Skip to main content

Are Incentive Instruments as Good as Economists Believe? Some New Considerations

  • Chapter
Public Economics and the Environment in an Imperfect World

Part of the book series: Natural Resource Management and Policy ((NRMP,volume 8))

Abstract

The Theory of Environmental Economics strongly suggests that the use of incentive instruments, which exploit the relative price effect, constitutes the most efficient and desirable policy. A recent survey on environmental policy (Hahn 1989, p. 95) notes that “the two tools which have received widespread support from the economics community (are) marketable permits and emission charges.” Environmental incentive instruments count among the most successful applications of economic theory (Faulhaber and Baumol, 1988; Cropper and Oates 1992). During the last few years, emission charges and even tradeable effluent licenses have moved from being an academic proposal to being part of the policy programme of many parties across the whole political spectrum. Nevertheless, incentive instruments are little used all over the world (Hahn, 1989); and an OECD study (1989) also sees little prospect that they will be used on an extensive scale in the future.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Aoki, M. (1990). “Towards an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm.” Journal of Economic Literature 28, 1–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Attfield, R. (1983). “The Ethics of Environmental Concern.” New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barkema, H.G. (1995). “Do Top Managers Work Harder When They Are Monitored?” Kyklos 48/1 ,1942.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumol, W.J. and W.E. Oates. (1979). “Economics, Environmental Policy, and the Quality of Life ” Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, G.S. (1976). “The Economic Approach to Human Behavior.” Chicago: Chicago University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beer, M. et al. (1984). “Managing Human Assets. ” New York: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blinder, A.S. (1987). “Hard Heads, Soft Hearts.” Reading: Addison-Wesley

    Google Scholar 

  • Cropper, M.L. and W.E. Oates. (1992). “Environmental Economics: A Survey.” Journal of Economic Literature 30/2, 675–740.

    Google Scholar 

  • DeAlessi, L. (1968). “The Utility of Disasters.” Kyklos 21, 525–533.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeAlessi, L. (1975). “Toward an Analysis of Postdisaster Cooperation.” American Economic Review 65/1, 127–138.

    Google Scholar 

  • Deci, E.L. (1971). “Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 18, 105–115.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Deci, E.L. and R.M. Ryan. (1985). “Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior. ” New York: Plenum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Des Jardins, J.R. (1993). “Environmental Ethics. ” Belmont: Wadsworth.

    Google Scholar 

  • Doeringer, P.B. (1991). “The Socio-Economics of Labor Productivity.” In R.M. Coughlin (ed.), Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency: New Perspectives on Socio-Economics. Armouk: Sharpe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Faulhaber, G.R. and W.J. Baumol. (1988). “Economists as Innovators.” Journal of Economic Literature 26/2, 577–600.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frey, B.S. (1992a). “Economics as a Science of Human Behaviour. Towards a New Social Science Paradigm. ” Boston: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frey, B.S. (1992b). “Pricing and Regulating Affect Environmental Ethics.” Environment and Resource Economics 2, 399–414.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frey, B.S. (1993a). “Motivation as a Limit to Pricing.” Journal of Economic Psychology 14, 635–664.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frey, B.S. (1993b). “Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty.” Economic Inquiry 31/4, 663–670.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frey, B.S. (1993c). “Shirking or Work Morale? The Impact of Regulating.” European Economic Review 37, 1523–1532.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frey, B.S. et al. (1984). “Consensus and Dissension among Economists: An Empirical Inquiry.” American Economic Review 74, 986–994.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodin, R.E. (1994). “Selling Environmental Indulgences.” Kyklos 47/4, 573– 596.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hahn, R.W. (1989). “Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patients Followed the Doctor’s Orders.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 95–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kelman, S. (1981). “What Price Incentives? Economists and the Environment. ” Boston: Auburn House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirchgässner, G. (1992). “Towards a Theory of Low-Cost Decisions. ” European Journal of Political Economy 8, 305–320.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kliemt, H. (1986). “The Veil of Insignificance.” European Journal of Political Economy 2/3, 333–344.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kochan, T., H. Katz and R.B. McKersie. (1986). “The Transformation of American Industrial Relations. ” New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lawler, E. E. (1990). “Aligning Organizational Strategies and Pay Systems. ” San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lee, C. (1987). “The New Employment Contract.” Training (Dec), 45–56.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lepper, M. and D. Greene (eds.). (1978). “The Hidden Costs of Reward: New Perspectives on the Psychology of Human Motivation. ” New York: Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGraw, K.O. (1978). “The Detrimental Effects of Reward on Performance: A Literature Review and a Prediction Model.” In M. Lepper and D. Greene (eds.), The Hidden Costs of Reward: New Perspectives on the Psychology of Human Motivation. New York: Erlbaum, 33–60.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, G.T. (1990). “Living in the Environment, ” 6th ed. Belmont: Wadsworth.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, D.C. (1990) “Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. ” Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • OECD. (1989). “Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection. ” Paris.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, E. (1990). “Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. ” Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Parkin, S. (1989). “Green Parties. An International Guide. ” London: Heretic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodman, J. (1983). “Four Forms of Ecological Consciousness Reconsidered.” In Donald Scherer and Thomas Attig (eds.), Ethics and the Environment. Engel wood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spretnak, C. (1986). “The Spiritual Dimension of Green Parties. ” Santa Fe: Bear &. Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, G. and G.S. Becker. (1977). “De gustibus non est disputandum.” American Economic Review 67, 76–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weck-Hannemann, H. (1994). “Die politische Ökonomie der Umweltpolitik.” In Rainer Bartel and Franz Hackl (eds.), Einführung in die Umweltpolitik. München: Vahlen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weck-Hannemann, H. and W.W. Pommerehne. (1989). “Einkommen-steuerhinterziehung in der Schweiz: Eine empirische Analyse.” Schweize-rische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik 125, 515–556.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wicke, L. (1991). “Umweltökonomie, ” 3rd ed. München: Vahlen.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Weck-Hannemann, H., Frey, B.S. (1995). Are Incentive Instruments as Good as Economists Believe? Some New Considerations. In: Bovenberg, L., Cnossen, S. (eds) Public Economics and the Environment in an Imperfect World. Natural Resource Management and Policy, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0661-0_8

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0661-0_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4289-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-0661-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics