Abstract
In an article published in the March, 1904 issue of The Philosophical Review, Royce made the claim that all of us are pragmatists, though we might not like to admit it, in that our thinking is empirically rooted and practically directed:
Whatever may be the rationalistic bias or tradition of any of us we are all accustomed to lay stress upon practical considerations as having a fundamental, even if not the most fundamental, importance for philosophy; and so in a general, and, as I admit, in a very large and loose sense of the term, we are all alike more or less pragmatists.1
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References
“The Eternal and the Practical,” 113–114. Hereafter we refer to this article as EP.
Cf. EP, 115. Royce here mentions pertinent works of Dewey, James and Schiller.
EP, 117.
EP, 116.
EP, 117. Note that all of these factors imply an emphasis on future experience.
Ibid.
Cf. WI I, 61, 62.
Cf. WI I, 63.
WI I, 135–136.
WI I, 137. Most realists of course would not go so far as Royce suggests. Independent existence of the object of knowledge would be construed as perfectly consistent with knowledge of the object.
WI I, 86.
WI I, 81.
WI I, 61.
Cf. WI I, 79.
Note the implied difference between knowledge and contemplation. For the mystic, even the practice of contemplation is a type of experience through which one achieves union with the Other. The Other to which Royce here refers is perfectly fulfilled Being or Truth.
WI I, 61. Note that Royce uses the terms “Valid” and “true” correlatively: “For the third conception, that is real which is purely and simply Valid or True.”
Cf. WI I, 193.
WI I, 193.
Cf. WI I, 204.
Both positions are developed as applications of critical rationalism in WI I, 228–238.
Cf. WI I, 240.
WI I, 61.
WI I, 270. (The italics in text were omitted.)
WI I, 271.
Cf. Vol. 75, “Andover Lectures,” 54, and Vol. 63, Lecture III, 20.
Cf. Vol. 74, “Columbia Lectures,” 8, and Vol. 70, Lecture III, 14.
WI I, 24–25.
Cf. WI I, 27.
WI I, 32–33.
Cf. WI I, 307.
WI I, 358.
E.g., there are three volumes in particular (68, 69, 70), in which the main theme is the relationship between social factors and the knowing process. The fact that this theme is scarcely present in the early writings makes it especially pertinent in tracing the development of Royce’s thought.
See Chapters III and IV, supra.
Vol. 68, Lecture IV, “The Social Origin of Our Fundamental Ideas,” 4.
Ibid.
Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 7.
Ibid.
Ibid., 12, 13.
Ibid., 12. Cf. Dewey’s emphasis on social interaction in Reconstruction in Philosophy, especially Ch. IV and VIII.
Vol. 68, Lecture II, “The Social Basis of the Intellectual Life,” 14.
Cf. Vol. 70, Lecture V, “Theory of the Origin of the Ideas of Ego and Alter,” 1.
Cf. Ibid.
Vol. 70, Lecture V, 2. (Italics in text.)
Vol. 70, “An advance resumé of Lecture V,” 3.
Cf. Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Vol. 70, Lecture VII, “The Social Basis of Reasoning,” 25.
Vol. 68, Lecture IV, “The Social Origin of Our Fundamental Ideas,” 34–35.
Ibid., 35, 36–8.
Cf. Vol. 70, Lecture VII, 26.
EP, 141.
EP, 142.
See Chapter IX.
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© 1972 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Mahowald, M.B. (1972). Theory of Knowledge Pragmatically Allied with Doctrine of Interpretation. In: An Idealistic Pragmatism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2736-6_6
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