Abstract
When one regards the life-world as the normative fundament, one has to face a problem: how can it be shown that such a position is compatible with the thesis that morality is autonomous? From the communicative ethics developed by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, one can find a possible way of demonstrating this compatibility. However, the basic difference between Apel’s and Habermas’ conception of communicative ethics has complicated the solution. Accordingly, it is necessary for us to clarify the difference between them, before showing how communicative ethics can at the same time maintain the autonomy of morality and the function of the life-world as the normative fundament.
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Notes
Apel, K-O., “Kann der postkantische Standpunkt der Moralität noch einmal in substantielle Sittlichkeit ‘aufgehoben’ werden?” (Ms.) 1985: pp. 21-22; p. 7; p. 14.
Habermas, J., Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln, Frankfurt. 1983: p. 131.
Apel (1985): p. 9.
Ibid.
Gadamer, H-G., Heideggers Wege, Tübingen. 1983: p. 143.
Apel (1985): p. 9.
Habermas (1983): pp. 91-92.
Apel (1985): p. 10.
Ibid.: p. 16.
Ibid.: p. 17.
Ibid.: p. 21.
Habermas (1983): p. 106.
Kwant, R. C, The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, Pittsburgh. 1963: pp. 159-160.
Habermas (1983): p. 106.
Waldenfels, B., Phänomenologie in Frankreich, Frankfurt. 1983: p. 164.
Kwant (1963): pp. 159–160.
Habermas (1983): pp. 107–108.
Ibid. Merleau-Ponty and Habermas are influenced by Piaget.
Habermas, J., Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans, by John McCarthy, Boston. 1979: p. 90. Instead of “generalizability,” we here use “universalizability.”
Habermas (1983): p. 41.
Cf. Ibid.: p. 119.
Ibid.: p. 68.
Ibid.
Ibid.: p. 119.
Habermas, J., Legitimation Crisis, trans, by John McCarthy, Boston. 1975: p. 159.
Habermas (1983): p. 116.
Tugendhat, E., Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, Berlin. 1967: pp. 201–211.
Habermas (1975): p. 159.
Cf. Honneth, A., “Diskursethik und implizites Gerechtigkeitskonzept” (Ms.) 1985: pp. 10–11.
Habermas, J., “Moral and Sittlichkeit. Treffen Hegels Einwände gegen Kant auch auf die Diskursethik zu?” (Ms.) 1985.
Kern, L, Husserls Verhälthnis zu Kant und zum Neokantianismus, (Dissertation) Louvain, 1961: p. 386. Here we mainly base our understanding of Husserl’s critique of Kantian ethical formalism on Kern’s excellent reconstructive exposition.
F I 20 (1920): p. 258, quoted according to Kern (1961): p. 389.
Kern (1961): p. 392.
Ibid.: p. 396.
Apel(1985):p.9.
Habermas, J., “A Reply to my Critics,” in Habermas: Critical Debates, ed. by J. B. Thompson and D. Held, London. 1982: p. 275.
Taylor, C, “Sprache und Gesellschaft” (Ms.) 1985: p. 8ff.
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© 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Wing-Cheuk, C. (1987). Phenomenology and Communicative Ethics. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Morality within the Life - and Social World. Analecta Husserliana, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3773-4_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3773-4_25
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