Moral Philosophy and Medical Perplexity: Comments on “How Virtues Become Vices”

Abstract

Professor MacIntyre has given us an eloquent, insightful, and persuasive presentation. In addition, unlike many other eloquent, insightful and persuasive presentations, it is important, addressing as it does not only fundamental issues in moral philosophy and in the analysis of medical practice, but also the question of whether there is any significant gain that can be reasonably expected as a result of bringing philosophy to bear on the morally troubling problems that arise in medical practice. We should all be grateful for his provocative analysis. I agree with much — perhaps with most of what is basic — in Professor MacIntyre’s remarks about medicine. But I believe that his conception of what it is reasonable to expect of moral philosophy is wrong in important ways, so that in consequence his final thesis about the relationship between philosophy and medicine is wholly unwarranted. And further, I will argue, unlike many other theses that are wholly unwarranted, it is pernicious, having as its consequence the view that philosophers ought not attempt to do what I claim it is both possible and crucial for them to do. The essence of my response will be quite simple: I grant that philosophy cannot provide what MacIntyre seems to wish of it, but I hold that it can nonetheless provide important goods that MacIntyre fails to acknowledge. I will address exclusively, and, I fear, with greater brevity than his essay merits, what I take to be MacIntyre’s main conclusions about moral philosophy and medical perplexity — although there is much more that, given more time, I would like to address.