Abstract
One who speaks his native language fluently and correctly has acquired over a period of time that mastery of the language which he now has. During this period he was exposed, no doubt, to many sentences produced by others and to some correction of sentences he produced himself. But his mastery of the language does not consist merely in his being able to reproduce the sentences produced by others and, in their corrected forms, the sentences earlier produced by himself. It consists in his being able also to produce indefinitely many new sentences, knowing what they mean, and in being able to understand indefinitely many new sentences which are produced to him. It consists also in his being able to distinguish between sentences of his language which are fully ‘correct’ and literally significant sentences — however elaborate or stylistically unusual they may be — and sentences which deviate, in various ways or degrees, from full ‘correctness’ or literal significance; and perhaps to remark, with more or less explicitness, on how the sentences which deviate from correctness do so deviate.
It will be obvious to any auditor of Professor Chomsky’s John Locke lectures, delivered in Oxford this summer after the present paper was written, that he has moved from, or modified, some of the positions here attributed to him on the basis of his publications. However, with occasional qualifications, I have allowed the attributions to stand; the written, checkable word provides a firmer basis for discussion than the spoken, uncheckable word.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
It will be obvious to any auditor of Professor Chomsky’s John Locke lectures, delivered in Oxford this summer after the present paper was written, that he has moved from, or modified, some of the positions here attributed to him on the basis of his publications. However, with occasional qualifications, I have allowed the attributions to stand; the written, checkable word provides a firmer basis for discussion than the spoken, uncheckable word.
See Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, p. 141.
Op. cit., p. 99. See also pp. 69, 117, 120, 141.
This is one important point on which Chomsky has modified his views. He now allows that surface structure also may bear on semantic interpretation; so that two sentences with exactly the same deep structure diagram may nevertheless differ in meaning, the difference appearing only at the level of the transformations which yield surface structure. However, he adheres to his original view as regards those aspects of semantic interpretation which depend on the grammatical relations; and it is with these that the present paper is concerned.
Leaving, one must suppose, a certain amount of work for psychologists and physiologists still to do.
Op. cit. pp. 116–7.
Op. cit. p. 78.
It appears from the John Locke lectures that Chomsky no longer holds (or holds for all cases) that such abstract nouns appear as the result of nominalising transformation. Rather, he holds that there are underlying semantic or lexical elements, in themselves neither nominal nor, e.g., verbal or adjectival, but capable of appearing in deep structures in either rôle. Nevertheless, there would appear to be grounds for awarding some kind of syntactical primacy to the verbal, or adjectival, over the nominal, rôle in such cases; and such an award will serve my present purpose, in whatever theoretical terms it is ultimately to be understood. My own guess, for what it is worth, is in line with Chomsky’s later position, in so far as I see no reason why we should not, and much reason why we should, have a use for a notion of nominalisation which does not depend on that of transformation.
See, for example, on both points, Katz, Philosophy of Language, Ch. 3.
It may seem to suggest, for example, that in certain areas in which we are inclined to number concepts of sorts of objects among our primary concepts, the most nearly corresponding primary concepts of other language-speakers may be of a different and possibly more primitive kind, not yet determined either as concepts of certain sorts of objects or as concepts of sorts of activities or situations in which such objects may be typically involved.
See Katz, loc. cit.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1972 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Strawson, P.F. (1972). Grammar and Philosophy. In: Davidson, D., Harman, G. (eds) Semantics of Natural Language. Synthese Library, vol 40. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_15
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0310-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2557-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive