Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Neo-Priyayis and Soekarno

  • Chapter
The Social Evolution of Indonesia

Part of the book series: Studies in Social History ((SISH,volume 5))

  • 114 Accesses

Abstract

The socially and politically more homogeneous priyayi world evinced no party political contrast of such magnitude as that of the Masyumi-Nahdatul Ulama polarity. However, just as the santris exhibited so many of the contradictions to be found in Indonesian society, so too did the priyayi world and its political and social organizations around the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. Geertz, Religion, pp. 235–238; Id., Social History, pp. 9, 78 ff, 140–141.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Feith, Decline, pp. 33 ff; Id., pp. 141–142.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Feith, (Id.) mentions ‘cliquelike segments of the “administrator” skill group’; the first mayor sector included PNI figures from the years 1927–29 such as R.M. Sartono and R.. Suwirjo, and the other sector younger types like Soejono Hadinoto and Wilopo.

    Google Scholar 

  4. This opposition was partly expressed in the rise of the mass organization (Ormas) leaders in the PNI during the latter years of Guided Democracy. Rocamora, Tartai Nasional Indonesia’, in: Indonesia, 10, Oct. 1970, pp. 151 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Whatever the neo-priyayis did for industry was negligible in comparison to the industrialization in the Philippines and Malaysia. Fryer, Emerging Southeast Asia, pp. 112 ff, 199 ff, 266 ff, 344 ff; Sutters, Indonesianisasi, pp. 772 ff. As to the quality of (priyayi) businessmen: Feith, Decline, p. 482.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Chang, Industrial Development, pp. 4, 51–52; Levy and Shih Kuo-heng, Rise of the Modern Chinese Business Gass, pp. 28 ff; Feuerwerker, China’s Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsiian-huai (1844–1916) and Mandarin Enterprise.

    Google Scholar 

  7. The parties could not be replaced by a national unity organization (state party) and Soekarno had to fall back on partial corporative (functional) representation in combination with the secular mass organizations of PNI and PKI. Soekarno had tried since 1959–60 to bring both organizations together in the National Front. Anderson, Java, pp. 224 ff; Feith, Decline, pp. 543 ff; Lev, Transition, pp. 57–58, 202 ff; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 100–102.

    Google Scholar 

  8. For the pre-colonial period: Soemarsaid Moertono, State, pp. 93 ff. For the principalities in the late 19th century: Veth, Java, 3, pp. 571 ff. Further: Sutherland, ‘Notes on Java’s Regent Families’, in: Indonesia, 16, Oct. 1973, pp. 113–147;Id., 17, April 1974, pp. 1–42; Burger, Structuurveranderingen, III; Geertz, Religion, pp. 227 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  9. ENI, I, pp. 283 ff; Schrieke, “The Native Rulers’, in: Indonesian Sociological Studies, I, pp. 184 ff; Palmier, Social Status, Chs 5 ff; Id., ‘Javanese Nobility’, in: CSSH, II, no. 2, Jan. 1960, pp. 200 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Modern nationalism before 1942 was very peaceful and did not seriously challenge Dutch rule. Pluvier, Overzicht; Kahin, Nationalism, Ch. 3. For the revolution period: Anderson, Java, pp. 99 ff, 232 ff; Rocamora (‘Political Participation’, in: Political Participation, pp. 151) points out that ‘Unlike Masyumi and PS, PNI never developed an effective paramilitary affiliate’.

    Google Scholar 

  11. The following authors contributed to the study of civil-military relations: Anderson, Java, Chs 11 ff; Feith; Lev; McVey, ‘The Post-revolutionary Transformation’; Sundhausen, Political Orientations (a rather uncritical approach); Nobel, Heer und Politik (superficial); Crouch, The Army. Anyhow, Guided Democracy could not have passed the conceptual stage without the powerful intervention by the Central Army Command.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Feith, Decline, Chs 7 and 11.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Prime Ministers were Sjahrir (3 Cabinets, Nov. 1945-June 1947), Hatta (2 Cabinets Jan. 1948-Aug. 1950) the ideal type of an ‘administrator’ and central figure amidst pro-Western tendencies and Natsir (Sept. 1950-March 1951). Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 152–159, 164 ff, 194 ff; Anderson, Java, pp. 170–212, 319–320; Feith, Decline, pp. 33 ff,46 ff, 146 ff, 303 ff. For this period we should also mention the temporary co-operation between a social-democratic (Sjahrir et. al) and a communist group (Sjariffudin) in one party, the Partai Sosialis. In the middle of February 1948 the Sjahrir group split off and founded the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI). Anderson, A/., pp. 202 ff; Kahin, Id., pp. 258–259.

    Google Scholar 

  14. The paralyzing balance between the elite sectors showed in the elections of September and December 1955. The PNI success of 1955 did not signify a decisive majority for any sector. Feith, Indonesian Elections, p. 65.

    Google Scholar 

  15. For general surveys of Dutch colonial policy: Smit, Indonesische quaestie;Id., De liquidate’, Duynstee, Nieuw-Guinea; Tichelman, ‘Nederlandse koloniale politiek’, in: De Gids, 4–5, 1970, pp. 259–262; Id., ‘Enkele opmerkingen’, in: Id., 135, April 1972, pp. 327–338.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Feith, Decline, pp. 237 ff; Legge, Sukarno, pp. 254, 261. ‘By mobilizing these strata [“lower urban strata”] behind national symbols, the PKI was supplying Sukarno with the “troops” he needed to maintain his supremacy against the army and the Muslims and fortifying his ambitions for the nation with an organized base of support.’ Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 86.

    Google Scholar 

  17. In August 1945 Soekarno proposed founding a state party. The PNI state party, which originated in the Japanese Djawa Hokokai foundered because of Sjahrir’s fierce anti-collaboration propaganda and the continuation of pre-war oppositions in the nationalist movement. Anderson, Java, pp. 88, 90 ff. On October 28th, 1956 Soekarno started his gradual elaboration of his ‘konsepsi’ (for Guided Democracy) with proposal to bury the parties. In view of the strengthened aliran bastions the idea was hopeless. Soekarno got no further than a national council in which all parties would be represented. Legge, Sukarno, pp. 271 ff, 282 ff; Lev. Transition, pp. 46 ff. His last effort was the organization of the ‘National Front’ (1959–65), which was meant to be a mass movement, and of which the PKI became the most substantial element. Soekarno proved incapable of organizing a nationalist majority movement to be controlled by himself and the radical neo-priyayis.Id., p. 314; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 190, 196, 200–201, 225–226, 370–371. Hering and Willis, Indonesian General Election, pp. 51, 63.

    Google Scholar 

  18. For the growth of the PKI: Feith, The Indonesian General Elections, pp. 65 ff; Hindley, Communist Party, pp. 222–229. Anti-communism was a main source of inspiration for the regionalist revolt of PRRI/Permesta and for the local level co-operation between PNI, Masyumi and NU. Lev, Transition, pp. 105–115. For the strengthening of the army: Id., pp. 59 ff, 182 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Jones (Indonesia, passim) deals with the rising Western (particularly American) enmity vis-à-vis Soekarno’s policy in the years 1958–65. The shift in American policy from Dulles’ orientation to the PRRI revolt towards support of the Army’s Central Command was largely Jones’s work. For American interest in Nasution cum suis:Id., pp. 118, 123 ff, 137 ff, 147 ff, 203.

    Google Scholar 

  20. The literature on Soekarno (Dahm, Penders, etc.) does not deal adequately with his balancing function between the alirans, the PKI and the army. Only Legge and Hering mention this aspect. Legge, Sukarno, pp. 307–308, 372 ff; Hering, ‘Alirans’, in: Courrier de I’Extreme Orient, 7, no. 56, 1973, pp. 51–52.

