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Conflict and Movement

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The Social Evolution of Indonesia

Part of the book series: Studies in Social History ((SISH,volume 5))

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Abstract

The change as outlined in our previous chapter created the conditions for a gradual development of social contradictions which were expressed in conflict over the (re)-division of the social surplus; a conflict that was manifested in social movements, in organizations, and in the political orientation of the various societal strata and classes.

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Notes

  1. Schrieke, ‘End of Gassical Hindu-Javanese Culture’, in: Id., Indonesian Sociological Studies, II, pp. 300–301; Benda, ‘Structure’, in: Continuity, p. 137.

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  2. Geertz, Islam Observed, pp. 67 ff.

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  3. ENI, I, pp. 77 ff, 166; II, p. 207; III, pp. 241–243, 245–247; Taufik Abdullah, ‘Adat and Islam’, in: Indonesia, 2, Oct. 1966, pp. 13 ff; Id., ‘Modernization’, in: Culture and Politics, pp. 199 ff; Sartono Kartodirdjo, Peasants’ Revolt; Communist Uprisings; van ‘t Veer, De Atjeh-oorlog, pp. 52 ff andpassim.

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  4. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements, pp. 80–93, 118 ff; Id., ‘Agrarian Radicalism’, in: Culture and Politics, pp. 101, 113–166. For the Java war: Louw and de Klerck, De Java-oorlog.

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  5. Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam, pp. 109 ff; Boland, Struggle, pp. 54 ff, 88–90.

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  6. Sartono Kartodirdjo, ‘Agrarian Radicalism’, in: Culture and Politics, p. 75.

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  7. Id., Protest Movements, pp. 1, 7 ff, 186 ff, and passim.

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  8. Id., pp. 8–10.

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  9. Id., ‘Agrarian Radicalism’, in: Culture and Politcs, pp. 86 ff, 101.

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  10. Id., pp. 95–96, 103–107, 111.

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  11. Id., Protest Movements, pp. 115–117, 127–133. For non-Muslim resistance on the long run: The Siauw Giap, ‘Samin and Samat Movements’, in: RSEA, 2, 1967, pp. 303–310; Benda, Continuity, pp. 269–302.

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  12. Mayor Polak, De herleving van het Hindoeisme.

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  13. See note 3 for the residencies Japara-Rembang and Surabaya and the Islamic Preanger.

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  14. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 179–180, p. 51; van ’t Veer, De Atjeh-oorlog, p. 301.

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  15. The 1955 election figures (Feith, Indonesian Elections, pp. 48 ff) indicate the influence of the Masyumi. See also Hering and Willis, Indonesian General Election, App. B, pp.42–47.

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  16. Geertz, Agricultural Involution, pp 148 ff.

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  17. Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 89, 92–93, 105 ff, 120. The Sumatrans constituted a separate category, businessmen (among the founders of the SI, particularly from the Minangkabau) and intellectuals like Abdoel Moeis, author and journalist.

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  18. Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 114 ff; McVey, Rise, pp. 25 ff, 38 ff.

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  19. Anderson, IAM, pp. 108, 157, 335 ff.

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  20. McVey, Rise, pp. 24–25, 42, 92–93; Levert, Inheemse arbeid, pp. 199–210.

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  21. Tichelman, De ISDV, I, (ms).

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  22. Peters-Hesseling, Vereeniging van Spoor- en Tramwegpersoneel, pp. 10 ff.

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  23. Tichelman, Henk Sneevliet, pp. 22–26; van ’t Hart, Henk Sneevliet, pp. 154 ff.

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  24. Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 123 ff, 134 ff; McVey, Rise, pp. 22 ff, 35 ff; Sarekat Islam Congress, Oct. 1917; Id., Sept.–Oct. 1918; Id., Oct.–Nov. 1919. McVey (Rise, p. 24) estimates the temporary mass following of the SI at 2,500,000 in 1919.

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  25. McVey, Indonesian Communism, p. 11. No data are available on the Muslim following of the PKI outside Sumatra and Banten, or on the continuity of communist sympathizers among the Muslim after 1927.

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  26. Tichelman, Henk Sneevliet, pp. 35–36, 56.

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  27. McVey, Rise, pp. 144–145.

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  28. Van Niel, Emergence, pp. 208–210; Blumberger, De nationalistische beweging, pp. 77–89, 311 ff; Benda, Crescent, pp. 53 ff; McVey, Rise, pp. 157–158.

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  29. For the Perhimpunan Indonesia; Blumberger, De nationalistische beweging, pp. 185 ff; Hoekstra, De Perhimpoenan Indonesia, pp. 7 ff; Indonesia, Jubileum-nummer 1938. R. Darsono and M. Alimin were priyayis with a secondary school education. McVey, Rise, pp. 36, 168. Among the 1000 who were interned after the revolt, only one had completed secondary school education. For the position of the nationalist study clubs in 1927: Blumberger, De nationalistische beweging, p. 203.

