Abstract
In this chapter I shall consider the main ‘scientific’ argument for the introduction of sense-data, the argument from Causation. I shall try to show that the argument has force only insofar as it is really an epistemological argument, and that its force derives from its calling attention to a dimension of the epistemological problem of perception that we have so far not considered.
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© 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Dicker, G. (1980). The Argument from Causation. In: Perceptual Knowledge. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9048-7_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9048-7_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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