    Google Scholar 

  21. For the PNI: Rocamora, ‘Political Participation’, in: Political Participation, pp. 150 ff. For a more critical evaluation: Ward, 1971 Election, pp. 134–156. Legge points out that Soekarno anticipated the corporative state by adding representatives of functional groups to the KNIP (the pre-parliament) at the end of 1946. Legge, Sukarno, pp. 222, 284, 299 ff. The army leaders had early corporatist leanings too that took shape in co-operative forms, June 1957. Lev, Transition, pp. 65 ff. The Golkar of the 1970s constitutes the culmination of these corporatist strivings to counteract class contradictions. Ward, 1971 Election, Ch. 8. To a certain extent there is continuity between Soekarno’s marhaen concept and the karya-wan ideology of the New Order, both being substitutes for the class concepts of the communist labour movement.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Lev, Transition, pp. 99,183 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  23. Id., 60 ff; McVey, ‘Postrevolutionary Transformation’, in: Indonesia, 13, April 1972, pp. 148–149, 155–162.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Sundhausen, Political Orientations, pp. 295 ff, 389 ff, 397 ff, 711. Sundhausen’s data indicate a parallelism between the process of professionalization and the increasing readiness for a coup, in the years 1955–57. The fear for a military coup in political party circles culminated in 1958. Lev, Transition, pp. 182 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  25. For the problems encountered by Nasution cs. on the road of centralization and professionalization: McVey, ‘Postrevolutionary Transformation’, in: Indonesia, 11, April 1971, pp. 131–176; Id., 13, April 1972, pp. 147 ff. For the Islam policy of Nasution; Federspiel, ‘Military and Islam’, in: PA, 46, 3, Fall 1973, pp. 409 ff. ‘Within the army santri participation is extremely limited’. Samson, ‘Army and Islam’, in: PA, 44, 4, Winter 1971–72, p. 547. Nasution had been too much engaged in the ‘middle way’ of ‘Front lebar’ (implying narrow co-operation with Soekarno) to be able to play a central role under the New Order. Sundhausen, Political Orientations, pp. 398.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Legge, Sukarno, pp. 297 ff, 379 ff; Sundhausen, Political Orientations, pp. 399 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  27. Feith, ‘Polities’, in: Sukarno’s Guided Indonesia, p. 53; Lev, (Transition, p. 62) mentions the ‘concurrence of interests between the pamong praja and the army’. For the army’s Vested interests’ in the status quo: McVey, ‘Postrevolutionary Transformation’, II, in: Indonesia, 13, April 1972, pp. 177 ff. The Pentagon had a better understanding of Indonesian power relations than the State Department (at the beginning of 1960); most of the senior officers had been trained in the USA. Jones, Indonesia, p: 203.

    Google Scholar 

  28. For the evolution of the simultaneous opposition and accommodation tendencies of the political parties: Lev, Transition, pp. 18 ff, 134 ff, 206 ff, 226, 228 ff, 235 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  29. For the ‘coup’: Anderson and McVey, A Preliminary Analysis;Gunawan, Kudetd; Wert-heim, ‘Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup’, in: PA, XXXIX, 1–2, Spring-Summer 1966;Id., ‘Suharto’, in: JCA, I, no. 2, Winter 1970; Utrecht, Indonesia’s Nieuwe Orde, pp. 32 ff; Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval; Mortimer, The Ideology, Ch. 9, pp. 41 ff

    Google Scholar 

  30. Rey, ‘Holocaust’, in: NLR, 36, March-April 1966, pp. 2640;

    Google Scholar 

  31. Oey Hong Lee, ‘Sukarno’, in: JSEAS, VII, 1, March 1976, pp. 119–135

    Google Scholar 

  32. Hering, “The Fall of Sukarno’, in: RIMA, 3, 3, 1970, pp. 1–9. Grosso modo there are opposite evaluations of the ‘coup’: one that sees the PKI as the driving force (Brackman a.o.); and another that concentrates on inter-military (Javanist-nationalist officers versus conservative generals at the top) contradictions (Anderson, McVey). Dake’s opinion — Soekarno as the central figure in the background — (the devious dalang) constitutes a special variety of the first school (the left as culprit). Concerning the hopelessness of counterrevolutionary moves from the outer-Javanese Pasisir: serious co-operation between the many right-wing groups on Sumatra and Sulawesi proved to be out of the question; moreover, the strongholds of the PRRI on Sumatra were taken by the central forces with astonishing ease. Lev, Transition, pp. 40–41; Mossman, Rebels, Chs 16 ff; McVey, ‘Postrevolutionary Transformation’, in: Indonesia, 11, April 1971, pp. 165–176. For Javanese supremacy in the New Order army: ‘Current Data’, Indonesia, 15, April 1973, p. 186. ‘The Rise and decline of the PRRI revolt does prove the strength of the idea of Indonesian national unity. Difficult to measure, this commitment to the idea of an Indonesian nation is deeply rooted in the colonial and revolutionary part and exists at present independent of and higher than the various subnational loyalties’. Liddle, Ethnicity, p. 208.

