Abstract
Macroeconomic policy in the United States is very much the product of a decentralised control process, as is best exemplifed by the separation of monetary and fiscal policy. In the past two or three decades monetary and fiscal policy have not always been coordinated or based on the same objectives. There have been periods in which the objectives differed, and also periods in which the objectives were the same but the world views on which policies are based differed. It has been argued that decentralisation has limited our ability to control the economy effectively.
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© 1984 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster
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Neese, J.W., Pindyck, R.S. (1984). Behavioural Assumptions in Decentralised Stabilisation Policies. In: Hallett, A.J.H. (eds) Applied Decision Analysis and Economic Behaviour. Advanced Studies in Theoretical and Applied Econometrics, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6161-6_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6161-6_12
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