Abstract
Twelve groups of undergraduate subjects participated in computer-controlled experiments designed to test the bargaining set and kernel models for n-person games in characteristic function form. Each group played four iterations each of 5 three-person games in which v(A) = v(B) = v(C) = v(ABC) = 0, and v(AB) > v(AC) > v(BC) > 0. The effects of (i) the communication rules governing the negotiations, (ii) the differences among the payoffs assigned to each coalition, and (iii) learning were systematically investigated.
The results are analyzed in terms of the frequencies of different coalition types that were formed, the disbursements of the payoffs, and the characterization of the bargaining process. They show the predominance of coalition AB, support the bargaining set and kernel models as predictors of final outcomes, reveal significant effects due to the latter two independent variables but not the former, and provide useful information about the nature of the bargaining process.
This research was supported in part by a PHS Grant No. MH-10006 from the National Institute of Mental Health and in part by a University Science Development Program Grant No. GU-2059 from the National Science Foundation. The authors wish to thank Bruce Taylor and Sandra G. Funk for assistance in data collection, Michael Maschler for his careful reading and insightful comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript, and Abraham D. Horowitz for assistance in data collection, data analysis, and for many valuable discussions.
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© 1974 D. Rediel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Kahan, J.P., Rapoport, A. (1974). Test of the Bargaining Set and Kernel Models in Three-Person Games. In: Rapoport, A. (eds) Game Theory as a Theory of a Conflict Resolution. Theory and Decision Library, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2161-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2161-6_7
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