Abstract
Typically, the outcomes of a two-person non-constantsum game can be partitioned into two classes — Pareto-optimal and non-Pareto-optimal. The former jointly dominate the latter in the sense that both players prefer any Pareto-optimal outcome to any non-Pareto-optimal one. However, in order to achieve a Pareto-optimal outcome, the strategy choices of the two players must, in general, be coordinated. Moreover, a Pareto-optimal outcome may not be an equilibrium; so that it may be in the interest of each player to ‘move away’ from it, even though if both move away, both may suffer an impairment of payoffs.
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Bibliography
Braithwaite, R. B., Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1955.
Nash, J. F., ‘Two-Person Cooperative Games’, Econometrica 21 (1953) 128–140.
Rapoport, A. and Guyer, M., ‘A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games’, General Systems 11 (1966) 203–214.
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© 1974 D. Rediel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Rapoport, A., Perner, J. (1974). Testing Nash’s Solution of the Cooperative Game. In: Rapoport, A. (eds) Game Theory as a Theory of a Conflict Resolution. Theory and Decision Library, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2161-6_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2161-6_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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