    Google Scholar 

  33. These authors also tend to exaggerate the PKI threat to the status quo: Hughes (Indonesian Upheaval), Pauker (Rise and Fall of the Communist Party), Brackman (Communist Collapse) and van der Kroef. Jones sometimes admits that Soekarno was no social radical, but on the other hand, he also tends to over-estimate Soekarno’s brinkmanship. Jones, Indonesia, III, Chs 8 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  34. Legge, Sukarno, pp. 383–384; Hauswedell, ‘Sukarno’, in: Indonesia, 15, April 1973, p. 112.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Oey Hong Lee, Indonesian Government, pp. 199–200; Lev, Transition, pp. 283 ff. According to Feith (‘Polities’, in: Sukarno’s Guided Indonesia, p. 57) the elite of Guided Democracy was conservative. Besides Hauswedell we have to mention: Weatherbee (Ideology in Indonesia) another case of treating ideology as an autonomous datum outside the real social context.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Hauswedell, ‘Sukarno’, in: Indonesia, 15, April 1973, pp. 110 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  37. SeeCh. 14.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Geertz, Islam, pp. 82–87. The army-protected anti-communist forces founded the Liga Demokrasi in 1960 (‘a group of people drawn from the ranks of Masyumi, PSI, NU, IPKI (League for the upholding of Indonesian independence — small party with strong military connections) and other anti-communist parties’. Legge, Sukarno, p. 323) and the ‘Badan Pendukung Sukarnoism’ in 1964. (Legge, Id., p. 375).

    Google Scholar 

  39. Pluvier, Confrontation, pp. 69 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  40. Hauswedell, ‘Sukarno’, in: Indonesia, 15, April 1973, p. 143.

    Google Scholar 

  41. No monographic literature is available on this subject. Interesting data are to be found in: Douglas, Political Socialization and Student Activism and in Sundhausen, Political Orientations, I; II, Ch. 1. Further: Rose, Socialism, pp. 145–175. For a Javanese PSI-milieu: Margono Djojohadikusumo, Herinneringen.

    Google Scholar 

  42. Pluvier, Overzicht, p. 49.

    Google Scholar 

  43. Blumberger, Nationalistische beweging, pp. 250 ff; Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 90–92.

    Google Scholar 

  44. Pluvier, Overzicht, pp. 49–52, 57 ff, 132–133; Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 92–93.

    Google Scholar 

  45. The election of 1955 demonstrated the extreme weakness of the PSI compared to the position in the years 194648. Feith, Indonesian Elections, pp. 58, 64 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  46. Feith, Decline, p. 130.

    Google Scholar 

  47. Anderson, Java, pp. 232 ff; Feith, Decline, pp. 81,171–173, 207 ff, 246 ff; McVey, ‘The Postrevolutionary Transformation’, in: Indonesia, 11, April 1971, pp. 143 ff; Sundhausen, Political Orientation.

    Google Scholar 

  48. Mossman, Rebels, pp. 226 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  49. The social-democratic and anti-Japanese ideas of Sjahrir were closely connected with his pro-Western orientation. For the politicies of Sjahrir and the PSI: Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 164 ff, 207 ff, 319–322; Anderson, Java, pp. 96–97, 172 ff, 297 ff; Feith, Decline, pp. 43, 129–131, 206, 226, 252 ff, 287, 302, 336–337, 415–416, 420, 423, 544, 604; Sjahrazad, Indonesische overpeinzingen; Sjahrir, Our Struggle. For the warm sympathy for Sjahrir in certain Dutch circles: Dagboek van Schermerhorn.

    Google Scholar 

  50. Tas, ‘Souvenirs of Sjahrir’, in: Indonesia, 8, Oct. 1969, pp. 152–153; Polomka, Indonesia, pp. 198–199. See also note 42.

    Google Scholar 

  51. Feith, Decline, pp. 246 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  52. Sumitro Djojohadikusomo became vice prime-minister of the PRRI government. Lev, Transition, p. 39 p. 51. The PSI leadership dissociated itself from the PRRI as contrasted with the Masyumi, but it did not take measures against Sumitro Djojohadikusumo as was demanded. Id., p. 135.

    Google Scholar 

  53. Hindley, ‘Alirans’, in: Indonesia, 9, April 1970, pp. 42 ff. It certainly is of some importance that the West-Javanese Siliwangi division played a prominent part in the crushing of Madiun (in 1948) and the PKI (in 1965) and those forces that put up resistance in parts of Central Java until the very end. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 288 ff; Anderson and McVey, Preliminary Analysis, p. 61.

    Google Scholar 

  54. For this contradiction see further on in this chapter. According to Mortimer ‘there is no clear line to be drawn between the two’ (the bureaucratic [Javanist] compradors and the technocrats). Id., ‘Indonesia’, in: Showcase State, p. 60.

