Abstract
It is considered a truism that not all inferences are deductive. Arguments which compel assent, granted their premisses, are said to be limiting cases of the more general class of those whose premisses support their conclusions inconclusively. Such arguments are variously labelled ‘inductive’, ‘informative’, or ‘probable’. The conclusions of deductive arguments from true premisses are invariably true, while conclusions of probable arguments from true premisses are said to be ‘for the most part true’.1 One speaks also of ‘arguments by analogy’, ‘statistical syllogisms’, and the like — terms which further argue that induction and deduction are but two sides of the same inferential coin.
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Rosenkrantz, R.D. (1977). Inductivism and Probabilism. In: Inference, Method and Decision. Synthese Library, vol 115. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1237-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1237-9_3
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