Abstract
This paper presents a synthesis of my research into the problem of the self in Hume. The copious bibliography available on this topic indicates that the subject I suggest to discuss is problematic but also of crucial interest. I propose to develop the following argument, namely, that there exists in Hume a psychological awareness of the self. There is no incompatibility between the denial of personal identity in A Treatise of Human Nature Book I, and the arguments put forward in Book II Of the Passions, and in Book III, Of the Understanding of Morals. I shall maintain that Hume is not elaborating an ontological but a psychological theory of the self. This represents a new departure with regard to the philosophy of his time. On the other hand, I consider Hume’s critique on the self as a substance as pertinent if one takes substance in the Cartesian sense of the word. However, his critique or his denial of an abstract identity of the seif does not mean that he denies the possibility of our knowing ourselves. For Hume it is possible for us to know who we are. I would express this in a rather paradoxical Statement: “Every man needs to know what he is in order to be so”.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
E. Gilson, Edition of Descartes’ Discours de la méthode (Paris: Vrin, 1930), p. 437 in Risieri Frondizi, The Nature of the Self (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1953 and 1971).
J. Noxon, Hume’s Philosophical Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 124.
Cf. F. Montero, ’El descubrimiento del yo’, Revista de filosofía, CSIC XX, 61, No. 76 (1958), pp. 337–363.
J. Noxon, Hume’s Philosophical Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).
Cf. D. Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984).
Also N. Phillipson,Hume, Historian on Historians (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989).
J. Choza, Manual de Antropología Filosófica (Madrid: Ed. Rialp, 1988).
M. Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).
Trans. C. Smith; Le Visible et Vinvisible (Paris: Ed. Gallimard, 1964)
P. Ricoeur, “Human Beings as a Subject of Philosophy”, at the XVIIIth World Philosophy Conference (August 1988), in Brighton, UK.
L. Duhan, “Ambiguity of Time, Self, and Philosophical Explanation in Merleau-Ponty, Husserl, and Hume”, Auslegung 13 (1987), pp. 126–138.
Cf. J. Vicente, “Yo y persona. El problema del sujeto en Wittgenstein”, Anuario Filosófico XIII (1985), pp. 128–129; G. E. M. Anscombe, The First Person, pp. 22–23.
F. Hernandez Borque, “Hume y Merleau-Ponty, filósofos de la experiencia”, Anales del Seminario de Meîafísica, Madrid XI (1976), p. 84.
G. Madell, Identity and Personal Identity (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1981 and 1984) 148 p.
S. Rábade Romeo, Hume y el fenomenismo moderno (Madrid: Ed. Gredos, 1975), p. 341; “Mejor aún, diríamos que la negación apunta directamente a negar que se pueda epistemologicamente justificar un conocimiento del yo como sustancia o como realidad necesitada de un sustrato permanente que le sirve de soporte”.
Cf. P. Maher, “Probability in Hume’s Science of Man”, Hume Studies VII, No. 2 (1981), pp. 137–153.
D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith, LL. A. (New York: Bobbs-Merril, 2 ed., 1947), p. 135.
Cf. N. Capaldi, David Hume. The Newtonian Philosopher (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975).
Cf. F. M. Berenson, Understanding Persons (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1981).
G. Deleuze, Empirisme et subjectivité (Paris: PUF, 1973), p. 1.
Cf. T. Penelhum, “Hume’s Theory of the Self Revisited”, Dialogue 14 (1975), pp. 389–409.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Elósegui, M. (1993). Hume on the Phenomenological Discovery of the Self. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Manifestations of Reason: Life, Historicity, Culture Reason, Life, Culture Part II. Analecta Husserliana, vol 40. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1677-0_25
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1677-0_25
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4733-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-1677-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive