Husserl and/or Wittgenstein

Abstract

The desire for unity is almost ineradicable in human nature, and a recent manifestation of this characteristic is to be found in the attempt to associate Wittgenstein with Husserl, or conscript Wittgenstein into the Husserlian camp or vice versa.¹ Not quite so hilarious as turning Kierkegaard into a linguistic philosopher, it nevertheless has its interest for those of us whose darling occupation it is to draw distinctions. It certainly cannot be gainsaid that there are points of resemblance between Husserl and Wittgenstein, but in my opinion these are of a superficial nature, whereas the differences between the two philosophers are quite radical. However, let us consider what they have in common.

Of course, even scholastic ontologism is guided by language (by which I am not saying that all scholastic research was ontologistic) but it loses itself by deriving analytical judgments from word meanings, in the belief that it has thereby gained knowledge of facts. Is the phenomenological analyst to be branded scholastic too, because he derives no judgments at all from word concepts but rather looks into the phenomena that language occasions by means of the words in question…? In the ἐττοχή of vigorous reaction against Scholasticism the war cry was: “Away with empty word analysesl We must question things themselves. Back to experience, to seeing, which alone can give to our words sense and rational justification.” Very much to the point! (Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science; my italics).