    Google Scholar 

  55. Hindley, ‘Alirans’, in: Indonesia, 9, April 1970, pp. 43 ff; Yozar Anwar, Dagboek van een Kami-student; Fremerey, ‘Student und Politik’, in: Gesellschaft und Politik, pp. 108–119 IFM, 1, no. 1, maart 1974, pp. 5–6; Id., 2, no. 1, Jan. 1975, pp. 3 ff; Polomka, Indonesia, pp. 142–143, 197–203, 211–212, 214–215.

    Google Scholar 

  56. Paget, Youth, p. 31.

    Google Scholar 

  57. The PNI was purged thoroughly but the regime could not afford to do away with this party on account of the need of counterbalancing forces against the Muslims. For the PNI after the coup: Mclntyre, ‘Divisions and Power’, in: Indonesia, 13, April 1972, pp. 183–210; Ward, 1971 Election, pp. 134–156; Hindley, ‘Alirans’, in: Id., 9, April 1970, pp. 44, 51 ff. It took some time before the new state party could be organized. Not until the election campaign in 1971 did the regime succeed in establishing the Golkar by means of large scale government and army support. Nishihara, Golkar, pp. 17 ff; Hering and Willis, Indonesian General Elections, pp. 9 ff, 53 ff; Castles, ‘Golkar’, in: Gesellschaft und Politik, pp. 269–282; Mackie, ‘The Golkar Victory’, in: Indonesia after the 1971 Elections, pp. 60–75: Ward% 1971 Election. Chs 2 ff. The Golkar did not become a mass movement, it con-stituted an extension of the state apparatus for the furtherance of the ‘private enrichment of a well-placed few’ versus the ‘powerless many’. Liddle, ‘Evolution from Above’, in: J AS, XXXII, 2, Febr. 1973, pp. 287–309.

    Google Scholar 

  58. All parties except the NU lost votes that went to the Golkar. Van Marie, ‘Indonesian Electorial Geography’, in: Indonesia After the 1971 Elections, pp. 4849. The Muslim

    Google Scholar 

  59. parties 9,100,000 (particularly from Masyumi strongholds), the Christian parties 1,300,000 and the non-religious parties 24,100,000. ‘So while Parmusi was able to still score in those areas of the Sumatran, Kalimantan and Sulawesian Pasisir, regions where Islamic reformism combined positively with the entrepreneurial ethic of the then located communities, this party…lost much of its lustre and attraction and fell victim to Golkar’s message of entrepreneurial promise’, Hering remarks. Hering and Willis, Indonesian General Elections, p. 21. The Parmusi leader Mintaredja even publicly supported the Golkar. Id., pp. 11–12; Ward, 1971 Election, pp. 166 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  60. Emmerson, ‘Bureaucracy’, in: Political Power, pp. 105, 122; Feith, ‘Political Control’, in: Kabar Seberang, 2, June 1977, p. 9.

    Google Scholar 

  61. Gregory, ‘New Order Indonesia’, in: Id., pp. 13 ff; Cf. Sundhausen, ‘The Military’, in:Political Power, pp. 77–78.

    Google Scholar 

  62. Jackson, ‘Bureaucratic Polity’, in: Political Power, pp. 12–13. Hering and Willis, Indonesian General Elections, p. 22.

    Google Scholar 

  63. As Jackson does in order to stress the ‘growth’ aspect of the present regime, Id., p. 66.

    Google Scholar 

  64. Van Dijk, ‘Survey’, in: RIMA, 12, 1 June 1978, pp. 95 ff. Hering and Willis, Indonesian General Elections, p. 57.

    Google Scholar 

  65. Mackie aptly termed the Golkar ‘a military controlled abangan front’. Indonesia after the Elections, p. 71.

    Google Scholar 

  66. Van Doom, Orde, pp. 76 ff; Ward, 1971 Election, pp. 296 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  67. Jackson, ‘Bureaucratic Polity’, in: Political Power, p. 21.

    Google Scholar 

  68. May (Indonesian Tragedy, p. 409) is speculating on this eventuality.

    Google Scholar 

  69. Liddle, ‘Participation’, in: Political Power, pp. 185–187; van Dijk, ‘Hariman Siregar Trial’, in: RIMA, 9, no. 1, Jan.–June 1975, pp. l–32; Id., ‘Survey’, in: Ibid., 12,1 June 1978, pp. 96 ff.; ‘White Book’, in: Indonesia, 25, April 1978, pp. 151–182.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Fritjof Tichelman
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1980 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, The Hague

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Tichelman, F. (1980). The Neo-Priyayis and Soekarno. In: The Social Evolution of Indonesia. Studies in Social History, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8896-5_14

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8896-5_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-009-8898-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-8896-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation