Abstract
If G is a game in normal form, and if k is a player in G, the (first-level) metagame kG, as defined in [2], is the normal-form game that would exist if player k chose his strategy in G in knowledge of the other players’ strategies (in G).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Aumann, R. J., ‘The Core of a Cooperative Game without Side Payments’, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 98 (1961) 539–552.
Howard, N., Paradoxes of Rationality: Theory of Metagames and Political Behaviour, MIT Press, 1971.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1974 D. Rediel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Howard, N. (1974). ‘General’ Metagames: An Extension of the Metagame Concept. In: Rapoport, A. (eds) Game Theory as a Theory of a Conflict Resolution. Theory and Decision Library, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2161-6_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2161-6_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0489-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2161-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive