Abstract
Given the foregoing arguments against epistemic contextualism and epistemic coherentism, we are left with two nonskeptical accounts of inferential justification, namely, inferential justification via infinite justificatory regresses and inferential justification via immediately justified foundations. Although the former account of inferential justification is unpopular at present, the foundationalist must nonetheless eliminate it before he can claim that a regress argument supports his foundationalism. In Chapter I, I have questioned the likely argument that an evidence chain extending infinitely is inadequate for inferential justification since no matter how far back in such a chain we go we always find a proposition that is only inferentially justified. This argument apparently assumes that an evidence chain is adequate for inferential justification only if this chain includes some proposition that is immediately justified. But since this assumption is the very point at issue in the debate between the foundationalist and the proponent of infinite justificatory regresses, the foundationalist cannot rely on the argument in question. We must determine, then, whether the foundationalist can say anything more substantive in opposition to infinite justificatory regresses.
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Moser, P.K. (1985). Epistemic Foundationalism (I): Infinite Regresses, Externalism, and Reliabilism. In: Empirical Justification. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 34. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4526-5_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4526-5_4
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