Metatickles, Ratificationism, and Newcomb-Like Problems without Dominance

Abstract

Newcomb-like problems for evidential decision theories purport to depict situations in which choice-relevant features, while certainly causally independent of, are yet probabi1istically dependent on, actions in a way that makes patently choice-worthy and rational actions different from the actions prescribed or permitted by evidential decision theories. Responses to these problems cover a wide range. Some allege incoherence and irrelevance. Others stonewall: ‘Just one box for, me, thank you.’ Some maintain that when properly applied by an ideal agent such theories get the right answers and, for example, prescribe the taking of both boxes, not just one. Still others consist in conservative revisions of evidential decision theories that are held to get these supposedly right answers while remaining true to their evidential, Humean spirit. And some, made by radical revisionists, claim that in the end only causal decision theories can get all Newcomb-like problem cases right.

This paper is a revision and condensation, augmented by an appendix, of “Metatickles and Ratificationism,” PSA 1986, Volume 1. Condensation consists in suppression of discussion of prisoner’s dilemmas. The appendix provides background on Newcomb’s Problem. I am grateful to Włodzimierz Rabinowicz for criticism and useful suggestions.