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  30. It concerned a protest meeting against raising the rent and other abuses on private estates at Surabaya (beginning of February) and in Semarang (early April 1916). HVW, 10–2–1916, pp. 73–75; 25–2–1916, pp. 84–87; 104–1916, pp. 120–121.

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  31. In the Netherlands nationalism was very slow to emerge among Indonesian students who did not leave a mixed association (of which Dutch ‘Indologists were members) until 1923. Nationalist Studyclubs were founded until c. 1924. Hoekstra, De Perhimpoenan Indonesia, p. 3. For the rise of the nationalist movement since 1927: van Niel, Emergence, pp. 227 ff. Perhimpoenan Indonesia rejected the idea of founding a political party (through returned students) in 1926 because the PKI was still too strong. Sitorus, Sedjarah pergerakan kebangsaan Indonesia, p. 39; Soekarnos MentjapaiIndonesia merdeka, passim.

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  32. ‘In most countries of Asia, and in Indonesia in particular, communist leaders come from lower status circles than do the leaders of the nationalist parties’, according to Mortimer, Indonesian communism, p. 27. McVey points out that the PKI had ‘little strength among the educated classes’. McVey, ‘Indonesian Communism and the Transition’, in: Communist Strategies, p. 160. On the other side there was ‘elite solidarity’. McVey, ‘Indonesian Communism and China’, in: China in Crisis, 2, pp. 357–394.

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  33. Blumberger, De nationalistische beweging, pp. 204 ff; Pluvier, Overzicht, pp. 197–198. For a recent analysis centred around Soekarno’s PNI see: Soekarno’s Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka, (ed. Hering), pp. I–IV.

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  34. We shall not consider the complicated transitional period between 1945 and the unification of several organizations in 1948: The PKI of Sardjono and Alimin, the Partai Buruh, the Partai Sosialis and the Pesindo. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 158 ff, 256 ff; Hasibuan, Political Unionism, pp. 38 ff.

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  35. See: Ch. 14.

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  36. Hasibuan, Political Unionism, p. 30.

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  37. McVey, Rise, pp. 147 ff; Peters-Hesselink, De VSTP, pp. 47 ff. In addition to the VSTP, the SPLI (Zeeliedenbond) should be mentioned. McVey, Id., pp. 215–216, 240, 276.

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  38. For the Fock regime: van Niel, Emergence, pp. 199 ff; McVey, Rise, pp. 108 ff, 120 ff, 148 ff, 306 ff; Hasibuan, Political Unionism, Ch. 7.

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  39. Communist Uprisings,passim.

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  40. According to Benda, the Japanese occupation should be treated as a separate period in its own right: Bastin and Benda, A History, pp. 123 ff; Anderson, Java, pp. 10 ff.

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  41. Id., p. 11.

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  42. Geertz, Agricultural Involution, pp. 124 ff.

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  43. Benda, Crescent, pp. 199 ff; Anderson, Java, pp. 65–66, 225. ‘On the eve of the Japanese surrender the military authorities had thus laid the groundwork for an orderly transfer of sovereignty…to a largely Javanese group of middle aged non-Islamic politicians with whom they had worked in reasonable harmony throughout the occupation’, Anderson observes; he also mentions the ‘impotence of Islam’ in the PPKI. The cleavage between neo-priyayi nationalists and priyayi civil servants cannot have been very great in colonial times, since it was relatively easy to persuade them to co-operate.

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  44. Anderson, Java, pp. 23 ff.

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  45. Id., pp. 16 ff.

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  46. Id., pp. 11 ff, 31, 33, 57–58, 64–66; Bastin and Benda, A History, pp. 127 ff. The trade union movement was suppressed altogether: Hasibuan, Political Unionism, p. 32. The Japanese regime also made use of the dichotomy.

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  47. These three interventions had different effects which should be analysed and compared. The Japanese intervention was of short duration but nevertheless had extremely traumatic effects. The Japanese authorities promoted separate action of Muslims and abangans by founding a separate Muslim combat organization. Anderson, Java, pp. 26, 222, 261; Smail, Bandung, pp. 91–93, 104–105, 156.

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  48. Kahin, Nationalism, Chs 5–6; Anderson, Java, Chs 4–7.

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  49. Id., pp. 125 ff; Smail, Bandung, pp. 55 ff.

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  50. Worsley, Third World, pp. 164 ff. See also: Oey Hong Lee, Indonesian Government, pp. 207–208; Anderson, Java, pp. 210 ff, 218, 245 ff, 284 ff, 332 ff; Anderson characterizes pemuda ideas as populist: Id., p. 267. For Soekarno’s own views on this matter see: Soe-karno, Indonesia Accuses! Soekarno’s Defence Oration in the Political Trial of 1930, pp. 49–112; and Soekarno, Soekarno’s Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka.

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  51. Anderson, Java, pp. 259. This applied particularly to West Java. Smail, Bandung, pp. 131 ff.

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  52. Anderson, Java, pp. 334 ff.

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  53. Ultimately, the tie with Masyumi (Anderson, Java, p. 222) proved to be more important than the sympathy for the radical pemuda movement in Surakarta, May–July 1946 (Id., pp. 364, 395). The transition from Muslim militancy in the revolution to the Dar’ul Islam movement in the Priangan is also enlightening. This concerned the rural based Sabilillah combat groups rather than the Hizbullah. Smail, Bandung, pp. 92–93, 128.

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  54. Anderson, Java, Ch. 10.

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  55. Id., Chs 12–16. It has been alleged that Malaka had Japanese contacts in a pan-Asiatic sphere: Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 118–119; Sluimers, ‘Enige theoretische beschouwingen over de Japanse bezettingstijd op Java’, in: Buiten de grenzen, pp. 265–266, p. 59; Poeze (Tan Malaka, Ch. X, pp. 49–50) states that there is no evidence whatsoever of such contacts. See, for the tensions in Surakarta, also: Soejatno, ‘Revolution and Social Tensions in Surakarta’, in: Indonesia, 17, April 1974, pp. 99–111.

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  56. Malaka’s radical minimum programme for the independence struggle did not touch the internal social contradictions, nor did it indicate how socialism should be realized. The populist conception of national unity was exposed in the socially heterogeneous leadership of the Persatuan Perdjuangan including members of the Masyumi and of the military establishment: Anderson, Java, pp. 290 ff. The social-democrats (Partai sosialis) were anti-fascists rather than socialists; moreover, the distance between the social democrats and the masses was very great. The communists were politically and organizationally divided; they co-operated closely with Sjahrir’s socia-democrats. Id., pp. 96 ff, 170 ff, 190 ff, 202 ff, 216–219, 345–347.

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  57. The SOBSI, by far the biggest trade confederation (founded 2–11–1946), was controlled by communists and did not play an autonomous role in the revolution. The Partai Buruh Indonesia represented one of the few efforts to emphasize autonomous action of the working class; yet it remained small in number and was partially absorbed by the PKI in 1948: Anderson, Java, pp. 212–216; Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 273, 277 ff, 300.

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  58. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 158–161; Hindley, Communist Party; p. 19; Anderson, Java, pp. 216–219.

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  59. Anderson, Java, Ch. 16.

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  60. Id., pp. 232, 267, 270 ff; Smail, Bandung, pp. 131 ff.

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  61. Hasibuan, Political Unionism, pp. 32 ff; Anderson, Java, pp. 118, 212–215.

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  62. Hasibuan, Political Unionism, pp. 38 ff.

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  63. For ‘Madiun’ see: Kahin. Nationalism, pp. 284. 303. For the transition from the Dimitrov- to the Zjdanow4ine: McVey, Calcutta Conference. A simple causal connection cannot be made between this conference and the revolts. Trager, ‘Impact’, in: Marxism, pp. 263 ff; Kautsky, Moscow, pp. 33–34; Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism, pp. 274 ff. The armed Pesindo movement which took part in the Madium rebellion, helped to fiercely crush the revolt of 3–7–1946 at Surakarta. Anderson, Java, pp. 401 ff.

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  64. Jay, Religion, pp. 28–29; Id., Javanese Villagers, pp. 278–279, 363.

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  65. For the Dutch colonial policy: Smit, De Indonesische quaestie; Kahin, Nationalism, Chs 7, 8, 11, 12; Tichelman, De Nederlandse koloniale politiek. No party programme expressed genuine concern for basic modification of the social power structure; but only vague antifeudal slogans. Anderson, Java, Ch. 10. Sjahrir’s Partai Rakjat Sosialis (founded November 1945) was almost the only one to introduce an anti-bureaucratic principle of an unspecified character. Id., p. 203.

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  66. This (temporary) vertical mobility tempted some observers to over-emphasize the revolutionary character of the social change in question. Van Doom (Orde-opstand-orde, pp. 60 ff) differentiates sharply between these changes and revolution; he criticizes Anderson’s use of the term ‘pemuda-revolution’. Anderson has convincingly demonstrated that suppression of the revolt initiated a consolidation of the social status quo. Anderson, Java, pp. 405 ff.

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  67. For the question of illegal occupation of estate land (‘squatting’): Feith, Decline, pp. 293–296, 308, 410–411, 552, 569–570, 596.

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  1. Fritjof Tichelman
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© 1980 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, The Hague

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Tichelman, F. (1980). Conflict and Movement. In: The Social Evolution of Indonesia. Studies in Social History, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8896-5_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8896-5_12

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