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Conception of the Individual Pragmatically Leads to Consideration of Community

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An Idealistic Pragmatism

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Abstract

In the sixth of his lectures for the Lowell Institute in 1906–7, William James described truth, according to his pragmatic theory, as the “agreeable leading” of our ideas towards their verification in future experience.1 That this description applies to the development of Royce’s concept of the individual is a claim that the present chapter hopes to justify. Through his own consideration of the meaning and role of the individual in his absolutistic system, Royce was led to place increasing emphasis on the notion of community. Several themes which illustrate this “agreeable leading” of pragmatism as a way of philosophizing form the subject matter for the sections which follow. Collectively, these ideas not only motivate but necessitate Royce’s later more extensive treatment of community.

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References

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  2. WI II, 257.

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  5. WI II, 268. Cf. James’s critique of the notion of self as a metaphysical entity in Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, Ch. XII.

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  8. WI II, 269. Cf. James’s notion of self as stream or flow of consciousness in Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, Ch. XI. The dialectic which Royce ascribes to self-consciousness suggests a process context similar to that of James.

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  11. Ibid.

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  13. Josiah Royce, The Conception of Immortality (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1900), 16. Hereafter, CI.

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  14. Ibid.

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  16. CG, 259.

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  17. Ibid.

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  18. CG, 260. Admittedly, the examples Royce here provides seem to illustrate the child’s confusion of concepts rather than his knowing the universal first. Nonetheless, when one so “confuses” one object for another, it may be because he recognizes a yet broader universal which encompasses both objects. E.g., pine cones and potatoes are both small round brown objects that grow.

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  20. Ibid.

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  21. Ibid.

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  23. Ibid., 48.

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  32. Or immorally orientated for that matter — for bad choices, says Royce, are also qualitatively moral. Cf. CG, 292.

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  34. Ibid.

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  43. Cf. CG, 304: “A true individual, as such, is therefore itself a free fact.”

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  58. Cf. Vol. 68, “The Social Factors of the Human Intellect,” Lecture II, 16.

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  61. Cf. Vol. 71, “On certain limitations of the thoughtful public in America,” 7, 39 and Vol. 68, Lecture IV, 38.

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  62. Regarding personality of community see Vol. 91, “Spirit of the Community,” 1900?, 23. Concerning community as organic life see Vol. 65, Lecture VII, 54.

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Authors
  1. Mary Briody Mahowald
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© 1972 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Mahowald, M.B. (1972). Conception of the Individual Pragmatically Leads to Consideration of Community. In: An Idealistic Pragmatism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2736-6_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2736-6_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-247-1184-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2736-6

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