Abstract
Because of the delicate position in which the Polish government found itself in 1943, the selection of an acceptable successor to Prime Minister Sikorski was not an easy task. Opposed to anyone harboring strong anti-Soviet sentiments, the British government favored Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, the Peasant Party leader and Sikorski’s Deputy Prime Minister, as the most suitable candidate and presumably the most acceptable to the Soviet Union. As the leader of one of the largest political parties, Mikolajczyk would provide the Polish government with a broadly democratic make-up. He was clearly favored over General Sosnkowski, another strong contender. Churchill reportedly told Retinger, a close confidant of General Sikorski: “You have a general called Sozzle-Something. We don’t want him. He would upset the Russians.” When Retinger pointed out that Wladyslaw Sosnkowski was the senior ranking general, Churchill replied “We ought to be able to get over that.”1 Although moderately experienced in the affairs of government, Mikolajczyk probably was not the most capable politician in Polish circles. Certainly, he did not inspire the admiration and trust with which the Poles in London endowed Sikorski, but with the possible exception of the National Democrats he was acceptable to his compatriots. A key to his policy can be found in an address to the National Council on July 27, 1943 in which he indicated that he intended to follow in Sikorski’s footsteps in directing Polish foreign policy. While admitting that Polish-Soviet difficulties posed the main challenge, he struck a positive note for understanding and collaboration based on “regard for mutual rights and interests.”2 Like General Sikorski he favored a modus vivendi with the Kremlin.
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References
Hugh Dalton, The Faithful Years: Memoirs, 1931–1945, Vol II (London: Frederick Muller, 1957), p. 418. As regards the composition of the government, since July 1941 Sikorski’s government essentially had been composed of members from two parties, the Peasant and the Socialist. Mikolajczyk’s government was made up largely of members of these two parties as well. The National Democrats, Wladyslaw Komarnicki and Marian Seyda, entered the government as individuals and not as representatives for their party; Kazimierz Popiel was a representative of the Christian Labor Party; and General Marian Kukiel (Minister of Defense) and Tadeusz Romer (Foreign Minister) were not members of any party.
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1948), p. 284. It should be pointed out that Mikolajczyk’s position differed fundamentally from Sikorski’s. A military man, Sikorski had been both head of the government and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
Mikolajczyk-Eden conversation (also present Raczynski, William Strang, and Joseph Retinger) quoted in Wladyslaw Malinowski, Najnowsza Historia Polityczna Polski, 1864–1945,(Recent Political History of Poland, 1864–1945 (London: Gryf Printers, 1960), II, Pt. 2, p. 455. Frontier rectification in favor of the Soviet Union posed a constitutional problem which Mikolajczyk had to solve, if he intended to stay within the framework of the 1935 Constitution from which the Polish government derived its legality and continuity. Neither he nor the Cabinet had the right to effect territorial changes, for the power belonged to the Polish Parliament under Article 58.
U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United-States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences of Cairo and Teheran, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 511, 512. Cited hereafter Teheran Conference. See also: Dokumenti i materialiipo istorii Sovietsko-Polskhich otnochenii (Documents and material relating to Soviet-Polish Relations) Vol. VII (1939–1943) (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), No. 304. Cited hereafter DMISPO.
Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers,Poland No., (1945) Cmd. 6616, August 25, 1939, “Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Polish Government regarding Mutual Assistance (with Protocol).”
Quoted in R. Umiastowski, Poland, Russia and Great Britain, 1941–1945 ( London: Hollis and Carter, 1946 ), p. 206.
DMISPO,VII, No. 304. The same theme, collusion with the Germans, had been repeated since the break in relations. In a message on September 27, 1943 from the Soviet Foreign Office to the British Ambassador, Clark Kerr, it was stated: “There is no good will on the part of the Polish Government. Yes, we want good relations with the Polish Government after the war… The Poles fell for German Fascist propaganda. They capitalized on the Katyn propaganda to discredit the Soviet Union and wrestle from the same the western Ukraine and Byelorussia.” DMISPO,VII, No. 291.
Declaration by the Polish government in connection with the crossing of the Polish frontier by Soviet troops, London, January 5, 1944 (GSHI, A.50.9/3), DPSR, II, No. 70. The Soviet government demanded the disclosure of the identity of underground units and Mikolajczyk had to decide whether to comply and risk the arrest of members of the underground was ready to come int the open and meet the requirements of Soviet military commanders even without prior Polish-Soviet agreement. Eden, p. 508.
Declaration by the Soviet government on the question of the Polish-Soviet frontier, Moscow, January i 1, 1944 (Soviet Monitor II. 1944 ), DPSR, II, No. 74. See also: DMISPO, Vol. VIII (1944–1945) (Moscow: Nauka 1974), No. 4. Herein it is also stated that “The Polish emigre Government does not represent the Polish nation and it is unable to conduct good relations with the Soviet Union. They have also shown they are unable to carry the struggle against German aggression in Poland.” Further, because of its `erroneous politics’, “… it plays into the hands of the German occupying forces.” The Soviet objective was clearly to discredit the London Polish government and thereby lay the groundwork for bringing to power the Lublin Committee — a minority that represented only the interests of the Soviet Union.
London, January 12, 1943. The view of the U.S. State Department as outlined by E. Durbrow in a memorandum entitled “Significance of Soviet Proposals for a New Frontier with Poland” held that ethnographically certain boundary changes were desirable, but not including Eastern Galicia because it would deprive the Poles of Lwow, a predominantly Polish city. FR US, 1944 Vol. III, pp. 1221–22.
Raczynski, p. 186. Raczynski recorded that during that time everything that had to do with the “Soviet Ally, and especially its relations with Poland, was enveloped in a dense fog of mendacity.” p. 183.
The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan,David Dilks, ed., (London: Cassell and Co., 1971), p. 597. Cited hereafter Cadogan Diaries. His suspicion of the Soviets’ honorable intentions were increased in other areas as well. The same entry includes: “Soviets have allowed Pravda to reproduce a story of a negotiation between Ribbentrop and British officials in a Pyrenean town, for a `separate’ peace. This is quite monstrous. We tell the Russians everything and play square with them. They are the most stinking creepy (lot) I’ve ever come across. Got Eden to agree to issue dementi here (as it’s got about in the press) and to demand a dementi of the Russians. They are swine!”
Richard Pipes, International Negotiations: Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy, U.S. Congress (Senate), Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 15. See also: Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., Negotiating with the Russians ( Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951 ).
February 4, 1944, Moscow, Correspondence, I, No. 236. The Secretary of State wrote to Harriman: “Large elements of our people who recognize that there is a complicated Russo-Polish boundary question requiring full and frank discussion, will not accept as valid the Russian contention that only after imposing a government of its own selection on Poland will it be prepared for direct exchange of views.” Washington, January 25, 1944, FR US, 1944, III, p. 1235.
Woodward, III, p. 171. See: Stalin to Churchill, Moscow, February 4, 1944, Correspondence, I,No. 236. Kot was Minister of Information and Kukiel, Minister of Defense.
Churchill to Stalin, London, March 21, 1944, Correspondence,I, No. 256. It was in reply to this statement that Stalin confronted Churchill with the Teheran resolution. “Does this mean that you no longer recognize what we agreed on in Teheran and are ready to violate the Teheran agreement?” Correspondence,I, No. 257.
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Kacewicz, G.V. (1979). Teheran: Decision on Frontiers. In: Great Britain, The Soviet Union and the Polish Government in Exile (1939–1945). Studies in Contemporary History, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9272-6_8
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