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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 14))

Abstract

We accept the results of science, and we must accept them, without having any strict proof that they are true. Strictly speaking all natural sciences are inexact. They could all conceivably be false, but we accept them as true because we consider doubts that may be raised against them to be unreasonable. Juries base their findings on the distinction between reasonable doubts which they must accept, and unreasonable doubts which they must disregard. They are instructed to make this distinction and to do it without having any set rules to rely upon. For it is precisely because there are no rules for deciding certain factual questions of supreme importance that these questions are assigned to the jury to decide them by their personal judgment. The scientist combines the functions of judge and jury. Having applied to his findings a number of specifiable criteria, he must ultimately decide in the light of his own personal judgment whether the remaining conceivable doubts should be set aside as unreasonable.

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Notes

  1. Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, published in 1946 by Oxford University Press; Phoenix Edition, 1964, p. 33.

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  2. Michael Polanyi, ‘Problemsolving’, Brit. Journ. Philos. Science 8 (1957), 89–103.

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  3. George Polya, Mathematical Discovery, John Wiley & Sons, New York, London, Sydney, 1965, Vol. II, p. 63.

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  4. Gerald Holton, ‘Einstein, Michelson and the ‘Crucial Experiment’’, Isis 60 (1969), 133–197.

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  5. C. D. Darlington, Darwin’s Place in History, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1960, p. 40. Professor Darlington has described in Chapter 8 entitled ‘The Retreat from Natural Selection’ how in the successive editions of Darwin’s Origin of Species natural selection is gradually abandoned and evolution “shored up with Lamackian inheritance”.

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Robert S. Cohen Marx W. Wartofsky

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© 1974 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Polanyi, M. (1974). Genius in Science. In: Cohen, R.S., Wartofsky, M.W. (eds) Methodological and Historical Essays in the Natural and Social Sciences. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2128-9_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2128-9_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0378-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-2128-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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