Abstract
This essay is offered in the spirit of interdisciplinary goodwill that prevailed during the Jerusalem meetings. It is not intended for specialists in the formal approach, though it will certainly stand in need of their corrections and comments; it is addressed rather to others who study language and philosophical problems concerning language — linguists, psycholinguists, ‘ordinary-language’ philosophers, etc. I am prompted to express the thoughts that follow, first of all, because the non-specialist already has available to him some general accounts of the nature of the formal approach that claim to show its ultimate fruitlessness for the study of natural language.1 I think these accounts are fundamentally wrong, and I hope to show this. I ain motivated, secondly, by the belief that some recent developments in the formal approach could be extremely suggestive to those who adopt other approaches. Much of what has been written on these developments is difficult to follow, and I propose to say something about some of them later in reasonably non-technical language.
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Martin, R.L. (1971). Some Thoughts on the Formal Approach to the Philosophy of Language. In: Bar-Hillel, Y. (eds) Pragmatics of Natural Languages. Synthese Library, vol 41. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1713-8_7
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