Review, 94, 236–254.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hershey, J. and Schoemaker, P., 1985, ‘Probability versus Certainty Equivalence Methods in Utility Measurement: Are They Equivalent ?’, Management Science, 31, 1213–1231.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, E. and Schkade, D., 1989, ‘Bias in Utility Assessments: Further Evidence and Explanations’, Management Science, 35, 4,406–424,424.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A., 1979, ‘Prospect Theory: an Analysis of Decision under Risk’, Econometrica, 47, 263–291.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Karmarkar, U., 1978, ‘Subjectively Weighted Utility: A Descriptive Extension of the Expected Utility Model’, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 21, 61–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lichtenstein, S. and Slovic, P., 1971, ‘Reversals of Preference between Bids and Choices in Gambling Decisions’, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89, 46–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCord, M. and de Neufville, R., 1986, ‘“Lottery Equivalents”: Reduction of the Certainty Effect in Utility Assessment’, Management Science, 32, 56–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCord, M. and de Neufville, R., 1983, ‘Empirical Demonstration that Expected Utility Decision Analysis is not Operational’, in Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory with Applications, Stigum and Wenstop, eds., D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 181–199.

    Google Scholar 

  • Payne, J., 1982, ‘Contingent Decision Behavior’, Psychological Bulletin, 92, 382–402.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Slovic, P., 1975, ‘Choice between Equally Valued Alternatives’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 1, 280–287.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tversky, A., Sattath, S. and Slovic, P., 1988, ‘Contingent Weighting in Judgement and Choice’, Psychological Review, 95, 3, 371–384.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Delquié, P., de Neufville, R. (1991). Response-Modes And Inconsistencies In Preference Assessments. In: Chikán, A. (eds) Progress in Decision, Utility and Risk Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3146-9_11

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3146-9_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5387-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-3146-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics